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ABSTRACT 
 
Historians have roundly criticized President Abraham Lincoln’s appointment of 
Union General Ambrose Burnside to the command of the Army of the Potomac in the 
fall of 1862. Many have viewed Burnside, who subsequently suffered a severe defeat at 
the Battle of Fredericksburg, as an incapable general who should never have been 
elevated to this position. By the fall of 1862, however, Burnside was in fact the logical 
choice for the command. He had achieved a great deal of success in an independent 
command in North Carolina, a campaign that has far too often been ignored, and he had 
become a hero in the eyes of the Northern public and the Northern press. Therefore, this 
thesis draws on a vast array of previously untapped Union and Confederate archival 
documents, pertaining both to the military and civilian spheres, to illustrate Burnside’s 
rise to prominence and high command, and demonstrate why Lincoln thought so highly 
of the general. 
Because no Union generals had pre-war experience handling large armies, 
Lincoln’s selection of commanders to lead the Army of the Potomac was not a simple 
process. He ultimately came to rely on two primary criteria: demonstrated success in the 
field and public opinion. Burnside’s victories at Roanoke Island, New Bern, and Fort 
Macon in the first half of 1862 not only displayed military ability, but made the public 
think very highly of him. Therefore, it is essential that his rise to command be linked 
with his earlier successes. This thesis does so by providing one of the first archival based 
accounts of Burnside’s 1862 campaign on the North Carolina coast (commonly referred 
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to as Burnside’s expedition), and analyzing the Northern response to that campaign. It 
also examines Lincoln’s decision making process in selecting commanders and thus 
sheds light on the complex restraints that wartime presidents are forced to operate under. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Near the end of January 1862, President Abraham Lincoln and Major General 
George Brinton McClellan received a report on a Union military expedition that had 
been sent to the North Carolina coast. The expedition, under the command of Brigadier 
General Ambrose Burnside, had been struggling to cross into the North Carolina sounds 
and had been hit with violent storms that wrecked several vessels. While he listened to 
the report, McClellan took notes, but remained mostly silent. When Lincoln, however, 
learned of the setbacks, he was greatly disheartened. The President rose from his chair 
and exclaimed to the room, “I see. It is all a failure. This is very discouraging.”1 But 
within weeks, Burnside would provide ample evidence that his expedition was anything 
but a failure, by winning a complete victory at Roanoke Island, and thereafter following 
it with several others. Lincoln’s despair would subsequently turn to gratitude, much of 
which he reserved for the general who had done so much to prove his gloomy prediction 
of failure wrong. 
Up until February of 1862, the Civil War had not gone well for the North. After 
the Confederacy inaugurated the conflict by firing on Union-held Fort Sumter in April of 
1861, little had happened to shake the South’s belief that it could win independence. The 
Confederates had won the first major battle of the war at Bull Run in July, and achieved 
                                                 
1 F. Sheldon to Ambrose Burnside, 2 February 1862, Record Group (RG) 94, Ambrose E. Burnside 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, National Archives (NA). 
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several smaller victories in both the Eastern and Western Theaters in the following 
months. Though the North’s newly minted Army of the Potomac, under the command of 
McClellan, had been growing greatly in numbers and training religiously around 
Washington, McClellan had yet to unleash it, despite the urgings of many Northern 
citizens and newspapers. Every day made Northern politicians, soldiers, and citizens 
more restless for a significant military victory, but until Burnside thundered down upon 
the North Carolina coast, no such victory had yet been won.2 
Nearly all Civil War historians have depicted Burnside as a strategically and 
tactically bankrupt Union general, who should never have received command of the 
Union’s most celebrated fighting force, the aforementioned Army of the Potomac, in 
November of 1862. This conventional wisdom, which blindly regurgitates the criticisms 
of a select few other Union generals and early scholars of the conflict, distorts the 
historical picture because it largely overlooks the factors that actually influenced Lincoln 
to give Burnside the command. Between February and May of 1862, Burnside invaded 
North Carolina and captured the vital post of Roanoke Island, the harbors of New Bern 
and Beaufort, and a large swatch of that state’s richest agricultural land on its eastern 
seaboard. Though the battles Burnside fought never involved more than 13,000 Union 
and 5,000 Confederate soldiers, they were clear-cut victories at a time when Union 
successes, particularly in the Eastern Theater, were sorely lacking. It was these victories 
                                                 
2 Burnside’s first victory happened almost simultaneously with General Ulysses S. Grant’s taking of Forts 
Henry and Donelson in Tennessee. The connection between Burnside and Grant’s successes will be 
explored in Chapter 3. 
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that catapulted Burnside to prominence, in the estimation of the army, of Lincoln, and, 
just as importantly, of the Northern press and public. A careful analysis of the military’s 
and of the Northern public’s understanding of and reaction to the North Carolina 
campaign (commonly referred to as “Burnside’s expedition”) shows that Lincoln’s 
appointment of Burnside was not only understandable, but in fact it made perfect sense, 
once the decision was made to remove McClellan from his post. 
Burnside’s initial orders for the North Carolina campaign, as relayed by 
McClellan, who also served for a time as general in chief of the Union armies, were to 
seize Roanoke Island and capture its garrison, then descend upon the coastal town of 
New Bern. After taking that town, Burnside was to move south to Beaufort and open the 
port there by reducing Fort Macon, which guarded the seaward approaches.3 Burnside’s 
expedition set sail from Annapolis in January of 1862, and by late April, he had 
accomplished all of these tasks. Roanoke Island and its entire garrison of around 2,500 
men surrendered on 8 February. Burnside then seized New Bern on 14 March after 
routing the Confederate defenders guarding the town, and on 26 April, he reduced Fort 
Macon and captured its defenders, leaving Union forces in control of a large part of 
North Carolina’s eastern seaboard. 
The primary reason the prevailing historical opinion regarding Burnside’s 
appointment has been allowed to stand largely unchallenged is the lack of attention paid 
                                                 
3 George McClellan to Ambrose Burnside, 7 January 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 3, NA. 
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to this expedition, and to the Northern public’s reaction to its victories and to the general 
who won them. A careful analysis of Burnside’s expedition, of its successes and results, 
and of the fervor it produced in the North proves that the existing historiography can and 
should be challenged based on a close reading of primary sources and a willingness to 
question what many historians have uncritically accepted. 
Histories of the Civil War as a whole generally fall into two categories as regards 
Burnside’s expedition: those that ignore it entirely, and those that give the battles 
cursory attention but fail to draw out their implications at any length. An example of the 
first is Russell F. Weigley’s study of the war, which contains absolutely no mention of 
Burnside’s expedition in over 450 pages of body text.4 Conversely, historians such as 
Shelby Foote, James McPherson, Richard Beringer, and Donald Stoker have discussed 
the expedition as part of the Union’s overall strategy and provided brief descriptions of 
the battles. These authors tend to praise the expedition for isolating Norfolk (home of the 
Confederacy’s best navy yard), providing bases that strengthened the Union blockade, 
and threatening a number of key railroads the Confederacy relied on to supply its armies 
in Virginia, most notably the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad. This, in turn, helped to 
draw Confederate attention and troops away from Virginia to North Carolina, but these 
historians (not without reason) are largely critical of the Union’s failure not to advance 
further into the interior of North Carolina and make stronger efforts to cut these very 
                                                 
4 Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865 (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2000). 
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railways. All of their works, however, stop short of examining the campaign’s effect on 
Northern morale and on Burnside’s reputation.5 
It would be entirely incorrect to assert that no historian has discussed at length 
elements of Burnside’s expedition. Both John G. Barrett and Dan L. Morrill devoted 
significant portions of their books on the Civil War in North Carolina to Burnside’s 
invasion of the state in 1862. Morrill’s study, however, is a relatively straightforward 
operational history, which relies almost exclusively on secondary works and the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. While the Official Records are 
undoubtedly a valuable source, they are limited mostly to official correspondence and 
are not adequate to tell the entire story of the campaign. Morrill’s work is, in fact, 
backed by virtually none of his own archival research. And though it devotes chapters to 
Burnside’s victories at Roanoke, New Bern, and Fort Macon, it is devoid of any 
discussion of the actual effects of these victories.6 Barrett’s work is more thoroughly 
researched, but it tends to lean heavily on Confederate documents and overlooks several 
key archival sources, most notably Burnside’s own manuscript collections. Furthermore, 
its focus is largely confined to detailing the operational aspects of the expedition, as well 
                                                 
5 Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Vintage Books, 
1986), 222-232; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 372-403; Richard Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. 
Still Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1986) 125-138, 205-
211; Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
 
6 Dan L. Morrill, The Civil War in the Carolinas (Charleston, S.C.: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing 
Company of America, 2002), 237-291. 
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as the expedition’s immediate effects on the state of North Carolina. Because both 
historians’ studies were centered on the war in North Carolina, they leave out any 
analysis of the results of Burnside’s victories on the people of the North, or on the 
general himself.7 
Other scholars have produced excellent works on individual aspects of 
Burnside’s expedition. Robert M. Browning Jr. has written the definitive history of the 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, including its contributions to Burnside’s victories, 
while also showing how Burnside’s capture of Roanoke Island and the harbors of 
Beaufort and New Bern strengthened the Union blockade by providing ports which 
could be used as coal depots and repair stations.8 Barton A. Myers has investigated how 
the Union Army’s presence in North Carolina led to unregulated guerrilla warfare and 
retaliatory violence, which intersected with issues of race, political loyalty, and social 
order, and ultimately led to growing disaffection with the war among citizens in some of 
the eastern counties of the state.9 Similarly, Judkin Browning has detailed how the Union 
occupation of eastern North Carolina forced Confederate citizens to choose allegiances 
and negotiate neutrality, while also examining the occupation’s effects on slaves and on 
                                                 
7 John G. Barrett, The Civil War in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1963). 
 
8 Robert M. Browning Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron 
during the Civil War (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1993). 
 
9 Barton A. Myers, Executing Daniel Bright: Race, Loyalty, and Guerrilla Violence in a Coastal Carolina 
Community, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009). 
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the Union soldiers themselves.10 Patricia Click too has produced a narrative history of 
the expedition’s interaction with the black population of North Carolina, focusing 
particularly on the establishment, growth, and demise of the freedmen’s colony founded 
on Roanoke Island in 1862.11 Though these works are all very valuable in their own 
right, none discuss the effects of the expedition outside the state of North Carolina, nor 
do they trace how the success of the expedition affected Burnside’s career trajectory. 
Therefore, discussion of Burnside’s rise to command of the Army of the Potomac 
is to be found mostly in studies of that army, or of Lincoln’s dealings with his generals. 
Due to the fact that these works are divorced from analysis of the North Carolina 
campaign itself, which was in all actuality the reason Burnside eventually received the 
command, they provide an unclear picture of why Lincoln viewed Burnside as the right 
choice for the command. In large part because historians do not wed these two events, 
Burnside and Lincoln have received a great deal of historical censure related to this 
appointment. This criticism has been based primarily on Burnside’s subsequent failure at 
the Battle of Fredericksburg in December of 1862. It also stems in part from Burnside’s 
earlier refusals of the command of the Army of the Potomac. Historians have used these 
points to argue that Burnside himself believed that he was neither capable nor worthy of 
commanding the Army of the Potomac; Fredericksburg merely confirmed what all 
                                                 
10 Judkin Browning, Shifting Loyalties: The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
 
11 Patricia C. Click, Time Full of Trial: The Roanoke Island Freedmen’s Colony, 1862-1867 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
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should have already understood about Burnside’s military ability (or lack thereof). To 
the detriment of history, discussion of Burnside’s noted success in North Carolina in 
early 1862 rarely finds its way into these analyses, and when it does, it is too often given 
merely a passing mention. 
After Burnside had suffered defeat at Fredericksburg, the Provost Marshal 
General of the Army of the Potomac, Marsena Patrick, expressed his belief that Burnside 
was “unfit to be in any separate command.”12 In making this assertion, Patrick 
completely ignored the significant successes Burnside had earlier won in such a separate 
command in North Carolina. The opinions of historians, however, have followed along 
much the same lines as Patrick’s. In 1952, noted Civil War historian Bruce Catton 
charged in his lauded history of the Army of the Potomac that Lincoln made a great 
mistake in elevating Burnside to command of that army. As Catton saw it, “Burnside 
was about as incompetent a general as Abraham Lincoln ever commissioned…A man 
who moved from disaster to disaster.” Catton’s assertion that Burnside never 
demonstrated promise as a general completely overlooked the fact that by the fall of 
1862, the Northern press, public, and even Lincoln saw Burnside as a rising star and the 
best choice to take the command.13 Furthermore, Catton’s claim that Burnside 
“apparently understood only one way of fighting: that was to put your head down and go 
straight forward, attacking the enemy where he was stronger” was based solely on the 
                                                 
12 Marsena R. Patrick, Inside Lincoln’s Army: The Diary of Marsena Rudolph Patrick, Provost Marshal 
General, Army of the Potomac, ed. David S. Sparks (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1964), 311. 
 
13 Bruce Catton, Glory Road (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 19-20. 
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general’s actions at Fredericksburg, and wholly discounted the rather innovative 
combined arms tactics and successful flank movements that Burnside used to secure his 
victories at Roanoke Island and New Bern.14 
Warren W. Hassler Jr. was another historian who argued against the replacement 
of McClellan with Burnside, who Hassler saw as slow, blundering, and severely limited 
in tactical ability. Like Catton, Hassler ignored Burnside’s success in North Carolina, 
and went so far as to incorrectly claim that the detachment of Burnside’s division to the 
North Carolina shore actually hindered McClellan’s operations on the Peninsula in the 
spring of 1862.15 These views continue to hold prominence; in 2011, Albert Castel 
stated, “In twice declining command of the Army of the Potomac on the grounds that he 
was unqualified for the post, Burnside spoke the truth…Lincoln displayed poor 
judgment by in effect forcing him to assume command of the Army.”16 Like those before 
him, Castel paid virtually no attention to Burnside’s earlier victories or to the North’s 
reaction to them. Indeed, Castel completely eschewed any discussion of the effect of 
Roanoke, New Bern, and Fort Macon on Northern morale and on Burnside’s growing 
reputation, choosing instead to claim that it was only General Ulysses S. Grant’s seizure 
                                                 
14 Bruce Catton, Reflections on the Civil War, ed. John Leekley (New York: Doubleday, 1981), 90. Catton 
went on to claim, “The maneuvers, the flanking movements, the feints and passes, which enable a soldier 
to find a weak spot and then exploit it, weren’t in Burnside’s repertoire.” 
 
15 Warren W. Hassler Jr., General George B. McClellan: Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1957), 77, 322. In actuality, McClellan saw Burnside’s operations on the coast as a 
key part of his overall strategy to take Richmond, as evidenced by his orders to Burnside. 
 
16 Albert Castel, Victors in Blue: How Union Generals Fought the Confederates, Battled Each Other, and 
Won the Civil War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 174. 
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of Forts Henry and Donelson that elated the North in the spring of 1862.17 The opinions 
of these historians have colored the perception of Burnside to the present day. Indeed, 
even before Castel’s book was published, Gary Gallagher pointed out that “Civil War 
scholarship reaches an almost perfect consensus about Ambrose E. Burnside’s 
competence to command an army…Burnside lumbers through innumerable accounts as 
a well-meaning but pitifully inept officer.”18 
There are, however, a select few historians who have provided more nuanced 
views of Burnside’s abilities and of Lincoln’s appointment of him. One of the first to do 
so was T. Harry Williams, who contended that “Burnside had done well in North 
Carolina, and Lincoln thought well of him for it.” Williams was right to point out that, in 
November of 1862, Burnside “seemed the best choice among the corps generals,” 
because the others were either old, McClellan disciples, or junior in rank to Burnside 
himself.19 But Williams failed to detail Burnside’s record of success, merely stating that 
the general had “seized some points on the coast of North Carolina.” By not discussing 
these victories in North Carolina, or their significant impact on Northern morale, 
Williams failed to show just why Lincoln thought so highly of Burnside, and therefore 
Burnside seems more like the choice by default. Furthermore, avoiding mention of 
Burnside’s successes in North Carolina made it easy for Williams to revert back to the 
                                                 
17 Castel, Victors in Blue, 50-51. 
 
18 Gary W. Gallagher, ed., The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), ix. 
 
19 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1952), 182. 
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standard interpretation that Burnside “did not have the brains” to command the Army of 
the Potomac, and that the general had therefore been right when he had twice previously 
declined the command.20 
In his analysis of Lincoln as Commander in Chief, James M. McPherson, perhaps 
the most well-respected Civil War authority of his generation, claimed that “[i]n 
retrospect it appears that [Lincoln] made several wrong appointments to command the 
Army of the Potomac. Yet in each case the general he named seemed to be the best man 
for the job.”21 Like Williams, McPherson noted that Burnside had achieved success in 
independent command in North Carolina, and seemed the “logical choice” in November 
of 1862.22 But McPherson too devoted almost no attention to Burnside’s expedition. 
Though this was admittedly not the focus of his study, the result is that McPherson failed 
to demonstrate the importance of Burnside’s earlier victories, or discuss how the press’ 
and the public’s reaction to them influenced Lincoln in naming Burnside to the 
command. Therefore, there is little evidence in McPherson’s work to back up his 
lukewarm assertion that Burnside was the logical choice for the job. Furthermore, 
McPherson repeated the all too familiar argument that “Burnside genuinely believed that 
                                                 
20 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 110, 180. 
 
21 James M. McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2008), 266. 
 
22 McPherson, Tried by War, 266. Historian George C. Rable has made a similar claim, stating that 
Burnside’s appointment “seemed prudent” and that in November 1862, “hardly anyone had anything bad 
to say about the general, at least publicly.” But because Rable’s focus was the Battle of Fredericksburg, he 
too did not detail Burnside’s successes in North Carolina, nor provide evidence that made it clear why the 
promotion of Burnside to command of the army did seem, in fact, prudent. See George C. Rable, 
Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 50-54. 
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he was unqualified to command so large a force as the Army of the Potomac.”23 While it 
is true that the general had twice previously declined the command and given this as the 
official reason, McPherson and others completely ignore any alternative potential 
motives for Burnside doing so, such as his excessive modesty and his strong friendship 
with the commander who he was asked to replace, McClellan. Though it is impossible to 
say just how sincere Burnside was in his conviction that he was not fit to handle a large 
army, simply claiming that Burnside’s refusals are evidence that he should not have been 
placed in command perpetuate the myth of Burnside the incapable and also ignore the 
fact that Lincoln was willing to overlook what he perceived as Burnside’s modest 
refusals because he fully believed that the general was capable of winning victories. 
As may be expected, the most thorough analysis to date of Burnside’s rise to 
command of the Army of the Potomac is that in the only modern scholarly biography of 
the general, written by William Marvel. Marvel, who is undoubtedly sympathetic to 
Burnside, argues that his reputation was poisoned by officers of the Army of the 
Potomac, most notably McClellan himself, and posits that Burnside “may be the most 
maligned figure of the war.”24 Although Marvel certainly devotes adequate attention to 
Burnside’s expedition, his study is lacking in several key areas. He correctly notes that 
                                                 
23 McPherson, Tried by War, 113. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the Civil War, printed 20 years 
earlier, McPherson had also pointed to Burnside’s refusals as evidence that the general “considered 
himself unqualified to command the Army of the Potomac. This conviction would all too soon be 
confirmed.” See McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 570. 
 
24 William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), xii, 122-126, 134, 
148-150. 
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Burnside’s victory at Roanoke was the first significant Union success after a string of 
defeats, but his assertion that Grant’s victories in the West overshadowed those of 
Burnside obscures the fact that the public saw these events as one turning point, and did 
not weigh them against each other, but rather gave a great deal of recognition to both. In 
addition, though he points out that Burnside’s victories “precipitated [a] flurry of 
congratulations,” he devotes less than one paragraph to this, and therefore largely 
ignores the accolades that the press, the Northern public, and the War Department 
heaped on Burnside, which were in fact driving factors behind the general’s ascension to 
high command.25 Indeed, throughout his discussion of Burnside’s rise to command, 
Marvel appears more focused on blasting holes in the claims of the general’s detractors 
than on proving just how influential the North Carolina victories were on Burnside’s 
reputation. 
One Civil War historian has recently lamented the notion that “[a]ny author who 
claims to proffer new information or a novel point of view regarding the Civil War is 
likely to appear naïve, if not arrogant and prone to braggadocio and hyperbole.”26 Yet 
this is a risk any good historian must be willing to run, as new or previously 
underutilized sources continually provide the means to present clearer, or more nuanced, 
pictures of the past. For despite both the longevity and support of the belief that 
Burnside was unfit for the command and that it was a mistake for Lincoln to appoint him 
                                                 
25 Marvel, Burnside, 77. 
 
26 Brent Nosworthy, Roll Call to Destiny: The Soldier’s Eye View of Civil War Battlefields (New York: 
Basic Books, 2008), 7. 
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to such, this argument is ripe to be challenged. Primary sources, both archival and 
published, indicate that historians have been far too simplistic in condemning Burnside’s 
appointment. Most importantly, they have read the merit of the appointment backwards, 
based on Burnside’s defeat at Fredericksburg, rather than forwards, based on the success 
Burnside had experienced as an independent commander in eastern North Carolina in the 
early months of 1862. This study will show how the overwhelmingly positive response 
to Burnside’s expedition catapulted the general to prominence and greatly elevated his 
reputation in the eyes of the press, the public, and of Lincoln and the War Department, 
and thus made Burnside the natural choice for commander of the Army of the Potomac 
in November of 1862. 
Attention to the collective reaction to Burnside’s victories in North Carolina has 
so far been the missing piece of the puzzle in historical analyses of his rise to command. 
Linking Burnside’s victories on the battlefields of North Carolina to the response to 
them among citizens, newspapers, politicians, and soldiers of the North is essential 
because it connects the civilian and military spheres, which always interplayed 
throughout the war. As historians such as Gallagher and Kathryn Meier point out, “Any 
study of the Civil War that slights the fundamental importance of military affairs to 
Americans at the time can yield only a flawed understanding of our greatest national 
trauma.” Therefore, attention to the battles themselves is important, but it is only one 
half of a two way street. While, as these authors note, “Victories and defeats and 
changes in leadership in national armies heavily influenced how people on the home 
front viewed the conflict and its likely outcome,” so too did the Northern public’s view 
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of the war’s progress and of the capabilities of the generals entrusted to make that 
progress affect military affairs themselves.27 More than once, Lincoln relented to public 
pressure when making military decisions; a perfect example of this was his ordering of 
General Irvin McDowell to engage the Confederate force at Bull Run in the summer of 
1861, spurred on by the demand of Northern newspapers, despite McDowell’s repeated 
claims that his army was not yet ready for battle. 
Attention to the connection between the civilian, political, and military spheres in 
1862 is also crucial because it provides insight into American history as a whole. By the 
end of Burnside’s campaign, Daniel Reed Larned, the general’s personal secretary, who 
handled the majority of his correspondence, was growing tired of all the suggestions he 
had received from civilians about what movements the expedition should make. As 
Larned contended, it was easy to watch events from a distance “and suggest and ask why 
this and that was not done, because you cannot tell what influences are brought to bear 
upon the different points.”28 Larned’s assertion holds just as much weight when 
analyzing Lincoln’s process in selecting Burnside for high command. As is true of all 
presidents, particularly during wartime, Lincoln had to weigh many influences as he 
made such important decisions as who would lead the Union’s largest army. Though he 
ultimately retained the final say, it is undeniable that the Commander in Chief worked 
                                                 
27 Gary Gallagher and Kathryn Meier. “Coming to Terms with Civil War History,” Journal of the Civil 
War Era 4, no. 4 (December 2014): 494, 501. 
 
28 Larned to Brother-in-law Henry, 16 May 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 2: Correspondence, 15 
May 1862 – 24 October 1862, Library of Congress (LOC). 
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under certain constraints. Historians, writing with the benefit of hindsight, are far too 
fond of criticizing military judgments made by wartime presidents while ignoring the 
realities under which they operated. This, in turn, yields flawed understandings of those 
men who have had to lead the country during the most trying times of its existence. In 
the case of Lincoln, he did not base his choices solely on public opinion, but neither 
could he afford to ignore it entirely. And when it came to sizing up Burnside as a 
commander, Lincoln’s thoughts on the general’s capabilities actually ran parallel to what 
the Northern public, and particularly the press, was saying. Therefore, it would have 
been more surprising if the President had ignored the clamoring of the Northern 
newspapers and named someone other than Burnside to the command of the Army of the 
Potomac in the fall of 1862. 
Fortunately, there are ample sources that provide a bridge of evidence which 
spans the distance between Burnside’s early successes and his rise to command of the 
Union’s largest army. Burnside’s manuscript collections in both the Rhode Island 
Historical Society and the National Archives (under record group 94), as well as the 
manuscript collection of Larned, housed in the Library of Congress, contain ingoing and 
outgoing correspondence of both a military and a personal nature. This correspondence, 
particularly that from private citizens, sheds light on the elation felt in the North upon 
Burnside’s victories, as well as on the general’s growing military reputation. So too does 
an analysis of the major Northern newspapers and illustrated periodicals, particularly 
those printed in New York, the undisputable news hub of the Northern states. The 
accolades showered on Burnside by the New York Times, New York Tribune, New York 
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Herald, Harper’s Weekly, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, and others show that 
the general had become one of the unquestioned heroes of the Republic by the summer 
of 1862. They also helped to influence Lincoln’s decision making process as he selected 
a commander to replace McClellan. These sources and others make it clear that the 
public not only thought highly of Burnside, but in fact lauded his appointment and 
expressed great pleasure with his military movements all the way up until his defeat at 
the Battle of Fredericksburg. 
In order to present a nuanced, archival based account of Burnside’s expedition, 
this thesis also utilizes multiple Confederate manuscript collections in addition to those 
of Burnside and Larned. The official and personal correspondence of Generals Daniel 
Harvey Hill and Richard Gatlin, who commanded in North Carolina, as well as that of 
the state’s governor, Henry T. Clark, are invaluable in determining the state of 
Confederate defenses on the North Carolina coast in 1861-1862, how North Carolina and 
the Confederate government in Richmond tried (and failed) to stem the tide of 
Burnside’s advance, and what the immediate effects of Burnside’s victories were both on 
Southern morale and on the Confederate war effort. Attention to the Confederate side of 
the story is essential because it allows for a full understanding of Burnside’s expedition 
and it demonstrates that it was not only those in the North who viewed Burnside’s 
victories as significant military events. As these archival sources make clear, the loss of 
Roanoke Island in particular caused panic in North Carolina and Virginia, led to a 
Congressional investigation that resulted in the removal of the Confederate Secretary of 
War, and even forced Confederate President Jefferson Davis to use martial law for the 
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first time in the conflict, an action he had previously claimed that he would not take. 
Therefore, because this thesis incorporates a balance of Union and Confederate archival 
sources as of yet unmatched by any historian who has studied Burnside’s expedition, it 
provides a new and more thorough view of this long underestimated campaign. 
At the outset of Burnside’s expedition, at a time when his fleet was being 
battered by storms off Hatteras Inlet and prospects appeared grave, one of his soldiers 
recorded a prophetic diary entry. As David L. Day, a private in the 25th Massachusetts 
Volunteer Infantry, postulated, “If the general, by the blessing of God, gets the 
expedition out of this scrape, and is successful where he strikes, it will give him great 
prestige, and he will be thought competent for any command.”29 This was, in fact, 
precisely how events came to pass. Therefore, this thesis will consist of two parts, each 
composed of two chapters. The first part is an in-depth narrative of Burnside’s 
expedition that emphasizes not only the general’s victories but also the conception of his 
campaign, as well as Confederate problems and decision-making in regard to the defense 
of eastern North Carolina. Therefore, the second chapter (following the introduction, 
which is listed as chapter one) will examine the background and formation of Burnside’s 
expedition, as well as the state of Confederate defenses in eastern North Carolina in 
1861-1862, and the back and forth debate between North Carolina and the Confederate 
government in Richmond over the importance of defending this region. An 
                                                 
29 Entry for 23 January 1862, in David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Massachusetts 
Volunteer Infantry (Milford, Mass.: King & Billings, 1884), 26. 
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understanding of the difficulty Confederate commanders such as Generals Hill and 
Gatlin faced in preparing for an invasion they long expected is absolutely essential to an 
understanding of Burnside’s victories. The third chapter will then detail the expedition 
itself and its successes, as well as its immediate results for both the state of North 
Carolina and the Confederacy more generally. These were numerous and far-reaching 
and ranged from a sharp drop in Southern morale, to Confederate fears for the safety of 
Norfolk and the vital Weldon Railroad, and even to the restriction of civil liberties in 
some areas of southern Virginia and eastern North Carolina. 
The second half of the thesis shifts its attention from the South to the North, and 
discusses the consequences of Burnside’s expedition in the Union, focusing primarily on 
how the reaction of the Northern press and public as well as of Lincoln’s administration 
and the War Department to this campaign ultimately led to the ascension of Burnside to 
the command of the Army of the Potomac. The fourth chapter will discuss the Northern 
reaction to Burnside’s victories, the general’s growing prestige, and his first two refusals 
of command. Finally, the fifth chapter will address Lincoln’s decision making process in 
selecting a commander, how Burnside fit the criteria Lincoln looked for, the bestowing 
of command on Burnside in November 1862, and the immediate reaction to this change 
in commanders, which was almost wholly positive. 
Both those who write history and those who read it should always keep in mind 
the caveat provided by another Civil War officer, Confederate Henry Kyd Douglas: 
“History can never know the whole truth. The historian may analyze, investigate, and 
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speculate until he is weary…yet his conclusion will fall short of the truth.”30 Yet we 
must also pay heed to historian George C. Rable’s contention that good military history 
“means treating the people involved as full human beings.”31 Judging the wisdom of 
Burnside’s appointment strictly based on hindsight does not allow the historian to do 
this. Burnside was not an incapable dolt who received command of the Army of the 
Potomac simply by default, and Lincoln was not naïve in appointing a general he 
honestly believed had the best chance to lead Union forces to victory, based on 
Burnside’s existing military record. The decision of Lincoln must be read in the context 
of the information that he had available in November of 1862, not that which revealed 
itself afterwards, via the disaster at Fredericksburg. Only in this way can a proper 
understanding be reached of both the general and the Commander in Chief. 
On 26 December 1861, Lincoln sent Burnside, who was assembling his 
expedition, a short telegram. It stated, “It is of great importance you should move as 
soon as possible. Consumption of time is killing us.”32 Within a few weeks, Burnside 
would sail for the North Carolina coast. Yet the echoes of this movement reverberated 
far beyond the Carolina shore. In fact, they would culminate in Burnside receiving 
                                                 
30 Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode with Stonewall, ed. Fletcher M. Green (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1940), 42. 
 
31 Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 5. 
 
32 Lincoln to Burnside, 26 December 1861, in Roy P. Basler ed., The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln: Supplement 2 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 39. 
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command of the Union’s largest and most prestigious army less than a year later. 
Therefore, it is to the conception and formation of the expedition itself that we now turn.
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CHAPTER II 
“THE WOLF IS AT THE DOOR”: THE PERILOUS POSITION OF NORTH 
CAROLINA AND THE FORMATION OF THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION 
Throughout the turbulent summer of 1861, four men met frequently at the 
Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. As the Union field army around 
Washington, later to be known as the Army of the Potomac, prepared for what 
Northerners hoped would be a decisive confrontation with the principle Confederate 
force at Manassas, these men planned a strategy for a longer war. Alexander Dallas 
Bache, John G. Barnard, Charles H. Davis, and Samuel Francis Du Pont formed what 
would be known as the Blockade Strategy Board, and it was the recommendations of 
these men that would set in motion a course of events that would ultimately lead to the 
invasion of North Carolina by General Ambrose Burnside’s Coast Division in the 
beginning of 1862.1 
 The primary purpose of the Blockade Board was to determine the best means to 
enforce Abraham Lincoln’s blockade, which the President had proclaimed at the outset 
of the war in April.2 Lincoln, particularly after the Union’s defeat at the Battle of Bull 
                                                 
1 Robert M. Browning Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron 
during the Civil War (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 8-10. Bache was the 
superintendent of the United States Coast Survey, Barnard the chief engineer of the Army Department of 
Washington, Davis another old member of the Coast Survey, and Du Pont a high ranking naval officer 
who had experience with blockades from his service in the Mexican American War. Bache had proposed 
the Board in May 1861, and Du Pont chaired it. See also Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and 
the U.S. Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 93-95, and Gustavus V. Fox to Samuel F. 
Du Pont, 22 May 1861, in John D. Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis Du Pont: A Selection from his Civil War 
Letters, Vol. 1, The Mission: 1860-1862 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 71. 
 
2 “Proclamation of a Blockade,” 19 April 1861, in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln, Vol. 4: 1860-1861 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 338-339, 346-347. On 
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Run in July, wanted the blockade to be “pushed forward with all possible dispatch,” and 
so the Board’s tasks were to outline the hydrographic conditions along the coasts of the 
Confederacy, and recommend strategic points to be seized which would serve as bases 
and also interrupt the activity of Confederate blockade runners.3 The Board would 
eventually go defunct in October 1861, but not before it pushed for the seizure of several 
key places on the North Carolina coast, among them Hatteras Inlet, Beaufort, and several 
towns along the Chowan, Roanoke, Pamlico, and Neuse Rivers.4 
 The North Carolina coast received particular attention from the Board because of 
its strategic significance, and the headaches it was causing for the Union Navy. 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis had issued his own proclamation in response to 
Lincoln’s April call for 75,000 militia to put down the rebellion, urging privateers to 
apply for letters of marque and aid the Confederate government by attacking Union 
vessels anywhere they could be found.5 As Confederate Secretary of State Robert 
Toombs explained, “It is only by the use of privateers that we can now encounter the 
                                                 
19 April, Lincoln had declared a blockade of the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and on 27 April had extended this blockade to cover the ports of 
Virginia and North Carolina. 
 
3 “Memoranda of Military Policy Suggested by the Bull Run Defeat,” 23 July 1861, in Basler, ed., 
Collected Works, Vol. 4: 1860-1861, 457; Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis Du Pont: A Selection from his Civil 
War Letters, Vol. 1, The Mission: 1860-1862, lxviii. 
 
4 Stoker, Grand Design, 95; Browning Jr., Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 9-10. 
 
5 Davis, “A Proclamation,” 17 April 1861, in James D. Richardson ed., A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Confederacy, Including Diplomatic Correspondence 1861-1865, Vol. 1 (Nashville, 
Tenn.: United States Publishing Company, 1905), 60-61. 
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United States upon the high seas. It is the only weapon of maritime defense left to us.”6 
Many of these privateers operated from the North Carolina sounds, particularly the 
harbor at Beaufort, which was protected by Fort Macon and viewed by North Carolina 
Governor John Willis Ellis as “the best, shortest, and most accessible refuge for 
privateers.”7 These privateers used the Hatteras lighthouse as a lookout for merchantmen 
and were protected by the dangerous coast and rough waters off Hatteras Inlet, thus 
ensuring them a large measure of success.8  
But as time passed, the very success of these privateers made North Carolina a 
Union target. As Brigadier General Walter Gwynn, charged with the defense of the 
North Carolina coast, pointed out to the Secretary of the Military Board of the state, 
Warren Winslow, “The better [the privateers] do in taking prizes, the more likely it will 
become that an attack will be made.” Those engaged in privateering well understood 
this; as one man from Beaufort wrote to Winslow, “As we are taking prizes and 
privateers from Wilmington and Charleston are coming here the U.S. will certainly make 
some effort to break up this nest; that is if they have not been bereft of their senses.”9 
                                                 
6 Toombs to William L. Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and William D. Mann, 18 May 1861, in Richardson, ed., 
Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, Vol. 2, 27. Yancey, Rost, and Mann were the Confederate 
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7 Ellis to Jefferson Davis, 25 April 1861, in John W. Ellis, The Papers of John Willis Ellis, Vol. 2: 1860-
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Carolina State Archives (NCSA). 
 
 25 
 
The commander of the forts at Hatteras, Major W.S.G. Andrews, tried to prevent the 
news of the numerous captures from spreading, but remarked that he was largely 
unsuccessful in doing so. Indeed, Governor Henry T. Clark, Ellis’s replacement, grew 
increasingly worried that the success of the privateers had made the state more 
vulnerable.10 
Because the vast majority of the North Carolina coast was shielded by a series of 
barrier islands which stretched from Cape Henry, Virginia down to Bogue Inlet, below 
Beaufort, penetrated by only a few inlets, the only way for Union forces to stop the 
privateering and blockade running was to gain control of the inlets and the interior 
waterways, particularly Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. Both the stormy waters and the 
small size of the Union Navy at the outset of the war made it a logistical impossibility 
for the North to station an adequate number of vessels at each inlet, so the most effective 
way to deal with this problem was to capture them, particularly Hatteras, which was the 
only inlet navigable by large ships.11 
                                                 
10 Andrews to Clark, 2 August 1861, Governor Henry T. Clark Papers, G.P. 153, Folder 1, NCSA. See also 
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On the advice of the Blockade Board, the Union Navy prepared to do this. As Du 
Pont explained to a friend, the Navy Department, which he termed “hitherto the most 
rickety and stupid of all” had achieved “a vitality and energy never seen there before.”12 
Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham, a veteran of both the War of 1812 and the Mexican 
American War, and commander of the Atlantic Blockading Squadron, was chosen to 
lead the naval part of the expedition, while the army contingent, comprising around 880 
men, was put under the control of General Benjamin F. Butler.13 Stringham assembled a 
flotilla of seven ships mounting more than 140 rifled guns, while two chartered 
transports carried the 9th and 20th New York Volunteers and a company of the 2nd United 
States Artillery. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles made clear to Stringham that 
“[t]here is no position off the coast which you are guarding…where well-directed efforts 
and demonstrations would be more highly appreciated by the government and country 
than North Carolina, which has been the resort of pirates.”14 The flotilla departed 
Hampton Roads on 26 August, and anchored off of Hatteras Inlet the next afternoon. 
Hatteras Inlet was guarded by two forts, Hatteras and Clark, which had been 
completed only in mid-summer. Fort Hatteras was a square dirt fort, mounting 12 32-
                                                 
12 Du Pont to Matthew Maury, 30 August 1861, in Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis Du Pont: A Selection from 
his Civil War Letters, Vol. 1, The Mission: 1860-1862, 138. 
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pounder smoothbore cannons, while Fort Clark was smaller, located closer to the ocean, 
and armed with five of the same guns. The chief engineer for North Carolina’s coastal 
defenses, Major W.B. Thompson, believed that the cross fire of the forts made the inlet 
“secure against any attempt of the enemy to enter it,” but in actuality the forts were 
poorly manned, poorly armed, and lacking supplies.15 Throughout the summer, Gwynn 
had complained that he did not have enough men to serve the batteries erected in the 
several forts along the coast, and had repeatedly made requisitions for ammunition, 
which netted him little.16 Meanwhile, other military officials criticized Gwynn himself, 
accusing him of “intemperate habits” and “great inefficiency” in putting the coast in a 
proper state of defense. One letter to Clark from an officer serving at Fort Hatteras in 
particular must have caused the governor great alarm. This officer called Hatteras Inlet 
“the most important [point] on the whole coast of North Carolina, and the least 
defended,” and accused the commanding officers at the forts of being “totally 
unfit…negligent of their duties…[and] drunken and rowdyish.” The writer pointed out 
that the forts were so lacking in powder that they could not even fire a salute to the 
deceased Governor Ellis, and that the cannons were old fashioned smoothbores, “[S]o 
that any steamer of superior guns can shell our fort without endangering the loss of a 
                                                 
15 Barrett, Civil War in North Carolina, 33-34. Fort Hatteras had been completed in mid-June, and Fort 
Clark in mid-July. Fort Hatteras was protected by an outside of sand, sheathed by planks covered in turfs 
of marsh grass. 
 
16 For instance, see Gwynn to Winslow, 28 June 1861, and Gwynn to Clark, 18 July 1861, RG 109.9, 
Records of Confederate Military Organizations: Records of the Department of North Carolina, Ch. II, vol. 
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single spar.” This opinion would too soon be proved correct, as would the belief that if 
the Confederates were driven from Hatteras, “[T]he lock and key of Carolina’s coast will 
be broken, and the enemy can have an inlet to our main.”17 
 Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the fight went almost exactly as this letter 
said it would. Stringham opened a bombardment of Fort Clark from out of range of the 
Confederate guns at 10:00 a.m. on 28 August, and before noon, over 300 of Butler’s 
soldiers had made it ashore through the rough surf. Colonel J.C. Lamb, commanding at 
Fort Clark, spiked his guns and evacuated his men to Fort Hatteras, and Butler’s force 
took possession of the deserted fort. At 7:30 a.m. the next day, the Union bombardment 
began again. In the words of one Confederate captain in Fort Hatteras, “Such a 
bombardment is not on record in the annals of war…It was like a hailstorm.” 
Stringham’s ships once again remained out of range of the Confederate cannons, and 
when a Union shell started a fire in the fort’s magazine around 11:00 a.m., a council of 
war among the Confederate officers resulted in the surrendering of the fort, along with 
around 700 soldiers. Stringham and Butler’s force had not lost a single man.18 As Du 
Pont reported to a Northern Congressman, “The first fruits of the labor of my associates 
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and myself [the Blockade Board] came out on the North Carolina coast – the first gleam 
of light from the ocean again as in 1812.”19 
 The loss of Hatteras Inlet quickly sent shockwaves through North Carolina. 
Frantic letters and petitions poured in to Clark from towns and counties along the coast, 
such as the petition from Beaufort penned the day after Hatteras fell. The citizens of 
Beaufort were greatly concerned about the “imperfect character” of the coast defenses 
given the new Federal position at Hatteras, which they correctly pointed out provided a 
“free and unobstructed passage to this place.”20 Those in Martin County, further up the 
coast, sent a similar petition, which stated that “we the people of Martin since the 
disaster that has befallen our forces on our coast feel a deep sense of insecurity…we are 
greatly deficient in ordnance, ammunition, arms, and the proper fortifications to resist 
the enemy should they attempt to invade.” These petitions always closed by asking Clark 
to send men, guns, and ammunition, which the governor was hard pressed to find.21 
 The private writings of citizens and soldiers make it clear that they were 
legitimately as alarmed as the petitions to Clark claimed. As Zebulon Vance, Colonel of 
the 26th North Carolina and future governor, wrote to his wife from the coast, “We are in 
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constant doubt here…where [the Union] will strike no one can say.”22 From Halifax 
County, one prominent female citizen described in her diary how “[t]he excitement was 
tremendous throughout the State…A thousand rumors, the last wilder than the first, were 
put in circulation…Now this town was reported burned, now that.” Her frustration with 
the situation is evident in her admonition that “[i]f one half the misdirected energy now 
used in vain endeavors to ‘shut’ the stable door had been expended in preventing its 
being opened, the horse would never have been stolen.”23 Even in Richmond, citizens 
were disconcerted by the defeat at Hatteras, and what it portended. As famed diarist 
Mary Boykin Chestnut explained, “Here we have Hatteras on the brain. It is useless to 
try and interest anyone in anything else…The wolf is at the door. In it at North Carolina 
– and ready to prowl around us.”24 
 Civil and military authorities in North Carolina proved just as alarmed as the 
citizens. The North Carolina House of Commons called for an investigation into the 
disaster at Hatteras, and demanded from Clark all of the information he possessed 
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relative to the incident.25 Brigadier General Richard Gatlin, who had taken over control 
of the Department of North Carolina and the coast defenses from Gwynn, wrote to Clark 
urging large additions to the forces on the coast. Gatlin firmly believed that the defenses 
had been too long neglected, and thought that no less than five regiments were 
absolutely essential. He also recommended that two additional brigadier generals be sent 
to the department, and explained that he was attempting to restore confidence and 
control in the eastern portion of the state, where there now existed “an unhappy state of 
feeling among a portion of the citizens.”26 Henry K. Burgwyn, a military aide sent by 
Clark to inspect Fort Macon’s defenses, complained that there was “not a single 
experienced gunner in the fort, not a rifled cannon nor mortar, only one ten inch and one 
eight inch columbiad, these in the hands of raw troops,” while Asa Biggs, another 
military aide, expressed great concern over the strength of the fortifications at Roanoke 
Island, and urged Clark to send no more troops to Virginia, but instead to “direct all the 
energies of the state for the protection of the state,” due to his belief that Union forces 
would soon advance into Albemarle Sound.27 
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 Clark was not blind to these deficiencies, and fought with Richmond to obtain 
the means to address them. As he made clear to Leroy Pope Walker, the Secretary of 
War, just days after the fall of Hatteras, “The recent successful invasion of our coast 
demand us to protect ourselves with all dispatch.” Clark asked for five rifled 32-
pounders, ten 8-inch shell guns, twenty 42-pounders, and twenty 32-pounders, which 
were not forthcoming.28 Just days later, Clark wrote again to Walker, lamenting the fact 
that “[t]he possession of Hatteras gives the control of Pamlico Sound to the enemy, and 
they can on any day send out predatory expeditions on the surrounding country and up 
the navigable streams doing immense damage.” Clark complained that North Carolina 
had sent almost all of its arms and men to Virginia, and “our liberality has exhausted our 
supply.” Therefore, he urged the return of troops to defend Washington, New Bern, and 
Beaufort, which he claimed were “without a single soldier.”29 Clark thought the situation 
in the eastern counties so bad that discontent was “verging on Civil War,” but Davis 
thought it “highly inexpedient to withdraw any of the N.C. troops from Virginia for the 
defence of [the] coast for many reasons, the chief of which is that it would assure the 
enemy of the success of his decided and avowed policy to weaken and demoralize the 
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Army in Virginia.”30 For although the Confederate Congress had passed a resolution 
calling for information on Hatteras and inquiring what steps Davis was taking to put the 
North Carolina coast in a state of defense, Davis continued to argue that the necessary 
troops and guns were needed elsewhere.31 
 All of this meant that the defenses of the North Carolina coast remained in a poor 
state throughout the fall of 1861. The situation was so bad that the Confederacy was 
forced to abandon the forts at Ocracoke and Oregon Inlets.32 Gatlin remained worried 
about the safety of Roanoke Island, a place he believed was “of such importance, that 
could I have done so, I should long since have reinforced it. But I am unable to send a 
soldier there without withdrawing them from points already insufficiently defended.”33 
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Gatlin, Clark, and North Carolina citizens were right to be concerned, for plans were 
afoot in the North to use Hatteras as a base for further operations in North Carolina. 
 Butler’s original orders had been to sink hulks in Hatteras Inlet, thereby blocking 
it for Confederate use, and then abandon the forts. But the general rapidly realized that 
Hatteras Inlet “was the opening to a great inland sea running up 90 miles to 
Newbern…[I]f we ever intended to operate in North Carolina and southern Virginia, we 
should operate by way of that inland sea.” The War Department in Washington became 
quickly convinced of this fact, and ordered the forts held on 5 September.34 This was a 
wise decision; as Union Admiral David Dixon Porter later remarked, the victory at 
Hatteras “gave us a foothold on southern soil and possession of the sounds of North 
Carolina…and ultimately proved one of the most important events of the war.”35 
 Union authorities soon moved to make the success at Hatteras pay further 
strategic dividends. Shortly after the capture of the inlet, Major General George 
McClellan, the commander of the Army of the Potomac and soon to be general in chief 
of all Union forces, asked Secretary of War Simon Cameron for permission to create a 
“Coast Division.” McClellan proposed to “organize a force of two brigades of five 
regiments each, of New England men…particularly adapted to coast service; the officers 
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and men to be sufficiently conversant with boat service to manage steamers, sailing-
vessels, launches, barges, surf-boats, [and] floating batteries.” He foresaw this division 
operating in conjunction with naval forces against various points on the Atlantic coast.36 
The idea, however, was not originally his, but that of his old friend, Brigadier General 
Ambrose Burnside.37 
 Ambrose Everts Burnside was born on 23 May 1824, in Liberty, Indiana, the 
fourth of nine children. The Burnsides, who had emigrated from Scotland, had originally 
settled in South Carolina before moving north. Burnside’s father, Edghill Burnside, was 
a court clerk, and the young man himself worked for a local tailor. In 1842, on the 
request of Edghill, 45 members of the Indiana Legislature signed a petition 
recommending Burnside for West Point, which was endorsed by the state’s two senators, 
and so Burnside arrived at the Academy in June 1843. He eventually graduated 18th out 
of 38 in the class of 1847, accepted a commission in the 3rd U.S. Artillery, and was sent 
to Mexico, but arrived too late to see any action.38 Burnside was well liked by his fellow 
officers and quickly became known for his openness, friendliness, and modesty. In 1852, 
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he was appointed to the command of Fort Adams in Newport, Rhode Island, a state that 
would become his adopted home. He did not serve at this post long, however, resigning 
from the army in 1853 to manufacture a rifle he had designed.39 
 The outbreak of the Civil War found Burnside working in the New York Office 
of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Despite having left the army, Burnside was 
quickly offered command of the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry by that state’s 
governor, William Sprague. Burnside accepted, and by July 1861 he had become a 
brigade commander. His brigade did hard fighting at the Battle of Bull Run, and due to 
his performance in this battle, Burnside received a commission as Brigadier General of 
United States Volunteers when the brigade subsequently disbanded. But for the time 
being, the newly minted general was without a command.40 It was at this point that 
Burnside began to push the idea for an amphibious division on McClellan, while also 
asking the governors of New York and several states in New England to contribute 
troops to such a force. 
McClellan and the War Department rapidly came to see the North Carolina coast 
as the most beneficial place to utilize this force. Stringham had in fact been replaced as 
commander of the Atlantic Blockading Squadron in mid-September because he had 
failed to advance further into Pamlico Sound, contending that he did not have enough 
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light draft vessels to do so.41 Meanwhile, other naval officers at Hatteras stressed to 
Secretary of the Navy Welles the strategic importance of a Union-held Roanoke Island, 
which would allow for command of the Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and the Neuse 
River, and shortly thereafter, Colonel Rush Hawkins, commanding at Hatteras, penned 
to the War Department his belief that “seven thousand men judiciously placed upon the 
soil of North Carolina would…draw 20,000 Confederate troops from the state of 
Virginia.”42 Washington ignored Hawkins’s letter beyond formal acknowledgement, but 
the correspondence of Du Pont makes clear that the Administration was seriously 
considering using Burnside’s proposed force in North Carolina. Du Pont related the 
events of a 1 October meeting with Lincoln, Cameron, Secretary of State William 
Seward, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox, in which Fox puffed 
cigar smoke into Lincoln’s eyes while the men discussed the expedition. While Lincoln 
denied any knowledge of an expedition to the cabinet, Du Pont claimed that “it was 
understood to be a pet enterprise with the President.”43 
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Du Pont, who was at the time commanding the South Atlantic Blockading 
Squadron and forming his own expedition to capture Port Royal in South Carolina, 
recommended that the Administration focus on one coastal attack at a time, and this the 
men agreed to.44 Though the subject of an expedition to North Carolina was therefore 
shelved for a few weeks, it soon came back up. On 6 November, Hawkins traveled to 
Washington and spoke to Lincoln’s Cabinet emphasizing the benefits of Union military 
action in North Carolina’s interior waterways. The colonel also attempted to convince 
Lincoln that there was a great deal of Unionist sentiment on the coast of North Carolina, 
thus playing to Lincoln’s desire to bring these loyal Unionists back under control of the 
government.45 Shortly thereafter, Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, the new 
commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, outlined a plan to Welles for a 
joint army-navy attack to secure Pamlico Sound, and preparations began in earnest.46 
Burnside immediately devoted all of his energy to preparing the expedition he 
was to lead. Not only did he procure regiments from New York, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Connecticut, but he also sorted through requests for appointments from 
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engineers, railroad men, carpenters, and others whose civil occupation might bear fruit in 
the coming months. He personally made efforts to obtain arms, provisions, and light 
draft boats for his force, in the process of which he received appeals from companies 
peddling their military products for his use. One such letter came from the Delano Life 
Preserving Coat & Vest Company, which attempted to sell Burnside life preservers for 
use in landing soldiers through surf. As the letter claimed, “With these life preservers 
you may land any number of men without loss. The men who put them on, about to enter 
the surf boats to land, will have double courage and the commander will himself feel that 
his forces cannot drown.”47 Despite this strong exhortation, there is no evidence that 
Burnside purchased any of these garments. 
The staging area for the expedition was Annapolis, and it was there that the 
regiments now attached to the general’s command began to gather. As these men went 
through drills, inspections, and reviews, Burnside continued his work.48 The general’s 
new personal secretary, Daniel Reed Larned, wrote that Burnside seemed “worn to 
death” by all of the preparations, and though they progressed slowly, Larned attempted 
to convince his sister that “if you could see the amount of work to be done you would 
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think it very strange if [the expedition] got away from here in two or three months, but 
General B[urnside] is a man that makes things move.”49 
Perhaps Burnside’s most crucial decision during this time was his selection of 
men to command his three new brigades. Burnside chose three West-Point classmates 
who were both career officers and his close friends. John G. Foster, who was to lead the 
First Brigade, had graduated fourth in the West Point class of 1846, and had served with 
distinction in the Mexican-American War, being breveted twice for gallant and 
meritorious conduct.50 Jesse L. Reno, commander of the Second Brigade, was a 
Virginian by birth who had grown up in Pennsylvania, and also graduated West Point in 
1846. Like Foster, he too had been breveted twice in Mexico, and after that conflict, he 
had served as the Secretary of the Board of Artillery, and then with the Coast Survey and 
the topographical engineers in the West.51 John G. Parke had graduated second in the 
West Point class of 1849, so unlike Foster and Reno he had not gained combat 
experience in the Mexican War. Yet Burnside was impressed by Parke’s competence and 
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devotion to duty, and so gave him control of the division’s Third Brigade.52 All three 
men would prove to be competent combat commanders and excellent choices. 
Meanwhile, the leader of the naval portion of the expedition, the stout and red-bearded 
Louis Goldsborough, was a long-serving veteran who had entered the Navy during the 
War of 1812, had commanded multiple heavy ships, and had attained experience with 
blockading duties during the war with Mexico. While the rear admiral, known in the 
navy as “Old Guts,” was not specifically selected by Burnside, he too would prove 
suitable for the task at hand.53 
By the end of 1861, preparations were almost complete for the expedition to 
leave Annapolis. On 29 December, Burnside traveled to Washington to visit with the 
War Department, a trip Larned hoped would lead to a movement as soon as possible, as 
he was “heartily sick” of the secessionists in Annapolis, who antagonized the Union 
soldiers by espousing their pro-Southern views.54 On 2 January, McClellan (by this time 
general in chief) requested a meeting with Burnside, at which Burnside reported his 
force ready, and five days later, McClellan gave Burnside written orders.55 Burnside was 
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to rendezvous with Goldsborough’s vessels at Fortress Monroe, and then proceed to 
Hatteras Inlet and cross the bulkhead into Pamlico Sound. His first point of attack was to 
be Roanoke Island, where McClellan hoped he could capture the whole garrison. After 
this was done, Burnside was instructed to “make a descent on New Berne, having gained 
possession of which and the railroad passing through it, you will at once throw a 
sufficient force upon Beaufort and take the steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon and 
open that port.” If the “temper of the people [and] the rebel force at hand” allowed it, 
Burnside was to conclude by seizing the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad as far 
west as Goldsborough. McClellan urged Burnside to use great caution in regard to 
issuing any proclamations, and specifically told him to say “as little as possible about 
politics or the negro” to the people of North Carolina.56 
McClellan clearly envisioned Burnside’s expedition as part of his overall strategy 
to exert pressure on the Confederacy on multiple fronts. At least one historian has argued 
that the detachment of Burnside’s Coast Division actually hindered McClellan’s later 
operations on the Virginia Peninsula, but this estimate is wholly incorrect.57 McClellan, 
in fact, believed that if Burnside took Roanoke and New Bern, and threatened the 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, this would aid the drive up the Peninsula (a strategy 
McClellan had been developing for some time) by forcing the evacuation of Norfolk, 
cutting off the flow of supplies to the Confederate armies in Virginia, and tying down 
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Confederate forces in North Carolina.58 As McClellan explained to the new Secretary of 
War, Edwin McMasters Stanton, Burnside would essentially form the left flank of 
McClellan’s own operations.59 Therefore, the general in chief saw the success of 
Burnside’s expedition as crucial to the success of his larger plan. While McClellan and 
Burnside discussed strategy, the soldiers at Annapolis could sense that the long-awaited 
movement was afoot. As one private in the 25th Massachusetts wrote in his diary, 
“Things certainly begin to look like leaving; the harbor is full of vessels, transports, 
gunboats, and supply ships…Appearances indicate that somebody will hear it thunder 
somewhere along the Southern coast before very long.”60 
Unfortunately for North Carolina, its coast defenses were not at all prepared for 
the thunder Burnside would bring down on them. The new commander of the District of 
the Pamlico, which included Roanoke Island, was Brigadier General Daniel Harvey 
Hill.61 D.H. Hill, as he was known, was a deeply religious West Point graduate and 
Mexican War veteran who had made his home in North Carolina before the Civil War, 
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and was the brother-in-law of General Thomas (Stonewall) Jackson.62 He was a small 
man who suffered from dyspepsia, which may have contributed to what many viewed as 
his abrasive personality. A fellow Confederate officer would later describe him as a 
“capable, well-read soldier and positively about the bravest man ever seen…but of sharp 
prejudice,” while a member of the Confederate government termed him “harsh, abrupt, 
[and] often insulting.”63 Hill’s frankness and willingness to insult those he viewed as 
incompetent would be on full display during his time in North Carolina. 
In September, Hill had claimed to his wife that he had “no fears of [an] 
expedition along the Southern Coast doing any serious mischief,” but when he reached 
the North Carolina coast and inspected its defenses, his tune changed.64 Hill quickly 
discovered a “terrible state of confusion, and an apathy among the people,” which he 
found highly alarming. This caused him to state to his wife his opinion that there was 
heavy work before him, based on his notion that “the people have done nothing for the 
defense of their unprotected homes and firesides,” a fact he viewed as “almost 
inconceivable.” Throughout October, Hill continued to complain about the “very great 
defects in all our coast defenses” and the perceived laziness of North Carolinians. As he 
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exclaimed, “The utter worthlessness of such people is really incredible.”65 By the end of 
the month, Hill was correctly estimating that the expected Union attack would come at 
Roanoke Island, and though he was surprised that this assault had not yet taken place, he 
found refuge in his trust in God, who he believed would make all things well.66 
Unfortunately for Hill, God could not supply him with the resources he desired to 
put Roanoke in a better state of defense. Instead, he was left to rely on Gatlin and Clark, 
who he termed an “imbecile Governor.”67 Clark urged Hill to direct all his requisitions 
for batteries and men directly to the Confederate government, as he had no arms at his 
disposal, and as the Confederacy, and not North Carolina, was technically in control of 
the defenses of the state.68 So, Hill stressed to Confederate authorities his belief that the 
“all important island” would undoubtedly be attacked. In his eyes, “[E]verything 
depends on holding it [Roanoke]…I am confident that Manassas itself is not more 
important.” Hill requested more powder and rifled cannons of heavy caliber, as well as 
four additional regiments, and correctly predicted that if he did not receive these, 
Roanoke Island would fall, followed by the towns of Washington and Plymouth.69 Hill, 
however, received very little to work with, and although he began to relocate the forts on 
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Roanoke and construct more earthworks on the island, in mid-November he was ordered 
back to Virginia.70 
Gatlin, like Hill, well understood the importance of Roanoke as the key to 
Albemarle Sound and the inland waters of North Carolina, but he too struggled to 
procure any aid from Confederate authorities.71 Gatlin begged the new Confederate 
Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, to send reinforcements to North Carolina at once, 
to no avail.72 Meanwhile, Gatlin struggled to arm the regiments he did have under his 
command. He explained to Hill that he had “made so many requisitions on the Ordnance 
Dept. at Richmond for guns and powder without obtaining anything,” and that Benjamin 
had forbidden any reinforcements being sent to the North Carolina coast “until we are 
certain where the enemy intends to attack.” Though Gatlin tried to placate Hill by 
stating, “You cannot regret more than myself my inability to forward more troops to 
your district,” and he assured Hill that he had urged Clark to send every available man to 
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the coast, he was still forced to conclude that “I have not a single soldier under my 
command…now in reserve.”73 
Clark, for his part, was fighting a losing battle with Confederate authorities, who 
were much more fixated on the military situation in Virginia than in North Carolina.74 
Though Benjamin assured the governor that “[t]he dangers which have threatened or 
may still threaten your state, have not escaped the solicitude of the government, and no 
effort has been spared…to provide against every attack,” he consistently claimed that he 
was unable to fulfill Clark’s requisitions for arms and men. Benjamin’s justification that 
these arms had to go to commanders “in whose departments the danger of attack by 
superior force seemed most imminent” must have greatly irritated Clark, who was still 
constantly receiving letters from Hill, Gatlin, and North Carolina citizens detailing the 
inefficiency of North Carolina’s defenses and the inevitability of a Union assault.75 The 
deficiency of arms in the state was so great, in fact, that Clark could not even call out the 
militia, and he was forced to decline the acceptance of many volunteer companies. As he 
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lamented to Gatlin, “When we can do no better we must fight with half arms or no 
arms.”76 
The most frustrating part of the situation for Clark was that, in his words, “The 
means as well as the management of this war belongs to the Confederate Government.” 
Therefore, as troops mustered into service, they passed into Confederate control, and the 
state’s guns were being constantly appropriated to other defenses.77 As stated by its 
Constitution, the Confederate government had a duty to “protect each [state] against 
invasion,” a duty Clark and other North Carolinians believed, with reason, that the 
authorities in Richmond were failing to uphold.78 In a long letter to Benjamin, Clark 
attempted to make his opinion on North Carolina’s plight clear: 
I have received various rumors of large fleets and expeditions fitting out 
at New York and Fortress Monroe supposed to be designed for our coast. 
I will make all preparations in my power to repel any invasion. But my 
resources are now restricted almost to the militia, and they are unarmed, 
undrilled, and some not yet organized…We feel very defenceless here 
without arms and I will not again report to you that this had been effected 
by our generosity to others…We see just over our lines in Virginia, near 
Suffolk, two or three North Carolina Regiments, well armed and well 
drilled who are not allowed to come to the defence of their homes…We 
are threatened with an expedition of 15,000 men. That is just the amount 
of our seaboard army extended along 400 miles of territory, and at no 
point can we spare a man and without the use of arms can’t increase it.79 
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This was not the last time Clark would rebuke Benjamin for refusing to allow North 
Carolina troops and arms to be used in defense of the state itself. Clark regarded North 
Carolina’s right to these arms and men as “unquestionable,” and assured Benjamin that 
North Carolina would not insist on this right were it not for an imperative necessity. 
Clark correctly predicted that Richmond's apparent willingness to let North Carolina 
wither on the vine would “awaken distrust and disaffection towards the Confederacy, 
and seriously impair our united counsels and action for the future.” Yet Benjamin and 
Davis either could not or would not heed the Governor’s warnings.80 
 On 18 November, Davis alluded to these issues in an address to the Confederate 
Congress, by stating that the war “has been constantly enlarging its proportions and 
expanding its boundaries,” making it more and more difficult for the Confederacy to put 
every important locale in a good state of defense. Yet he remained firm in his belief that 
“sudden calls from the remotest points for military aid have been met with promptness 
enough not only to avert disaster in face of superior numbers, but, also, to roll back the 
tide of invasion.”81 This tide of invasion, however, would soon wash back up on North 
Carolina’s shore, and despite Davis’s proclaimed optimism, this time the Confederacy 
would not be able to avert disaster. 
 By the end of the first week of January, many of the soldiers of Burnside’s Coast 
Division had been ordered aboard transports at Annapolis. Residents of the city crowded 
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windows, doorways, and streets to watch the men march through a fresh snowfall from 
their camps to the vessels. Though conditions on board the ships were cramped, the men 
being packed, according to one soldier, “like sardines in a box,” the troops were in good 
spirits, having been paid before they embarked. They sang “John Brown” and “Dixie” as 
they debated among themselves where the expedition was bound.82 And when the 
steamers actually began towing the rest of the vessels out to sea, the men gave six 
rousing cheers for Burnside, which the general came on deck to acknowledge with a 
raise of his hat.83 By 11 January, the expedition had arrived at Fortress Monroe. As the 
steamer Picket, with Burnside on board, streamed into Hampton Roads, bands played the 
“Star Spangled Banner” and “Hail to the Chief.” Burnside stood on the pilot house to 
receive this greeting, but soon returned to work, making final preparations with 
Commodore Goldsborough. Meanwhile, the bands continued to play into the night, 
music which one newspaper correspondent found “soul-stirring in the extreme.”84 
 At this point, only Burnside, his brigadiers, and a few staff officers knew the 
expedition’s destination. The captains of the vessels carried sealed orders, which they 
were not to open until the fleet had cleared Hampton Roads. This was achieved on 12 
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January, as the fleet of about 70 vessels, with flags flying and bands playing, sailed 
south.85 The armada Burnside had assembled presented quite the spectacle; as the New 
York Tribune’s correspondent with the expedition wrote, “Probably a more 
heterogeneous congregation of water craft was never collected on any waters at any one 
time.”86 As per McClellan’s orders, the first stop was Hatteras Inlet, where the 
expedition would have to cross the bar before it could enter Pamlico Sound and advance 
on Roanoke Island. It was at Hatteras that the expedition would run into its first 
obstacles, which turned out to be far greater than Burnside, Goldsborough, or McClellan 
ever imagined. 
 Burnside’s time in independent command almost ended before it really began. In 
an effort to foster courage and confidence among his men, the general had placed his 
headquarters aboard the gunboat Picket, which was the smallest craft in the expedition. 
When the expedition arrived at its destination on 13 January, as one soldier in the 23rd 
Massachusetts recorded, “Cape Hatteras was wide awake for us…and saluted us with a 
squall that very near upset us.”87 Another soldier, David L. Day, a private in the 25th 
Massachusetts, termed the ships tossing in the storm “the grandest, wildest scene I ever 
beheld,” and described how “the water [was] rolling, foaming, and dashing over the 
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shoals, throwing its white spray into the air, as though the sea and sky met.” The Picket 
was almost swamped by the rough seas, and though it stayed afloat, Burnside came 
down quite sick.88 The steam transport City of New York was wrecked on the shoals, and 
could not be pulled off. Its captain and crew were forced to hang on in the rigging of the 
vessel. The next day Burnside went to their assistance in a tug; as Day explained, “The 
general is not one to see his men perish, and make no effort to rescue them.” But 
Burnside could do nothing to stay the rough weather and turbulent seas, which kept the 
fleet at their mercy for days.89 
 The severity of the weather, force of the tides, Hatteras’s numerous shoals and 
bars, and the fleet being crammed into the harbor all caused significant problems. All of 
these conditions caused the New York Tribune’s correspondent to term Hatteras a “libel 
upon honest harbors.” The north-easterly gale continued on the 14th and 15th, causing the 
wrecking of the gunboat Zouave, which sprung a leak and could not be pumped out. 
More disheartening was the drowning of Colonel Allen and several other men of the 9th 
New Jersey, whose small boat was driven into the breakers on its way back from 
General Reno’s vessel. As the Tribune’s correspondent lamented, “It has, in truth, been a 
sad, sad day, and a gloom is cast over the spirits of all.”90 Days later, the transport 
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Pocahontas also ran aground, resulting in the loss of about 70 horses, which would be 
sorely missed during the coming campaign.91 
 The best thing for Burnside and Goldsborough to do was get the vessels out of 
the harbor and across the bar into the calmer waters of Pamlico Sound as quickly as 
possible, but both men quickly realized that this would prove much harder than they had 
anticipated, for a simple reason. Burnside had been informed that the depth of water on 
the bar at Hatteras Inlet was at least nine feet, but in fact it was only between seven and 
eight feet on the bulkhead.92 Furthermore, several steamers had been purchased by 
government agents on sworn affidavits of owners that they drew under seven feet of 
water, but some in fact drew nine feet or more. This had been discovered while the fleet 
was at Hampton Roads, but Burnside was forced to proceed anyway and work with what 
he had.93 As if these were not problems enough, Hawkins had told Burnside that he 
would find experienced local pilots at Hatteras who could guide the ships over the bar, 
but this turned out to be an entirely false hope. Indeed, as Larned explained in a letter 
home, he could not give a complete account of the many obstacles to progress, because it 
would fill far too many papers.94 
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 As Burnside tried to figure out the best way to get his vessels across the bar, the 
fleet continued to take a beating. The boats constantly banged against each other in the 
tiny harbor. This caused significant damage and actually disabled some ships.95 When 
the storm died down on 17 January, Day described the scene as one of “boats and vessels 
ashore all around us, in a partially wrecked or damaged condition.” Unfortunately, 
another storm sprang up on 23 January, which was so bad that Day compared it to the 
storm through which Noah passed. As he saw it, the fleet was “going to the devil…A 
great many of the men are beginning to despond, and in fact the success of the 
expedition begins to look gloomy enough. Nothing but hardship and disaster has 
attended us since we left Fortress Monroe, and only God knows when it will end.”96 
Burnside himself remarked to Montgomery C. Meigs, the Union’s quartermaster general, 
“No one unless actually on the spot can for a moment conceive the difficulties I have 
had to encounter…all the elements have seemed to combine against our progress.”97 
 The longer the expedition remained mired on the wrong side of Hatteras Inlet, 
the more difficulties arose. By 22 January, the troops, stuffed in the foul-smelling holds 
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of the transports, were short of rations, and almost entirely out of water. For a while they 
were forced to drink condensed sea water, which Day thought “might be made palatable 
by adding about nine parts whiskey to one of water.”98 But soon several vessels, 
including the transports Cossack and Admiral with hundreds of troops on board, were 
out of water entirely, and the gunboats had only water from the condensers. This 
situation was primarily caused by the fact that the schooners and colliers Burnside had 
arranged to supply water had been prevented from reaching Hatteras by the very storms 
that were wreaking havoc on his fleet.99 Captain Benjamin Pardee of the 10th 
Connecticut aptly described the plight of the troops thusly: “No news to cheer us; 
disasters all around us; the skies black and unpromising…sickness on all the vessels, 
epidemics rapidly extending; deaths frequent; no comfort for the sick; scant foot for the 
well; water, tainted with kerosene, served out in limited quantity; our expedition a 
seeming failure!” Water remained scarce until 27 January, when a heavy rain fell, and 
three days later, four of the desperately awaited schooners finally arrived.100 Lincoln, 
meanwhile, was clearly aware of Burnside’s troubles. As the President’s chief personal 
secretary, John G. Nicolay, wrote to his fiancée, “At last we have heard from the 
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Burnside fleet, but the news is not cheering. A great storm encountered, a fleet 
dispersed, a vessel wrecked, and a colonel drowned, the result doesn’t sum up well at 
all.”101 
 All of the difficulties caused Goldsborough to tell Welles that his patience was 
“well-nigh exhausted,” and Burnside himself told McClellan that “elements of a decided 
failure look me square in the face…I think you have overestimated my ability, but [I] 
shall try not to disappoint you.”102 Yet while Burnside may have been entertaining some 
self-doubt, his suffering troops saw him as one of the only reasons for continued hope. 
Both his soldiers and the newspaper correspondents with the expedition heaped praise on 
the general for his unflagging work ethic and outward display of confidence. Larned 
claimed that Burnside worked long hours to get the vessels over the bar, and told his 
brother-in-law that “we have all been discouraged time after time, but a sight of 
[Burnside] and a few encouraging words from him works a speedy change.” The 
secretary went so far as to state, “I can assure you if there is such a thing as victory it 
will rest on his arms.”103 Day wrote that Burnside was everywhere to be seen, always 
looking cheerful and confident and doing his best to encourage the men, and became 
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convinced that the general was a man of “indomitable energy, perseverance, and 
courage.”104 Meanwhile, the newspaper correspondents almost always used the phrase 
“night and day” when describing Burnside’s work habits, and told their readers that the 
soldiers, despite the bad conditions, retained full confidence in the general. The 
correspondents saw Burnside’s work as purposeful, if slow; as one contended, “So far 
from Burnside being one of your strutting, gold-laced Brigadiers, I challenge his worst 
enemy, if he has one, to point to a single instance of his having done anything for show.” 
And while another correspondent thought that Burnside seemed weighed down by all of 
his responsibilities, he remained convinced that the general “seems as strong-hearted as 
on the day on which he set sail from Annapolis,” and concluded by exclaiming, “With 
such a leader let no one despair of the result.”105 
 Yet the same correspondent was fully aware that Burnside “is not the Almighty, 
to say to the winds, ‘Be Still.’”106 Nor could the general raise the water level on the bar. 
Therefore, Burnside had to rely on his own ingenuity to get the vessels which drew too 
much water into Pamlico Sound. This was made even more difficult by the fact that he 
initially had the use of only a few tugboats. The solution Burnside hit on was to unload 
the men and supplies from the larger transports at Hatteras so that they would draw less 
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water, and then deliberately run them aground in the swash against the outgoing tide. 
The transports then dropped anchor, and the tugboats were used to hold them on the bar. 
As the strong current washed the sand from beneath the boats, they limped along toward 
the sound. It was a slow process, but it worked, eventually creating an eight-foot 
channel. Burnside commandeered the use of three light draft steamers that had been 
forced to put in at Hatteras on their way south to Port Royal, and on 31 January, five 
more tugs arrived from Annapolis. All of these were immediately put to use in dragging 
the rest of the transports over the bar. Though Burnside made clear to McClellan that “I 
have never undertaken a work that has presented so many obstacles,” he managed to get 
almost all of the expedition’s vessels into Pamlico Sound by the end of January.107 
 It had been roughly three weeks since the expedition had left Fortress Monroe, 
and in Burnside’s own words, crossing the bar at Hatteras had taken “almost 
superhuman exertions” due to the litany of obstacles. Yet by 1 February, the general 
could pronounce the situation “much more cheering.”108 He even joked privately that he 
had “always known water was a most powerful element.” When Burnside’s own vessel, 
the steamer Spaulding, came across the bar on 29 January, the general had been 
welcomed by the blowing of steam whistles and the loud cheering of all the regiments on 
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the transports already across. The band of the 24th Massachusetts had serenaded him by 
playing “Hail to the Chief” and “Home Sweet Home,” and Burnside responded by going 
to the upper deck of the Spaulding and doffing his hat to the men.109 
The Northern press, meanwhile, was growing increasingly expectant to hear of any 
attack by Burnside, a feeling that was fueled by the correspondents with the expedition, 
such as that of the New York Tribune, who assured the readers that they could depend on 
the fact that, now that the fleet was over the bulkhead, “Burnside’s blows on the enemy 
will be quick and sharp…There is every present prospect for a series of brilliant 
successes.”110 Though another storm blew up and delayed any advance for a few days, 
Larned and the rest of the men felt that the worst was over, and grew anxious to advance 
upon Roanoke Island. This sentiment was only increased by the reports of deserters and 
contrabands who had reached the fleet via their own small boats, and reported that the 
Confederate defenses on Roanoke were in a poor state.111 
Much to the chagrin of Gatlin, Clark, and other Confederates, these reports were 
all too true. Part of the reason for this had to do with the fact that commanders for the 
defenses of the island had shifted so often. Both Gwynn and Gatlin had exercised control 
over Roanoke before Hill was put directly in command of the District of the Pamlico, 
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which included the island. But when Hill was ordered back to Virginia in mid-
November, this district was split between two commanders. Though Gatlin strongly 
resented the loss of Hill, who he believed was close to placing Roanoke in a proper state 
of defense, he could not change Hill’s orders.112 Brigadier General Lawrence O’Bryan 
Branch received command of the New Bern region, while the new district of the 
Chowan, which included the defenses of Roanoke, would eventually come under the 
command of Brigadier General Henry A. Wise. This district was then incorporated into 
the Department of Norfolk, under the command of Major General Benjamin Huger, 
further confusing the situation and complicating the change of command.113 This state of 
affairs would cause Wise, Gatlin, and Clark great headaches over the next month, and 
ultimately result in disaster for the Confederacy. 
All three of these men took a similar view of the situation in eastern North 
Carolina in the winter of 1861-1862. They believed that the inland sounds would be 
attacked, starting with Roanoke Island; that, given its weak state, Roanoke would 
undoubtedly fall, which would be followed by the loss of other strategic points; and, 
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perhaps most importantly and certainly most frustratingly for them, that the Confederate 
authorities in Richmond, as well as General Huger at Norfolk, were apathetic regarding 
the impending danger to North Carolina. A month before Burnside’s expedition arrived 
at Hatteras, Clark made clear to Davis that “[t]he possession of Hatteras afford the 
enemy a position or nucleus to form expeditions almost without observation to radiate to 
different points,” yet he could not succeed in turning the President’s attention to the 
North Carolina coast.114 Davis remained fixated on the Union threat to Richmond, and 
though he was not blind to the possibility of an invasion of North Carolina, he continued 
to believe that these Union expeditions were primarily attempts to disperse the already 
limited supply of Confederate troops and ammunition. 
Clark’s overall frustration spilled over in a mid-December letter to Gatlin, in 
which he rebuked the general by stating, “I am compelled again to call your attention to 
the situation of Roanoke Island. I am in constant receipt of intelligence of its neglected 
defences and critical position. I trust that you may have it in your power to repair them.” 
Clark was particularly upset that nothing had been done to obstruct Croatan Sound, the 
channel between Roanoke Island and the mainland.115 Two days later, Gatlin responded 
by stating that he would send an engineer to Roanoke and order piles to be driven into 
Croatan Sound, but he explained to Clark that he needed more troops for the defense of 
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Roanoke, and that many of the island’s defenders, such as Colonel J.V. Jordan’s 31st 
North Carolina, were half armed, relying on home rifles and shot guns, and short of 
ammunition.116 
Indeed, Gatlin’s letters make clear that, despite Clark’s hopes to the contrary, he 
did not have the means in his power to repair the deficiencies of the coast defenses. In 
fact, in early December, one of the regiments at Roanoke, the 3rd Georgia, which had 
been ordered to the island after the fall of Hatteras had aroused Confederate fears for its 
safety, had actually been sent back to Norfolk.117 The letters that went back and forth 
between Clark and Gatlin reveal a vicious cycle; Clark would complain that Gatlin had 
not put the coast in a proper state of defense, Gatlin would reply by requesting more 
men, arms, and ammunition so that he could do so, and Clark would answer that he 
could not send these things because they were under the command of Confederate 
authorities, and he simply did not have them.118 In this, Clark was not being deceitful. 
The dearth of arms in North Carolina was so bad that the governor was seriously 
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considering arming cavalry companies with lances.119 Clark was also doing his utmost to 
keep the gunpowder that was being produced by North Carolina powder mills (such as 
Waterhouse & Bowes) in North Carolina. Though Colonel Josiah Gorgas, the chief of 
the Confederate Bureau of Ordnance, ordered that all powder be sent immediately to 
Richmond, Clark forbid the execution of this order and tried to conserve the powder for 
North Carolina’s coastal defenses, despite the fact that he knew he would be sanctioned 
by the Confederate government for his actions. As he explained to Gorgas, “The 
manufacture of powder was entirely for the use of the Confederate troops and therefore 
our objects are identical. But the batteries and fortifications of No. Carolina could never 
get a supply…[Therefore] I intended first to supply the defences of North Carolina who 
are more threatened everyday with invasions.”120 
There was no point more threatened than Roanoke, a fact Wise was well aware of 
when he took command of the island. Wise was not a career soldier but a former 
Governor of Virginia, who had recruited and led his own force, the Wise Legion, 
throughout the early part of the war. His performance thus far in the conflict had been 
less than stellar, including a disastrous stint in the Kanawha Department in western 
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Virginia, where his inability to get along with fellow general and ex-Virginia governor 
John Floyd seriously compromised the plans of Confederate General Robert E. Lee.121 
Yet Wise remained personally popular and at least one member of the Confederate 
government was convinced that the general would have no trouble defending Roanoke 
with half as many men as any attacking force.122 
Wise himself was not so sure of this. Even before he reached the island, he was 
aware of the sad condition of its defenses, which he found disconcerting because he saw 
Roanoke as “the very key of the rear defenses of Norfolk.” At this early juncture, and for 
this reason, Wise was confident that he would receive help from Huger; as he saw it, 
“Norfolk and the navy-yard may well then supply [Roanoke’s] deficiencies, in order to 
save themselves.” Therefore, Wise requested four boats armed with howitzers, as well as 
four rifled cannons and 30 days provisions for the defenders of the island.123 
When Wise did reach Roanoke at the end of the first week in January, he found 
conditions even worse than he had anticipated. The driving of piles across Croatan 
Sound, which Clark and Hill had called for and Gatlin had said would be addressed, had 
not proceeded. Furthermore, Wise found that the map Huger had provided him of the 
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island’s environs and defenses was “wholly inaccurate and incomplete.”124 Wise 
immediately took steps to put the island in a better state of defense, ordering a wharf to 
be constructed for the landing of troops and supplies, as well as banning all consumption 
of alcohol, forbidding the discharge of weapons to conserve ammunition, and seizing all 
the boats in the area to prevent any of the citizens from having communication with 
Union forces at Hatteras.125 He also directed the 46th and 59th Virginia Infantry, of the 
Wise legion, to proceed as quickly as possible to Norfolk, and from there to Roanoke, 
and set out to secure boats and pile drivers from the navy yard at Norfolk to assist in the 
blocking up of Croatan and Roanoke Sounds. As Wise explained to the Colonel 
exercising direct command of the regiments at Roanoke, Henry M. Shaw, “[A]ttack is 
hourly expected and the camp must be in constant order and readiness.”126 
Wise’s efforts to block Croatan Sound, however, proceeded at a glacial pace. 
Though he applied to Marshall Parks, president of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal 
Company, for steam pile-drivers and steam-dredging machines to be sent with their 
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crews to Roanoke, they took much longer to arrive than he had expected. Wise had 
ordered First Lieutenant William B. Seldon, performing engineering duty at Roanoke, to 
commence placing 24 foot poles 8 feet apart in Croatan Sound on 8 January, but for 
weeks Wise had the use of only one pile-driver. Benjamin claimed that this was the only 
one available, but Wise thought differently, arguing that there were three pile drivers that 
had been offered to his command by Parks and Dr. Thomas Warren of Edenton.127 Wise 
used this one pile driver to drive 20 piles a day across Croatan Sound, but due to poor 
weather this work could only proceed on average three days a week. At the end of 
January, Wise was still desperately attempting to procure the additional pile drivers, and 
though they did arrive in the beginning of February and Wise ordered piling to go on 
“without cessation, day and night, during the period of moonlight nights,” this would 
prove to be too little, too late.128 
The setbacks in blocking Croatan and Roanoke Sounds, however, were not 
Wise’s only problem. Wise constantly bemoaned his lack of men and supplies to Huger, 
who was idle at Norfolk with over 13,000 men and many pieces of artillery.129 Officers 
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at Roanoke, including Shaw, had informed both Wise and Huger that the forts on the 
island were poorly sited, all being located on the northern half, and that they were 
desperately short of rifled cannon, meaning that Union naval vessels could shell them 
into submission from out of range, as they had done at Hatteras. Furthermore, the guns 
that did exist in the forts were mounted in exposed positions on poor carriages and could 
be easily disabled. As the commander of Fort Bartow, located on the northwestern 
portion of the island, explained, “My opinion of the battery in its present position is that 
it affords no protection to the defense of the sound.” This opinion was echoed by Shaw, 
who called the defensive works on the island “altogether insufficient” to halt a Union 
attack.130 
 After hearing all of these reports, Wise put in a requisition to Huger for artillery 
and ammunition, as well as additional cannons and men. He believed strongly that 
Roanoke could not be defended unless batteries were erected on the marshes at the 
southern end of the island, to prevent gunboats from passing into Croatan Sound. As he 
told Huger, “At least 3,000 infantry are needed on the island, and a considerable force, 
say 1,500 more, are needed on the beaches…We need on the beach and on the island at 
least eight field pieces and the carriages and caissons necessary.” Wise’s own returns 
showed that the entire effective force on the island at this time was less than 1,500, and 
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that there were only three available pieces of field artillery.131 Wise hurried back to 
Norfolk from Roanoke to meet with Huger, and in his words, “[M]ade in person the 
strongest verbal representations of the defenseless condition of the post.” Yet Huger, 
who had never inspected Roanoke’s defenses himself, was strangely indifferent to all of 
these problems. He told Wise in no uncertain terms, “I think you want supplies, hard 
work, and coolness among the troops you have, instead of more men,” and expressed his 
belief that “I do not consider large forces necessary for the defense of this island.”132 All 
of this would cause Wise to later contend that if Huger “had promptly aided me, as he 
ought to have done, with men and munitions of war, I could, while in good health, have 
been preparing at Roanoke Island, and may have saved my command, if it had not been 
grossly neglected.”133 
 Infuriated by Huger’s unsympathetic attitude, Wise resolved to go over his head 
to Benjamin. In mid-January, he wrote to the Secretary of War pleading for men and 
powder, and stating that Roanoke “is now utterly defenseless. No preparations have been 
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made there at all adequate…We have very limited means, and not half time enough to 
prepare to meet an enemy who is now almost in our immediate presence in very 
formidable force.” Benjamin’s reply to Wise’s pleadings, however, offered the general 
little comfort. As Benjamin explained, “[O]ur supply of cannon powder is very limited. 
At the first indication, however, of an attack on Roanoke Island a supply will be sent 
you. With the number of batteries now requiring a supply we have a very small reserve, 
that we can only part with to the point that may actually be attacked.”134 This seemingly 
ignored the fact that such an attack at Roanoke was expected daily, especially since 
Confederate military authorities had learned that the Burnside expedition had sailed 
south. Wise wrote back to Benjamin expressing his conviction that if and when Union 
gunboats arrived, they would pass Croatan Sound out of range of the batteries, silence 
the forts on the island, and cut off both Roanoke and Norfolk. As he saw it, “If we are to 
wait for powder from Richmond until we are attacked…that attack will be capture, and 
our defeat will precede our supply of ammunition…Delay is defeat now at Roanoke 
Island…[I] cannot guarantee successful defense for a day.”135 Nevertheless, Benjamin 
continued to deny Wise’s appeals. 
 This was not entirely the Secretary of War’s fault. Davis had appointed Benjamin 
to replace Walker in part because Benjamin was so personally loyal to the President 
himself. Davis essentially functioned as his own secretary of war, meaning that 
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Benjamin was, in the words of historian Shelby Foote, “[q]uite literally the President’s 
secretary for military affairs.” Benjamin had been roundly criticized almost since the day 
he took office, primarily because he could not send men and supplies to all the points 
that so desperately needed these things.136 In reality, Benjamin had almost no men, 
cannons, or powder to spare, but to admit this publicly would have been to reveal the 
Confederacy’s military weakness and contradict the positive view of the military 
situation emanating from Davis. So, commanders such as Gatlin and Wise were left to 
think that Benjamin had the capability, but not the desire, to reinforce them. 
 Wise, however, was not one to give up easily. On 17 January, he risked court 
martial by leaving his post and traveling to Richmond to protest his situation face to face 
with Confederate authorities. Wise did manage to secure an interview with Benjamin, 
during which he complained that Huger had thousands of idle men at Norfolk, while 
Roanoke, “The key of the whole command,” was desperately in need of them. But 
Benjamin refused to intervene and force Huger’s hand.137 Wise seemed hesitant to leave 
Richmond without accomplishing his purpose, so on 22 January, Benjamin was forced to 
directly order the general to proceed back to Roanoke Island. Wise was delayed in doing 
so by poor weather and a lack of transportation, but he managed to reach the island by 
the end of January.138 By this time, Wise was so frustrated and worn that he physically 
                                                 
136 Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 1, 222; Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, 121, 146. 
 
137 O.R., Vol. 9, 134, 137. 
 
138 Special Orders No. 17, 22 January 1862, O.R., Vol. 9, 139. See also pages 140-142 for details of Wise’s 
return trip to Roanoke. 
 
 71 
 
broke down. On 1 February, he was seized with a violent attack of pleurisy, which 
would keep him prostrate in bed with a high fever at his headquarters on Nag’s Head, 
across the sound from Roanoke, until the island was lost for good.139 
 Before Wise became sick, he fought one more losing battle. This was with Flag 
Officer William F. Lynch, who commanded Confederate naval forces in the region. 
Governor Clark had earlier accused Lynch of neglecting the naval defenses of North 
Carolina, a charge that Lynch strongly denied. Lynch argued that many of his vessels 
were under repair, and that of the rest, only one was trustworthy. By 16 January, he had 
brought the few ships he had to Roanoke, but he realized that this fleet would be little 
match for any Union naval force.140 
 Lynch’s goal was to create what he termed a “mosquito fleet” of small steam 
vessels, each mounting a single 32-pound gun, which he thought “will annoy if it cannot 
overmatch the foe.”141 To do this, Lynch commandeered all but one of Wise’s steam-
tugs, which the general badly needed to bring in supplies and piles, move troops around, 
and help with the construction of works on the south end of the island. This naturally 
angered Wise, who believed Lynch had “hindered operations of the army materially,” 
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and termed the officer’s mosquito fleet “perfectly imbecile gunboats.” Wise further 
charged that Lynch had taken men from the infantry to be used on his “worthless 
gunboat fleet,” and though the general believed that “a braver, more earnest, and active 
officer is not to be found in either Army or Navy,” he remained convinced that Lynch 
“was too vainglorious of the fleet,” and meddled too much with his command. As he 
later wrote, “The truth is that the greatest assault upon the reputation of the Navy was the 
want of judgment and skill in getting up a tug-boat fleet of seven to meet a Burnside 
expedition of sixty vessels.”142 But try as he might, Wise never got the boats back from 
Lynch. 
 By the time Gatlin, Clark, and Wise learned of Burnside’s fleet crossing the bar 
at Hatteras Inlet, they could see the writing on the wall. An escaped pilot from the area 
(presumably one of those Burnside had desperately hoped would aid him) had reported 
to Gatlin that the large number of gunboats and steamers were bound for Roanoke 
Island.143 Though Gatlin hoped that the storms that blew up off the North Carolina coast, 
which had caused Burnside so much trouble, would delay any attack, he told 
Confederate authorities that “there can be no doubt that the Burnside expedition is 
intended to operate in our sounds” and therefore “it becomes a matter of vital importance 
to consider the means in our power to resist his advance.” Gatlin called again for 
reinforcements for Roanoke, Washington, and New Bern, and again they were not 
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forthcoming.144 This caused him to complain to Hill, back in Virginia, that Richmond 
had “persisted, in the face of facts…to assure that the expedition was not intended for 
us…I feel very much discouraged at not having any suggestions of mine attended to, not 
even answered at times.” And as he told General Joseph R. Anderson, commanding the 
District of Cape Fear, “[I] see plainly that North Carolina has to fight her own battles 
notwithstanding the larger force she has sent to Va., S.C., and Tenn. If we are invaded 
there is nothing for it but that we turn out to a man and drive off the invader.”145 
 Clark, for his part, shared similar feelings of distress and anger. He pleaded with 
Benjamin to return the 5th North Carolina and several other regiments, serving on the 
Virginia Peninsula, back to their home state. Though he too hoped that the storm would 
delay Burnside’s invasion, he knew that it had not changed its destination, which he 
correctly believed to be Roanoke Island, “the key of the Albemarle.” Clark once again 
told Benjamin that the loss of this island would “inflict a blow on the whole 
Confederacy,” because it would “give the enemy a ready march to our sea board Rail 
Road from Wilmington to Norfolk.” In what was most likely an attempt to catch flies 
with honey, Clark told Benjamin, “I feel some reluctance in appealing to you again for 
reinforcements, knowing the great strain now pressing on you for aid from so many 
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quarters…I am sensible of the immense labors of your present position and the zeal and 
attention you devote to it.”146 Yet this approach too netted Clark nothing. Instead of 
more troops, Benjamin called on Clark to fill up North Carolina’s quota for Davis’s most 
recent call for soldiers.147 Therefore, by early February, it was clear that Clark, Gatlin, 
and Wise would have to make do with what men, arms, and ammunition they had. It 
would not be long before their ability to do so would be tested. As one Confederate 
official noted in his diary, “Burnside has entered the sound at Hatteras with his fleet of 
gun-boats and transports. The work will soon begin.”148
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CHAPTER III 
“EVERY PATRIOT HEART WILL BE FILLED WITH GRATITUDE”: BURNSIDE’S 
SUCCESSES IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Roanoke Island, the site of Sir Walter Raleigh’s “Lost Colony” and the birthplace 
of the first English child born in the Western Hemisphere, was as historic a place as any 
in America. But the small island, approximately ten miles long and between two and 
three miles wide, also had great strategic value. Pamlico Sound, which the Burnside 
expedition had entered at the beginning of February, was divided from Albemarle Sound 
by a low lying peninsula. At the eastern edge of this peninsula sat Roanoke, located 
north of all of North Carolina’s barrier inlets, and aptly described by one historian as “a 
loose-fitting cork plugging the neck of a bottle called Albemarle Sound.”1 This sound 
granted access to several important towns along North Carolina’s interior waterways, 
and also served as the watery backdoor to Norfolk and the navy-yard there, which was of 
vital importance to the Confederacy. It was at Roanoke that Burnside would land his first 
blow, and before three months were out, he would capitalize on his victory there by 
capturing a large part of North Carolina’s eastern seaboard, including the important posts 
of New Bern and Beaufort. North Carolina had long dreaded such an invasion, and 
Northerners had long yearned for such victories, which had been scarce for Union 
armies. Before his expedition was over, Burnside’s unbroken string of successes would 
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make North Carolinians realize their fears while fulfilling the hopes of many in the 
Union, chief among them the War Department and Lincoln’s administration. 
 As General Wise lay at Nags Head shaking with fever and spitting up blood, 
Burnside put his force in motion. On 4 February, Burnside reported his men ready to 
Commodore Goldsborough, and the next day, the 19 gunboats and roughly 50 transport 
vessels received orders to advance. The gunboats led the way, and the first day’s sailing 
proceeded until 6:00 p.m. under a beautiful sunset. When Burnside, aboard the Picket, 
sailed past the rest of the fleet, the men gave him six rousing cheers. That night, the 
expedition came to rest at Stumpy Point, six miles from the entrance to Croatan Sound. 
The next day, the ships passed single file through the narrow channel entrance, and the 
advance continued until the fleet came within full sight of the island. The rigging of each 
vessel was filled with soldiers, looking, in the words of Larned, “like so many monkeys 
in the ropes.” Though a thick fog came on and brought the fleet to a standstill, Burnside 
went out in a tug on a reconnaissance, and continued to formulate his plans for an 
attack.2 
 Burnside’s soldiers were issued three days rations and forty rounds of 
ammunition in preparation for the attack. The men reported themselves in fine spirits, 
and though one private in the 25th Massachusetts admitted that “[t]he thing is being 
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managed pretty cautiously,” he was convinced that “when the show comes off, it will be 
ahead of anything we ever saw, not excepting Barnum’s.” As the men talked of booming 
guns, the rattle of infantry, splendid bayonet charges, brilliant victories, and deeds of 
courage, daring, and heroism, the bands filled the air with national music. This same 
soldier closed his 6 February diary entry by quoting a poem that pointed to the action 
ahead: “Then welcome war, our arms to brace/The standards planted face to face/Tho’ 
death’s pale horse leads on the chase/We’ll follow there.”3 
 Meanwhile, the Confederates on Roanoke were scrambling to do all they could to 
prepare for the coming attack. The island’s primary defenses consisted of three forts all 
located on its northwestern side. Not one of the batteries in the marshes to the south, 
thought so important by Wise, had even neared completion. A little over half way up the 
island, at Pork Point, sat Fort Bartow, mounting nine guns, eight of which were heavy 
32-pounder navy smoothbores of limited range. North of Fort Bartow was Fort 
Blanchard, mounting four of the same guns, and at the northwest tip of Roanoke, at 
Weir’s Point, sat Fort Huger, armed with ten 32-pounders and two rifled pieces. Across 
Croatan Sound, on the mainland, was located Fort Forrest, which held seven smoothbore 
cannon and a few rifled pieces that would be out of range and contribute nothing to the 
coming battle. For field artillery, Colonel Shaw of the 8th North Carolina, in direct 
command with Wise sick, had only a heavy 24-pounder boat howitzer, a 6-pounder brass 
                                                 
3 Entry for 6 February 1862, in David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th Massachusetts Volunteer 
Infantry (Milford, Mass.: King & Billings, 1884), 32. 
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field piece, and an 18-pounder field gun that was a remnant of the Mexican war. None of 
these three guns had caissons, and Shaw had the use of only four mules to haul them 
about.4 
 Before he took sick, Wise had made desperate attempts to bring more cannons to 
the island. On 28 January, he had ordered Colonel C.F. Henningsen, commander of the 
Wise Legion’s artillery, to bring the six guns in his possession, along with their carriages 
and caissons, to Norfolk, and then tow them down the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal. 
At the same time, Henningsen’s men and horses were to move by land over the sea 
bridge and down the beach to Nags Head. Wise was convinced that this route would 
allow the artillery to reach him by 1 or 2 February at the latest.5 But his orders to 
Henningsen were countermanded by Huger, who claimed that he could not furnish water 
transportation for the cannons and caissons, and argued that the road along the beach 
would not allow for the movement of guns or men. Therefore, he rerouted the artillery, 
ordering it to proceed inland. Henningsen was forced to haul the six cannons to 
Elizabeth City, over forty miles away. The result of this was that none of the sorely 
needed guns reached Roanoke in time for the battle.6 
                                                 
4 Shaw to Wise, 8 January 1862; Report of Lieut. Daniel W. Flagler, U.S. Ordnance Department, 20 
February 1862; Wise to Davis, 13 February 1862, all in O.R., Vol. 9, 81-82, 111-112, 127-128. 
Furthermore, Shaw had only 12-pounder ammunition to serve the 18-pounder field gun. 
 
5 O.R., Vol. 9, 118, 143. 
 
6 Henningsen found the view that the guns and men could not be transported along the beach to be 
“erroneous”; Wise himself felt that the beach road was “the very best and firmest road in all this section,” 
and accused Huger of being “grossly ignorant of the routes.” See Extract from Colonel Henningsen’s 
Report, and Wise to Burgess Sidney Gaither, 28 March 1862, both in O.R., Vol. 9, 118-121, 143-144. 
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 Nor could Wise and Shaw expect the arrival of more infantry. Though Governor 
Clark had commissioned and armed the 32nd North Carolina in the fall of 1861 with the 
express understanding that they were to be used to defend Roanoke, Huger had detained 
them at Norfolk, and they never arrived on the island.7 Therefore, three North Carolina 
regiments (the 8th, 17th, and 31st), and the 46th and 59th Virginia of the Wise Legion were 
all the infantry that Shaw possessed, numbering in total a little over 2,000 men. The 
majority of these soldiers, particularly the North Carolinians, were poorly clothed and 
insufficiently drilled, and the armament of these men was even less adequate than that of 
the forts.8 Many of the soldiers carried only fowling pieces, sporting rifles, or old flint 
muskets they had brought with them into the service. Though the North Carolina 
regiments had been awaiting new guns for some time, these had not yet arrived, much to 
the dismay of the soldiers who were well aware that they carried inferior weapons. As 
one man of the 31st North Carolina explained, “I would like to have some good guns for 
the company we could do a heap better fighting than we will with these.” Yet though this 
soldier resigned himself to the fact that these weapons were not coming, he knew that 
                                                 
7 Clark to Weldon N. Edwards, 17 February 1862, Governor Henry T. Clark Papers, G.L.B. 46, Part II, 
NCSA. 
 
8 Wise to Davis, 13 February 1862, in O.R., Vol. 9, 111-112, 129; Statement of Defenses of Roanoke 
Island, submitted to Gov. Clark, 30 January 1862, Governor Henry T. Clark Papers, G.P. 157, Folder 1, 
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the regiment would have to go into battle nonetheless. As he concluded in a letter to 
friends, “Boys we will have to fight here.”9 
 In short, the defenses of Roanoke on the eve of Burnside’s attack were, in the 
words of Wise, “[A] sad farce of ignorance and neglect combined, inexcusable in any or 
all who were responsible for them.”10 Nevertheless, Burnside’s task was not an easy one. 
He would still have to find a way to land his as-yet untested soldiers on the island in the 
face of Confederate defenders, while also neutralizing or bypassing the forts. To 
accomplish this, Burnside turned to Goldsborough and the navy, which would provide 
invaluable firepower over the coming two days. Though one of the leading scholars of 
combined operations in the Civil War has described Burnside’s capture of Roanoke as “a 
regular infantry action, unsupported by the fleet,” even cursory analysis demonstrates 
that Burnside relied heavily on Goldsborough’s gunboats to drive away Flag Officer 
Lynch’s mosquito fleet, soften the Confederate defenses, and cover the landing of the 
infantry.11 
 On the morning of 7 February, Goldsborough hoisted a signal on his flag ship, 
the Southfield. Echoing Admiral Nelson’s famous exhortation at Trafalgar, it read, “Our 
country expects every man to do his duty.” By midmorning, the fleet, led by the 
                                                 
9 Report of Lieut. Daniel W. Flagler, U.S. Ordnance Department, 20 February 1862, in O.R., Vol. 9, 82; 
George W. Barber (31st North Carolina) to Friend, 28 January 1862, Penney Family Papers, Box 1, Folder 
2, SHC. 
 
10 O.R., Vol. 9, 129. 
 
11 Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 41. 
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steamers Ceres, Putnam, and Underwriter, had passed the southern tip of Roanoke, and 
Goldsborough’s vessels were heavily engaged with the Confederate battery at Fort 
Bartow.12 The army gunboats, including the Ranger, Hussar, Vedette, and Pioneer, all 
opened on the fort with their 30-pounder Parrott rifles, and as the day wore on and their 
shots began to tell, they moved closer and blasted away with 12-pounder and 6-pounder 
Wiard guns. The Hussar alone managed to fire 200 Parrott shells and 52 shots from the 
Wiard, which fell with great accuracy among the Confederate works. The gunboats 
continued this shelling until they received the order to cease fire around 6:30 p.m.13 
 Several of the naval vessels had been struck by the Confederate batteries, but 
none had suffered any serious damage. One of the tensest moments on board any ship 
occurred on the steamer Valley City, when a Confederate shell passed through the 
magazine and exploded in the locker. To prevent the resulting flames from setting off an 
open barrel of powder, gunner John Davis courageously sat on top of the barrel, thus 
shielding it with his own body and possibly saving the ship.14 But if the shore batteries 
proved little threat to the Union vessels, Lynch’s mosquito fleet proved none at all. 
Almost as soon as the gunboats engaged the forts, one sent a shot through the 
Confederate gunboat Curlew, which subsequently ran aground. The rest of Lynch’s 
                                                 
12 Robert M. Browning Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron 
during the Civil War (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 24-25; Burnside to Thomas, 
14 February 1862, O.R., Vol. 9, 75; Larned diary entry, 7 February 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 
1: Correspondence, LOC. 
 
13 O.R., Vol. 9, 90-92, 100. 
 
14 Browning Jr., Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 25. Davis was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. 
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vessels then precipitately withdrew up Croatan Sound and played no more part in the 
battle, thereby proving every bit as ineffective as Wise had always claimed they would 
be.15 
 While the gunboats chased Lynch’s fleet away and pounded the Confederate 
forts, Burnside sent out a reconnaissance and sounding mission to find a good place to 
land his infantry. Burnside’s topographical engineer, Lieut. W.S. Andrews, was greatly 
aided in this endeavor by Thomas Robinson, a slave who had earlier escaped from 
Roanoke. Robinson directed Andrews to Ashby’s Harbor, about halfway up the island, 
which Andrews immediately recognized to be an ideal place to land troops.16 This 
information was reported back to Burnside, who subsequently ordered General Foster to 
prepare to land with the First Brigade.17 
 Foster’s men had been watching the gunboats shower Fort Bartow with shells, a 
scene many of the soldiers found mesmerizing. Shortly after 2:00 p.m., they were 
ordered to load their weapons and board barges headed for the harbor.18 Foster had 
detected a concealed force of Confederate infantry in the woods adjacent to the harbor, 
                                                 
15 Browning Jr., Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 26. Union naval casualties at Roanoke were 6 killed, 17 
wounded, and 2 missing; O.R., Vol. 9, 92, 100; Larned diary entry, 7 February 1862, Daniel Reed Larned 
Papers, Vol. 1: Correspondence, LOC. 
 
16 Larned diary entry, 7 February 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: Correspondence, LOC; 
Patricia C. Click, Time Full of Trial: The Roanoke Island Freedmen’s Colony, 1862-1867 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 24. 
 
17 Burnside to Thomas, 14 February 1862, in O.R., Vol. 9, 76. 
 
18 Entry for 7 February 1862, William J. Creasey Diary, Vol. 1, SHC; Entry for 7 February 1862, in Day, 
My Diary of Rambles, 33-34. 
 
 83 
 
so he shifted the landing site slightly to the north. His landing was covered by the 
gunboats Delaware and Picket, who chased the Confederates away, allowing Foster to 
disembark his brigade without molestation.19 As the barges and surfboats neared the 
shore, each one flying the national flag, Captain Pickett of Company A, 25th 
Massachusetts jumped off his boat and waded through waist deep mud and water to 
become the first Union soldier on the island. The rest of the 25th Massachusetts, along 
with the 23rd and 27th Massachusetts and the 10th Connecticut soon followed his lead, 
and by 5:00 over 1,500 men had been landed. These soldiers immediately set to work 
using rails and planks to build a road across the marsh so that artillery could come 
ashore.20 
 Reno’s Second Brigade followed, the 21st Massachusetts and 51st New York 
coming in hot on Foster’s heels aboard light-draught steamboats, trailed by the 9th New 
Jersey and 51st Pennsylvania. The 21st Massachusetts was sent to occupy the road and 
woods in front of the harbor, so that no Confederates would be able to contest the 
landing from cover. Meanwhile, Parke proceeded to land his four regiments. The 4th 
Rhode Island was transferred to the light-draught steamer Phoenix, which was run into 
the marsh, allowing the men to jump overboard and wade ashore. In tow of the Phoenix 
was a collection of surfboats and life boats bearing the 8th Connecticut, 5th Rhode Island, 
                                                 
19 Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Foster, 9 February 1862, and Burnside to Thomas, 14 February 1862, in 
O.R., Vol. 9, 75-76, 85-86. 
 
20 Entry for 7 February 1862, in Day, My Diary of Rambles, 34; Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Foster, 9 
February 1862, in O.R., Vol. 9, 85-86. The 24th Massachusetts was not landed until the next morning, due 
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and 9th New York, and by 11:00 p.m., Burnside had gotten his entire division ashore 
save one regiment, some 7,500 plus men in total. Additionally, six naval howitzers had 
been landed with their gun crews, artillery that would be put to good use the next day.21 
Thus, by judicious planning, use of combined arms, and a well-executed landing, Union 
forces had wrested control of the entire southern half of Roanoke without any significant 
fighting. 
 As the Union troops bivouacked on their arms near the harbor in a driving rain, 
Foster, who had assumed command on the island as the senior officer present, conducted 
a night reconnaissance with Parke and Reno. Despite the soggy conditions, he reported 
the men in excellent spirits, and ready for the coming fight. The commander of the 21st 
Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Alberto C. Maggi, stated that the rain made it impossible for 
his soldiers to sleep, so every half hour he made the companies fall in to keep the men 
occupied. And though the colonel almost surely exaggerated when he testified that there 
was “not a word of grumbling, not an expression of weariness” among the soaked 
soldiers, morale did remain high as the troops anticipated their first battle.22 
 Despite Wise’s and Shaw’s shortage of infantry and artillery, the principal 
Confederate position on Roanoke was a naturally strong one. Only one road, a 
causeway, ran up the length of the marshy island, and the Confederates had constructed 
                                                 
21 Report of Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno, 10 February 1862, and Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Parke, 9 
February 1862, in O.R., Vol. 9, 97-98, 105; Browning Jr., Cape Charles to Cape Fear, 26. 
 
22 Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Foster and Report of Lieut. Col. Alberto C. Maggi, Twenty-First 
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a strong series of earthworks directly across it, with both its right and left flanks 
anchored on what were believed to be impenetrable swamps filled with thick 
underbrush. It was here, about a mile from Ashby’s Harbor, that Shaw placed his 
infantry as well as his three field pieces, and he had wisely cleared trees along the 
causeway for several hundred yards in front of the position to deprive any advancing 
Union forces of cover.23 The terrain in this sector of the island was so bad that Burnside 
believed that it “precluded the possibility of any general oversight of operations on the 
field,” so he left Foster, Reno, and Parke with a great deal of discretion in planning and 
fighting the battle.24 
 At daybreak on 8th February, Foster ordered his brigade to fall in and advance, 
with the 25th Massachusetts in the lead. These men skirmished with Confederate pickets 
before discovering the main enemy position astride the causeway. Foster immediately 
placed the six naval howitzers in the road, commanded by Midshipman Benjamin Porter 
and Acting Master J.B. Hammond, and supported them with the 25th Massachusetts, 
which advanced to within 300 yards of the earthworks and began firing on the 
Confederate center at 8:00 a.m. Foster then ordered the 23rd and 27th Massachusetts to 
“advance through the morass on our right and endeavor to turn the enemy’s left.”25 John 
                                                 
23 Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Foster, 9 February 1862, and Wise to Davis, 13 February 1862, both in 
O.R., Vol. 9, 86, 112; Larned diary entry, 9 February 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: 
Correspondence, LOC; William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 
56-57. 
 
24 Burnside to Thomas, 14 February 1862, in O.R., Vol. 9, 77. 
 
25 Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Foster, 9 February 1862, and Report of Col. Edwin Upton, Twenty-fifth 
Massachusetts Infantry, 10 February 1862, both in O.R., Vol. 9, 86-87, 96. 
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Kurtz, the Colonel of the 23rd Massachusetts, marched his men across the face of the 
Confederate fire, through what one of his soldiers termed “the worst swamp in the 
South,” to reach this position, but though the 23rd and 27th Massachusetts poured fire into 
the Confederate works, they could make but little headway in turning the enemy’s left 
flank for the next two hours.26 
 Due to the narrow road to the battlefield and the woods and swamp to its right 
and left, Reno’s brigade advanced slowly behind Foster’s. After a quick survey of the 
field made clear that little progress was being made in the center and on the Union right, 
Reno informed Foster that he would move his regiments to the left and “endeavor to 
penetrate the woods and swamp, and thus turn [the Confederate] right.” Therefore, the 
21st Massachusetts, 51st New York, and 9th New Jersey all slogged through water and 
dense underbrush, which was so bad Colonel Edward Ferrero described the area as “a 
dense jungle,” as they moved off the road. These men commenced oblique fire on the 
Confederate works and battery, which they kept up for two hours, but like Foster’s 
regiments on the right, they found that the terrain greatly impeded their progress and 
prevented an immediate charge against the Confederate flank.27 
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 Parke’s Third Brigade was the last to reach the battlefield, and the general had 
left the 8th Connecticut behind to hold the camp near Ashby’s Harbor. By the time Parke 
arrived with the 4th Rhode Island and 9th New York, Reno was already heavily engaged 
on the left. Foster ordered Parke to support his own brigades on the right, and Parke 
promptly sent the 4th Rhode Island, Colonel Isaac P. Rodman commanding, to take 
position on the left of the 27th Massachusetts. As they moved into position, Rodman’s 
regiment was exposed to a continuous fire of musketry, but the men, according to the 
Colonel, “[P]lunged into the swamp, nearly waist-deep with mud and water, and after 
almost incredible exertions succeeded in forcing [their] way through briers, cypress, and 
a dense mass of birch.” The 9th New York, which had been waiting in the clearing by the 
road, was then ordered to follow.28 
 Burnside was content to let Foster, Reno, and Parke, who were all more familiar 
with the terrain than he was, exercise direct control over the battle. Nevertheless, he 
remained in constant communication with them, and itched to place himself in the thick 
of the fighting. As Larned explained, Burnside’s “impatience was beyond all bounds and 
it was all we could do to keep him back.” Burnside would eventually go to the front with 
an escort, but before he did, he made efforts to greet the wounded who were starting to 
stream back towards the camp. Larned described how the general came face to face with 
men who had “arms torn off at the shoulder, legs ragged and bloody, heads broken open 
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and feet torn off – and such looking faces.” As Burnside spoke to and shook hands with 
these men, he drew tears from both wounded and witnesses. One of the wounded 
soldiers tried to bolster the general’s spirits in turn by exclaiming, “They didn’t kill me, 
General, only knocked me senseless. I’ll be ready for them again in a few days.” Yet the 
scene was still so gruesome that Larned believed that none could adequately describe its 
horrors, or the anxiety it caused among all at the rear.29 
 Anxiety among the Confederate defenders, however, was also growing. Shaw 
had less than 2,000 men in the works, which was enough to blanket the causeway with 
musketry. But the Union fire on the right and left flanks indicated that the swamp that 
the Confederates had perceived to be impassable was in fact being advanced through, 
albeit slowly. This spelled disaster for the Confederates, for although the 2nd North 
Carolina was on its way to the island, for the moment Shaw had no reserve to bolster his 
wings, and the fact that he had only four mules to move his artillery, several of which 
had already been hit, meant that repositioning his guns to combat any Union 
breakthrough on the flanks would be time consuming and most likely futile.30 
 The battle, however, was not yet won for the Union. The 25th Massachusetts had 
suffered heavily by the road from what its colonel termed an “incessant fire,” and had by 
10:30 completely exhausted its ammunition. In fact, several regiments were running low 
on ammunition, which was slow making it to the battlefield because it had to be carried 
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through the knee-deep mud on the shoulders of tired soldiers.31 As the 25th 
Massachusetts withdrew, their place was taken by the 10th Connecticut, whose Colonel, 
Charles Russell, was soon after killed. Like the 25th Massachusetts, the 10th Connecticut 
took severe punishment, ultimately sustaining 55 casualties, the highest number in any 
Union regiment. Indeed, Foster would heap praise on these two regiments in his official 
report by claiming that he “never saw men stand up more gallantly under a hot fire.”32 
But stand up though they might, these regiments could not advance against the 
Confederate center until more of the fire emanating from that position was diverted. 
 Therefore, the breakthrough would have to come on the flanks, and Reno was 
working hard to make such an event occur. He had continually shifted the 51st New York 
and the 21st Massachusetts to the left, until they were solidly astride the right of the 
Confederate line. These regiments then began to pick their way through the swamp 
directly towards the Confederates, and by 11:00 they were only 100 yards from the 
breastworks. Realizing this, the Confederate right wing began to give way, at which 
point Reno ordered these two regiments, supported by the 9th New Jersey in reserve, to 
charge and take the three-gun battery.33 
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 Colonels Ferrero and Maggi led the charge, with the 51st New York to the left of 
the 21st Massachusetts. These two regiments arrived inside the Confederate works 
almost simultaneously, and as Captain Wright of the 51st New York planted the 
American flag on the ramparts, the 21st Massachusetts did the same with its state and 
regimental flags. Reno himself stated that the charge was gallantly executed, and Maggi 
exclaimed in his official report that “I never saw better behavior by any soldiers, young 
or veterans, and I do not believe it was possible in such a ground – if a continual swamp 
and ponds of water can be so called – that anyone could have surpassed the brilliant and 
gallant conduct of all my command.”34 Though Shaw attempted to shift his three 
artillery pieces to confront the advance of Reno’s regiments, all of his mules had been 
killed, making this impossible.35 
 Nor would this have done the Confederates much good, for increased pressure 
came not just from the flanks, but now from the causeway as well. About the same time 
as Reno ordered his men forward, Foster had ordered the 9th New York Zouaves, led by 
Colonel Hawkins, to charge directly up the road at the battery. This regiment had 
originally been ordered to follow the 4th Rhode Island into the swamp on the right, but 
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the terrain had so impeded their progress that Foster and Parke had decided to detain 
them near the road. Shortly before 11:30, Foster bellowed his order to Hawkins: “This is 
the very moment. Zouaves, storm the battery!” Led by a brave major, the Zouaves made 
for the Confederate center at a run, their own yells mixing with the cheers of the Union 
troops who watched their advance.36 The weight of this charge, combined with the 
success of Reno on the Union left and with the creeping advance of the 23rd and 27th 
Massachusetts on the right was too much for the Confederate defenders, who spiked 
their guns and fled in great confusion towards the northern tip of the island. 
 Before 15 minutes had passed, Foster and Reno had organized a pursuit. This 
was led initially by Reno’s 21st Massachusetts and the 9th New York, which was ordered 
to the eastern edge of the island to round up the Confederates trying to escape in small 
boats from Shallow Bag Bay to Nags Head. The Zouaves captured 40 prisoners around 
the bay, including the mortally wounded Captain O. Jennings Wise, the son of General 
Henry Wise and commander of the Wise Legion in his absence. When the 21st 
Massachusetts began to outpace the other regiments, Fostered ordered them to halt, and 
the advance was then led by the 24th Massachusetts. This regiment had not been landed 
on the island until that morning and arrived on the battlefield just after the battery had 
been captured. Company B and Company H of the 24th Massachusetts rounded up 
roughly 160 Confederate soldiers hiding in the woods, while the rest of the force 
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advanced steadily north. Meanwhile, Parke took the 10th Connecticut and 4th Rhode 
Island along a narrow road to the west for a mile to take control of Fort Bartow at Port 
Point, which the Confederates had abandoned during their retreat. These regiments 
found the guns at the fort spiked and the gun carriages all severely damaged from the 
naval bombardment.37 
 As the national colors were raised over Fort Bartow, Foster rode in to announce 
the surrender of the rest of the Confederate force. The 24th and 21st Massachusetts had 
skirmished briefly with Confederate troops near Fort Huger at Weir’s Point before Lieut. 
Col. Fowle of the 31st North Carolina had approached Foster with a flag of truce, asking 
for terms of surrender. Foster replied that the terms were “none but those of 
unconditional surrender,” and Shaw, quickly realizing the hopelessness of his position, 
was forced to accept these. This was all the more unfortunate for the Confederates, as the 
2nd North Carolina had just landed on the island and was also forced to lay down its 
arms. Furthermore, Fort Forrest, on the mainland opposite Weir’s Point, was hastily 
burned and evacuated, its garrison fleeing precipitately inland.38 
 Burnside and his brigadiers had won a complete victory. At the cost of 264 
casualties, Burnside’s division had captured 2,675 Confederates, along with 4 forts, 
3,000 small arms, and 42 pieces of artillery, and secured Union possession of the crucial 
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island, and therefore of Albemarle Sound.39 The next day, Burnside issued a 
congratulatory order to his victorious troops, praising them for their “brilliant and 
successful occupation of Roanoke Island.” Burnside lauded Foster, Reno, and Parke for 
their conduct of the battle, and proved prescient in estimating that the courage and 
steadiness of the soldiers was a “token of future victory.” Each regiment was to inscribe 
on its flag “Roanoke Island, Feb. 8th, 1862.” Burnside also wrote directly to McClellan 
announcing his capture of the island and the Confederate garrison, and stating his belief 
that “[t]he expedition begins to look like a success.”40 
 The events of the next two days would only make this opinion appear all the 
more correct. While Union soldiers dried out their wet clothes over fires, sipped a 
whiskey ration, mingled with Confederate prisoners, and searched for trophies of the 
battle to send to loved ones at home, the navy attempted to put the finishing touches on 
the victory by destroying the remainder of Lynch’s mosquito fleet, which had retreated 
up Albemarle Sound to Elizabeth City.41 On 9 February, Goldsborough ordered 
Commander Stephen Clegg Rowan in pursuit with 14 vessels mounting 37 guns. Though 
Lynch’s force numbered only six weak boats, the naval bombardment of Roanoke had 
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greatly depleted Rowan’s ammunition, to the point where he had less than 20 rounds on 
average for each of his guns. Rowan later termed this “the most trying hour of my life,” 
but he decided to give battle nonetheless. That night, Rowan informed his officers that 
the advance was to be a reconnaissance in force, to be converted into a full attack if he 
deemed it prudent.42 
 Lynch’s boats were ostensibly under the protection of the battery at Cobb’s Point 
above Elizabeth City, which mounted four 32-pounders. The battery, however, was 
poorly cited, and described by one of the captains of Lynch’s vessels as a “wretchedly 
constructed affair.” Instead of remaining aboard his flag ship, Lynch actually went 
ashore to direct the fire from this battery.43 On the morning of 10 February, Rowan’s 
vessels advanced, led by the steamers Underwriter, Commodore Perry, and Morse. 
When the fleet closed to within two miles, the Confederates opened fire, but most of the 
shots passed harmlessly overhead. Rowan determined to have his ships hold their fire, 
pass the fort, and “smash old Lynch up,” and when the Union vessels moved within a 
mile of the mosquito fleet, Rowan gave the signal “dash at the enemy.” As the 
commander described it, “We opened fire and at the same time the throttle valves. It was 
a pretty sight.”44 
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 The ensuing battle was brief. The superior firepower of Rowan’s vessels quickly 
overwhelmed the Confederate force. The crew of the Delaware boarded and captured the 
Confederate gunboat Fanny, while the Confederates were forced to abandon the Black 
Warrior and set her on fire. The Ellis also fell into Union hands. Meanwhile, the flag 
ship of the Confederate fleet, the Sea Bird, tried to flee to the Dismal Swamp Canal, but 
was forced to surrender, and soon after sank when the Commodore Perry accidentally 
smashed into her. Only one Confederate steamer, the Beaufort, escaped, as did Lynch, 
who fled the fort and left his fleet to its fate.45 The Confederates then set fire to Elizabeth 
City, and many citizens evacuated the town. It was Rowan’s sailors who helped put out 
the flames, which Rowan believed “must have its effect in teaching our deluded 
countrymen a lesson in Humanity and Civilization.”46 But whether Confederates drew 
this lesson or not, one thing was clear: with Rowan’s victory, the naval arm of 
Burnside’s expedition had secured complete control of the sounds of North Carolina. 
Union vessels would in fact operate relatively undisturbed in these sounds for the 
remainder of the war. 
 The Union soldiers at Roanoke were naturally elated when they heard of 
Rowan’s success, completing as it did their own hard-fought victory. McClellan too 
wrote that he was rejoiced to hear of the capture of Roanoke Island and the destruction 
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of Lynch’s gunboats.47 And though it was Rowan who had destroyed the Confederate 
fleet and Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke who had primarily directed the land action on 
8 February, this in no way diminished Burnside in the eyes of his division. As Larned 
explained, “The General is already nominated for the Presidency in [18]64.”48 But while 
Northerners celebrated and praised the victorious general, Southerners were going 
through a wholly different ordeal. Shockwaves of fear and anger immediately 
reverberated out from North Carolina all along the Atlantic coast. Both Confederate 
civilians and soldiers began to despair and heap blame on the government in Richmond 
for failing to protect Roanoke, and the Davis administration itself took a grim view of 
the defeat, coming as it did at the same time as the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson in 
Tennessee.49 The majority of Confederates, in fact, saw these battles as a linked string of 
defeats that cast a pall over the optimism they had harbored for success in 1862. 
 While Burnside’s expedition was crossing the bar at Hatteras in late January, the 
New York Herald asserted its belief that “some telling blows from Burnside will be 
known throughout every rebel camp from Manassas to Mobile, and in every town and 
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hamlet of the South.”50 Roanoke was the general’s first blow, and the results were 
exactly what the Herald had predicted. Citizens of North Carolina understandably 
panicked, as they knew full well that Burnside’s control of Albemarle and Pamlico 
Sounds, as well as the eradication of Lynch’s mosquito fleet, meant that Union forces 
could land at any point they chose along North Carolina’s interior waterways. As one 
wealthy plantation owner from Halifax County in northeastern North Carolina put it, 
“Albemarle Sound and its tributaries are now open to inroads and incursions of all kinds. 
Wherever their gun boats can go they will be masters.” This same citizen immediately 
commenced packing up valuables to move inland, but before she left, she attended a 
dinner party, which turned out to be quite a somber affair. As she explained, “We 
thought of little else save Roanoke Island and tho’ I made an effort to throw off the 
gloom and talk of other things yet it all seemed hollow and artificial…Union now means 
conquest, and conquest, confiscation [of slaves]. So we go!”51 
 Governor Clark immediately began receiving petitions both from citizens asking 
that their counties be put in better states of defense, and from North Carolina regiments 
requesting that they be transferred back to the state, so that they might, in the words of 
one colonel, “[D]efend to the last extremity…our patriotic and beloved old 
                                                 
50 “The Condition of the South,” New York Herald, 26 January 1862. 
 
51 Entries for 10, 11, and 13 February 1862, in Catherine Ann Devereux Edmondston, ‘Journal of a Secesh 
Lady’: The Diary of Catherine Ann Devereux Edmondston, 1860-1866, eds. Beth G. Crabtree and James 
W. Patton (Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History, 1979), 114-116. 
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county…[and] be enabled to look after our wives children and property.”52 Many were 
worried that Burnside would immediately advance on the Weldon Railroad; in light of 
this, Archibald McLean, the Mayor of Fayetteville, requested a regiment and a battery of 
six guns, while the North Carolina Convention passed a resolution demanding that Clark 
report as early as possible what force could be sent to the Roanoke River to protect the 
Weldon Bridge in that area.53 Clark, in fact, received so many reports of disaffection 
among citizens and military officials of the state that he felt the need to issue a strongly 
worded proclamation exhorting North Carolinians not to despair, but to instead enlist in 
the army. It read, in part: 
North Carolinians! Our country needs your aid for its protection and 
defence against an invading foe…Our own boarders are invaded by the 
enemy in force, now threatening an advance to deprive us of liberty, 
property, and all that we hold dear as a self-governing and free people. 
We must resist him at all hazards and by every means in our 
power…North Carolina has always proved true, constant, and brave in 
the hour of trial and of danger. Never let it be said that in the future she 
has failed to maintain this high renown…The enemy is redoubling his 
efforts and straining every nerve to over-run our country and subjugate us 
to his domination…Fellow Citizens! Your first allegiance is due to North 
Carolina. Rally to her banners.54 
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Yet although there was a short-lived increase in enlistments in North Carolina, many 
citizens remained disenchanted with a Confederacy they believed had failed to protect 
their state.55 
 It was not only in North Carolina, however, that citizens were troubled by the 
loss of Roanoke, and the manner in which it fell. In Richmond, Thomas Bragg, Davis’s 
Attorney General, noted a great deal of discontent, causing him to remark that the capital 
was in a state of “general panic,” and to record in his diary his opinion that “our cause is 
hopeless.”56 And from the same city, Robert Garlick Hill Kean, the soon-to-be head of 
the Confederate Bureau of War, listed Roanoke alongside Fort Henry as disasters that 
had befallen the Confederate Army, and penned his belief that “[d]angers close us round 
on every side. The timid will begin to croak, the half-hearted to quail and suggest 
submission, [and] the traitorous to agitate.”57 
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 Confederate military figures were just as disgusted and worried by the loss of 
Roanoke as Southern citizens. D.H. Hill, who had for months attempted to get 
Confederate authorities to realize the importance of the island, was disheartened by its 
fall as well as that of Fort Henry, and wrote to his wife from Virginia, “We are losing 
ground rapidly…This will be a year of blood and of awful reverses to our arms.” Hill 
could not help adopting an I-told-everyone-so tone, arguing that “I have not made a 
single mistake in my calculations of what the enemy would do,” and blaming the defeats 
on those who were too busy “stupidly crowing over past victories” instead of preparing 
for the future. He was convinced that Roanoke “could have been made impregnable;” 
the fact that it was not made him “ashamed of the South.” Indeed, the general thought 
the military situation so bad that he told his wife that “we will be conquered in three 
months, probably sooner.”58 
 Hill was not alone in these sentiments. General Robert E. Lee, at the time 
commanding the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, told his own wife 
that the news from Tennessee and North Carolina “is not at all cheering, and disasters 
seem to be thickening around us.” Lee was, in fact, so awed by the achievements of the 
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Union gunboats at Hatteras, Port Royal, and Roanoke that he told General Roswell 
Ripley, commanding at Charleston, S.C., that he was in favor of abandoning that 
position and retreating into the interior, where the Confederates could meet the Union 
forces on more equal terms. Indeed, the fact that Lee entertained the possibility of 
evacuating such a key post shows just how much an impression Burnside’s and 
Goldsborough’s victories had made.59 
 All of this despondency and anger led to a great deal of censure of the 
Confederate government. Edward A. Pollard, the editor of the Richmond Examiner 
during the war, later called Donelson and Roanoke part of a “thread of Confederate 
disaster,” but stated that it was in fact the loss of Roanoke that “dated the period when 
public censure towards the Richmond Government appeared to have first awakened.” As 
Pollard explained, “Heretofore the administration of that Government had gone on 
almost without inquiry…But such a disaster…in which improvidence stared out, and in 
which an army had been put, as it were, in a mash-trap –in a condition in which it could 
neither hope for success nor extricate itself from a besetting peril – provoked public 
inquiry.” Pollard contended that no one who lived in Richmond during this period 
“could ever forget these gloomy, miserable days,” and made clear his belief that the 
defeats were not accidents nor a hand of providence, but rather that they could be 
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“distinctly and sufficiently traced to human causes.”60 To Pollard and many other 
Confederate citizens, these “human causes” were Jefferson Davis and Judah P. 
Benjamin. 
 Diarist Mary Chestnut, for one, wrote that North Carolina newspapers constantly 
criticized Davis for ignoring the defenses of their state, while citizens everywhere, angry 
with Benjamin, referred to him regularly as “Mr. Davis’s pet Jew.”61 In Congress, Henry 
S. Foote of Tennessee railed against those he saw as responsible for the losses of Forts 
Henry and Donelson in his home state, as well as of Roanoke Island, exclaiming, “Leave 
us now, and go to your own vocations; leave us; you have done us harm enough; go your 
way, you are utterly incompetent.” A clerk in the Confederate War Department, John 
Beauchamp Jones, also noted that Benjamin was denounced “as the sole cause of the 
calamities which have befallen the country.”62 But Jones erred in this regard: criticism of 
Benjamin was naturally linked to criticism of Davis, who was closely associated with his 
Secretary of War and widely believed to be the real hand behind military affairs. Indeed, 
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Davis was not exaggerating when he told his brother he was the object of special 
malignity.63 
 Any sympathy Benjamin may have clung to most likely evaporated when the 
funeral for O. Jennings Wise (whose remains had been returned by Burnside) was held at 
St. James Episcopal Church in Richmond. The event, according to Jones, who was in 
attendance, “saddened the countenances of thousands.” Benjamin, who the Wise family 
was furious with and who they in essence charged with Jennings’s murder, was forced to 
watch the procession through his window at the War Department, not daring to attend 
the ceremony.64 This was not, however, the end of the Secretary of War’s troubles. 
 In late February, a congressional committee was set up to investigate not only the 
causes of defeat at Roanoke Island, but who was at fault for the disaster, and it was 
chaired by Burgess Sidney Gaither, a North Carolina representative. Over several weeks, 
the committee took a great deal of testimony, interviewing Shaw, Wise, Huger, 
Benjamin, and many others, as well as receiving written statements from Clark. Many in 
Richmond generally, and those on the committee specifically, at first laid the blame for 
the island’s quick surrender at the feet of the North Carolina regiments, who Wise had 
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claimed in his initial report to Davis “did not fight…except a few companies.”65 Gaither 
told Clark that Colonel Shaw’s and Colonel Jordan’s regiments had been slandered, but 
he succeeded in gathering from the Governor detailed information on the large number 
of troops and arms North Carolina had sent away to the defense of other states. Gaither 
then pointed out to the committee that hardly any troops, arms, or money from other 
states went to the defense of the North Carolina coast, and therefore, as he claimed to 
Clark, he was able to “repel the taunts and disparaging remarks of others” and show the 
committee that the North Carolina soldiers “fought bravely for more than four hours at 
great disadvantage,” only succumbing to “overpowering numbers.”66 
In the light of this information, it quickly became clear to the committee that 
Roanoke was insufficiently supplied with men, arms, and powder, but as Gaither 
explained, determining who was responsible for this neglect was expected to prove a 
more difficult challenge.67 But when it was Benjamin’s turn before the committee, he 
provided them with a much-needed scapegoat. The Secretary of War, whose loyalty to 
Davis had not wavered, stated directly “I take personal responsibility for the decision at 
Roanoke.” As he later explained to Colonel Charles Marshall, an aide-de-camp to Lee, 
“I consulted the President whether it was best for the country that I should submit to 
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unmerited censure or reveal to a congressional committee our poverty and my utter 
inability to supply the requisitions of General Wise.” To reveal such would have alerted 
both Confederate citizens and Northern military authorities to the powerlessness of the 
Confederacy to properly defend any of its exposed positions, which would certainly have 
caused great anxiety among the former and renewed exertions among the latter. 
Therefore, according to Benjamin, “It was thought best for the public service that I 
should suffer the blame in silence.”68 And suffer the Secretary did, becoming the object 
of a great deal of scorn. 
Ultimately, the committee determined that the blame for the Roanoke disaster 
should rest on Huger and Benjamin.69 Benjamin was charged with a failure to adequately 
supply the island’s defenders, and he was removed as Secretary of War. In accordance 
with the reason for which he had claimed responsibility before the committee, he never 
attempted a defense of this charge, and therefore it remained on the public record. Davis, 
however, appointed the disgraced Benjamin to replace Robert M.T. Hunter as Secretary 
of State. Given his organizational ability and internationalist background, this was a post 
Benjamin was well suited for. But Davis’s willingness to shift his much maligned friend 
(who had, in the words of Pollard, been charged with “a matter of the gravest offense 
known to the laws and the interests of the country”) to a position of equal magnitude in 
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his cabinet only hurt the President’s popularity.70 As one resident of Richmond made 
clear, “This act on the part of the President, in defiance of public opinion, was 
considered as unwise, arbitrary, and a reckless risking of his reputation and popularity.” 
Likewise, Gaither wrote back to North Carolina that “The president does things pretty 
much in his own way, without consulting anyone…[I] do not feel that we have the men 
here to ride upon the whirlwind and direct the storm.”71 Nevertheless, Benjamin would 
serve ably as Secretary of State until the end of the war. 
Davis himself could not escape the gloom Roanoke had cast over both Richmond 
and, in a larger sense, Confederate optimism regarding the military situation. The 
President attempted to defend himself to William W. Avery, another North Carolina 
congressional representative, by writing that the Confederacy’s ability to defend the 
coast “is limited by the supply of arms, powder, and other munitions of war,” and 
claiming that Roanoke, had it been better served by its commanders, should have 
entertained “a reasonable hope of successful resistance to any force the enemy could 
then bring to bear against it.” Yet in the same letter, Davis admitted that the island’s fall 
was “disastrous…our signal defeat.”72 Unfortunately for Davis, he knew that he would 
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soon have to discuss the Roanoke debacle in a more public forum, for he was to be 
inaugurated as President under the Confederacy’s permanent constitution on 22 
February, and therefore had to make an inaugural address. 
 As if the atmosphere in Richmond was not depressed enough, the day brought a 
torrential rainstorm so fierce that Jones remarked in his diary, “The heavens weep 
incessantly. Capitol Square is black with umbrellas.” Yet an immense crowd still 
collected to hear Davis give his speech.73 The President could not ignore the current 
military setbacks; as he told the people, “we have recently met with serious disasters.” 
Davis in fact termed it “the darkest hour of our struggle,” and admitted that “the tide for 
the moment is against us.”74 Three days later, he would tell the Confederate Congress in 
a separate address that “events have demonstrated that the Government had attempted 
more than it had power successfully to achieve,” and call the surrender at Roanoke 
“deeply humiliating.”75 But Davis also went to pains to point out to those assembled for 
his inauguration that “there has been no act on our part to impair personal liberty or the 
freedom of speech, of thought, or of the press. The courts have been open, the judicial 
functions fully executed, and every right of the peaceful citizen maintained as securely 
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as if a war of invasion had not disturbed the land.” Thus far, Davis had avoided any use 
of martial law, unlike Lincoln, who had proclaimed it in several areas. To Davis, this 
was proof of the Confederacy’s “sincerity of our purpose to maintain our ancient 
institutions.”76 The panic stemming from the Roanoke disaster was so bad, however, that 
it put this supposed sincerity to the test. 
 Confederates had long understood that Roanoke Island was the key to defending 
Norfolk; this was, in fact, the primary reason Wise believed throughout January that 
Huger should have been more willing to help him defend the island, if only out of self-
interest.77 Indeed, only two days after the garrison at Roanoke surrendered, Huger wrote 
to Richmond claiming that he was worried about the safety of Norfolk and that it was 
urgent that he be reinforced. He immediately ordered the 6th Virginia to Currituck Bridge 
to block the outlet of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, and ordered two other 
regiments to fall back to South Mills and protect the canal locks. Other companies were 
instructed to block up the Blackwater River, which flowed from Albemarle Sound.78 But 
with reinforcements slow in coming, and Burnside’s force at Roanoke appearing more 
menacing by the hour, the citizens of Norfolk began to panic. Wise only made this 
worse. In a great anger, the general made his way from Nag’s Head to Norfolk, and 
undermined any existing confidence in Benjamin by making statements like “I intend to 
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‘accuse’ General Huger of nothing! nothing!! nothing!! That was the disease which 
brought disaster at Roanoke Island.”79 
 Davis soon began to receive letters from Confederate officers detailing the 
“painful excitement” existing among citizens in Norfolk who were concerned about its 
defenses, as well as a request from the mayor of the city for 20,000 additional troops. 
Davis thought the alarmism so bad that on 27 February, less than a week after he had 
bragged to the Confederate people that the government had never restricted their civil 
liberties, he ordered the establishment of martial law in Norfolk, Portsmouth, and the 
surrounding area. Davis instructed Huger that all citizens who would embarrass the 
city’s defense in the event of a siege were to be evacuated. Furthermore, all citizens had 
to give up their arms, the entire male population was to be enrolled for military service, 
and all persons “against whom there is well-grounded suspicion of disloyalty” were to be 
imprisoned.80 
 Though some historians have attributed Davis’s first use of martial law to the 
Confederate defeats in Tennessee, both the timing of the President’s proclamation and 
the location affected make clear that it was, in fact, the affair at Roanoke and the 
resulting effects that caused Davis to ultimately utilize this measure.81 And once Davis 
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finally resorted to this tactic to quell public unrest, he began to use it liberally. Two days 
after he had put Norfolk under martial law, Davis did the same with Richmond, and a 
week later Petersburg and the country surrounding it suffered the same fate.82 In fact, by 
1 May, Davis had extended martial law over at least fifteen counties in Virginia and 
North Carolina, as well as over entire military departments in eastern Tennessee and 
coastal South Carolina.83 
 Davis’s adoption of martial law clearly indicates just how scared the Confederate 
government and military were of Burnside’s victorious division. The report given by 
Colonel Charles Dimmock to the Virginia House of Delegates in late February is further 
illustrative of this fear. Dimmock stated that he regarded a Burnside-led attack on 
Richmond as “imminent.” As the Colonel saw it, “Burnside has obtained a permanent 
landing on the North Carolina coast, at which he is getting re-enforcements. With 15,000 
or 20,000 men he can ascend the Roanoke [River], march to Petersburg, thence to 
Manchester, and from the commanding hills there shell this city…This he can do in ten 
days.” Benjamin too believed that it was evident that Burnside would soon advance on 
Norfolk, and therefore he ordered the only 2,000 men he could spare to go to the aid of 
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Huger.84 Burnside’s force provoked such anxiety that Davis wrote to General Joseph E. 
Johnston, commanding the principal Confederate army in Virginia, complaining that 
Richmond was liable to “isolation and attack in rear, should we be beaten on the lines 
South and East of Richmond.” Therefore, Davis instructed Johnston to make dispositions 
which would enable the general to quickly come to the capital’s aid in the event of 
disaster. Two weeks later, Johnston evacuated the position at Manassas that his army had 
held since the previous summer.85 
 Despite the Confederate worries, Burnside had to attend to several tasks before 
he could contemplate any further advance. First, the general had to figure out what to do 
with all of the Confederates he had captured. Burnside actually told Larned that he 
“didn’t know what on earth to do” with the over 2,500 prisoners.86 The general 
determined that the most expedient course of action was to parole the prisoners until 
they could be formally exchanged, which he hoped would increase Unionist sentiment 
among the people of eastern North Carolina, as well as remove the necessity of guarding 
these men. Therefore, Burnside proposed to Huger to send the prisoners to Elizabeth 
City upon the condition that an equal number of Union prisoners held in the South be 
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released on parole.87 On 13 February, Major General John Wool, commanding Union 
forces at Fortress Monroe, also communicated to Huger that the Union was willing to 
exchange the Confederate prisoners “on fair terms of exchange, man for man, and officer 
for officer, of equal grade…all the prisoners of either side to be discharged on parole 
with the agreement that any prisoners of war taken by the other party shall be returned in 
exchange as fast as captured,” a proposition Wool believed to be “in the interests of 
humanity.” When Huger agreed to this arrangement, Wool instructed Burnside not to 
send any of the Confederates north.88 Burnside then officially informed Huger of his 
intention to release the prisoners on 20 February, requesting that Huger act in good faith 
by releasing at once the same number of Union prisoners.89 Despite Huger’s assurances 
that none of the Confederates would take up arms until formally exchanged, historian 
Barton A. Myers has uncovered ample evidence that a number of these men, particularly 
those from Pasquotank County, soon joined partisan ranger companies.90 
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 The Confederate prisoners, however, were not the only men Burnside had to 
decide how to handle. Though many of Roanoke Island’s inhabitants had fled before the 
battle, some did remain. From his new headquarters near Fort Bartow, now renamed Fort 
Foster, Burnside had the oath of allegiance administered to any of these citizens who 
desired to take it; by late February, around 60 had done so. The general found the 
majority of those who came forward “ignorant and inoffensive.”91 But a more pressing 
issue for Burnside was what to do with the slaves who were now fleeing in scores to the 
island from places such as Elizabeth City, Plymouth, and Edenton. While the New York 
Tribune’s reporter with the expedition could pen lofty sentiments such as his belief that 
“[t]here is something truly touching in the spectacle of these people risking all and 
leaving all for the sake of liberty,” Burnside, who had been instructed by McClellan to 
interfere with slavery as little as possible, had to approach the situation much more 
pragmatically.92 
 Burnside was by no means an abolitionist, but he also evinced little desire to 
return escaped slaves to their masters, several of whom came to Roanoke Island to 
reclaim the contrabands. Indeed, Vincent Colyer, the man Burnside soon appointed to 
superintend contrabands in North Carolina, reported that the general “had too much 
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sagacity to despise the services of blacks” and “was too large hearted a man to love 
slavery.”93 Burnside’s opinions in this matter may have been influenced by letters he 
received from his friends, which attempted to convince him of the value of conciliating 
the slaves. One such letter made the case thusly: “He who has not the confidence of the 
Negro cannot win this game of war…To take from the enemy is to deprive the enemy of 
valuable persons, who feed the army while fighting against us, who are more useful to 
them than many of their fighting men…To save the Union and the Constitution we must 
take from traitors all they have.” This particular friend reminded Burnside that he held 
these sentiments despite the fact that he was an old Tammany Democrat.94 
 The First Confiscation Act, passed in August 1861, allowed Union military 
commanders to seize all property, including slaves, used in the Confederate war effort, 
and Burnside’s policies indicate that he acted accordingly. As historian Patricia C. Click 
has determined, the general “established a four-point policy with respect to the 
runaways.” Burnside allowed them to enter Union lines, took their names and former 
places of residence, gave them work and charitable support, and refused to hand them 
back over to their owners. By mid-March, Burnside had over 130 contrabands employed 
on Roanoke Island, laboring not only on the fortifications but also as dock workers, 
carpenters, blacksmiths, coopers, and guides. Less than a month later, this number had 
                                                 
93 Colyer quoted in Click, Time Full of Trial, 38. Burnside appointed Colyer, a member of the Christian 
Commission, to be Superintendent of the Poor in the Department of North Carolina on 31 March 1862; 
“From the Burnside Expedition,” New York Tribune, 14 March 1862. 
 
94 Friend to Burnside, 17 January 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, NA. 
 
 115 
 
jumped to 250.95 Male contrabands received $10 monthly, along with soldier’s rations 
and a clothing allowance, while women received $4 monthly plus rations and an 
additional monetary allowance equal to the male clothing allowance. Union soldiers and 
officers were ordered to treat all of these contrabands “with great care and humanity,” 
and Burnside ordered the creation of Camp Burnside, where the contrabands could be 
assembled and taught by the chaplains and soldiers.96 
 While the contrabands labored, Burnside’s soldiers did their best to occupy 
themselves. The regiments set up camps near the barracks of Fort Huger (renamed Fort 
Reno) and Fort Blanchard (now Fort Parke). A rousing salute was fired from these forts 
when the men learned of the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, and Larned claimed that 
the echo of the cannonade was “by far the greatest thing I ever heard.”97 Though Larned, 
the staff, and the generals enjoyed good food, including turtle soup, broiled fish, roast 
goose, duck, boiled ham, corn, beets, tomatoes, potatoes, sweet potato pudding, and 
apple fritters, the rest of the men got by on much simpler rations, although they 
occasionally found some pigs in the woods, which they promptly appropriated for 
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dinner.98 All of the forts had been put back in good order and the guns repaired, and 
under their barrels the men drilled during the day and anxiously waited for letters from 
home in the evening. Three hospitals were established on the island, all containing 
stationary beds, fireplaces, dispensaries, surgeon’s rooms, and cookhouses, and though 
the division suffered a few cases of typhoid fever, the health of the men was generally 
good. Those who did pass away were buried in a new cemetery the men had dedicated 
with a religious service. The plots of ground were divided among the regiments, and 
each soldier who was laid to rest here had his name, age, regiment, and date of death 
inscribed on a headstone.99 
 This cemetery may have served as a grim reminder that the division had much 
work before it. Though Burnside remained unready to make any major movement 
throughout February, he did send the 9th New York and 4th Rhode Island up the Chowan 
River to Winton. The gunboat Delaware drew fire from a Confederate force on the 
shore, but when the Union force reached the town on 20 February, they found the enemy 
gone and the American flag flying. Colonel Hawkins and Commander Rowan, leading 
the expedition, then ordered all military stores that could not be removed to be burned, 
but shifting winds carried the flames to some empty houses. Rowan and Hawkins soon 
discovered, however, that the river had been barricaded by felled trees, rendering it 
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impassable, so they returned to Roanoke. The raid, however, still left an impression on 
the Confederates, demonstrating as it did their inability to defend towns along the rivers 
and sounds in North Carolina. As Burnside explained, “The enemy is very much 
distracted by these frequent dashes on their coast, and seem to have but little idea where 
the next blow will be aimed.”100 
 Burnside was, in fact, planning this next blow. Though McClellan did ask 
Burnside to “gain all possible information as to the possibility of attacking Norfolk from 
the south,” he thought it best that Burnside stick to the original plan, which called for an 
advance on New Bern.  The taking of this city would provide the Union Navy with a key 
harbor that would aid in its blockade of the North Carolina coast, which was still less 
than effective. It would also give Burnside a base he could use to advance on Beaufort or 
move into the interior of the state and threaten the Weldon Railroad and thus the supply 
line to the Confederate forces in Virginia. To aid in this, McClellan had sent Burnside 30 
maps of the southern states; three were colored, for his personal use, and the rest were to 
be distributed among the colonels.101 This advance was delayed throughout February and 
early March by bad weather, as well as Burnside’s shortage of coal and forage. The 
incoming correspondence Larned handled indicated that many in the North were anxious 
for Burnside to follow up his victory, but as the secretary explained to his brother-in-
law:  
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You may all think us slow…but when you remember that there are some 
10,000 mouths to feed and care for, and some 70 or 80 vessels to coal and 
water and provision, with a scanty supply of material, the island to guard 
and the plans of the campaign in an enemy’s country to arrange, with the 
possibility of meeting a larger force than we have yet met, you will see 
this can not be done in a moment.102 
 
But by 5 March, Burnside was able to report his force ready to McClellan, and told the 
general in chief that he would “move at once upon New Bern.” Though bad weather 
again postponed the advance, this cleared on 9 March, and Burnside seized his 
opportunity.103 
 While Burnside waited for supplies and clear weather, Confederate General 
Lawrence O’Bryan Branch, commanding the District of the Pamlico, was busy at work. 
Branch had been hastily improving the defenses at New Bern, and though he explained 
to Clark that his progress was retarded by the want of tools to work with, by late 
February the town appeared to be in a good state of defense. Fort Thompson, situated on 
the Neuse River four miles below New Bern, anchored the left of Branch’s main line. 
This line extended a little over a mile to the west, with the extreme right resting on a 
brickyard alongside the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad. Below the fort Branch had 
constructed an additional four gun battery “to prevent vessels from taking such a 
position as to shell that work out of range of its guns.” Six miles further down the Neuse, 
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Branch had strengthened another line of fortifications originally constructed by D.H. Hill 
between Otter Creek and the swamps to the southwest, and known as “Croatan 
breastwork.” Branch, however, complained to Clark that, though his troops were “in a 
fine state of discipline and animated with the best spirit,” their numbers “ought to be 
increased – doubled if possible.” As it stood, he could count on only six infantry 
regiments and one militia battalion to hold his extensive defensive line.104 Having 
already lost Roanoke, North Carolinians could ill afford for New Bern to fall as well. As 
one concluded, if God and the general somehow managed to stop Burnside, “What a 
hero Gen. Branch will be.”105 
 Burnside, of course, preferred a much different outcome. On 11 March, he had 
gotten his expedition underway from Roanoke Island, and by 11:00 a.m. it had passed 
into Pamlico Sound. The weather was good and the sailing proceeded smoothly, with 
one exception. The steamer Louisiana, loaded with troops, ran aground trying to get out 
of the sound, which the general believed was no accident. Burnside, suspecting the 
loyalty of the Louisiana’s captain, ordered him arrested. The next day, the gunboats led 
the way into the Neuse River. Union soldiers crowded the rigging of the vessels and 
yelled jokes and salutations back and forth. The banks of the Neuse were covered with 
pine woods, scattered farm houses, and a few large plantations, and all along them, the 
soldiers could spot bonfires burning on the shores, undoubtedly Confederate signals of 
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the fleet’s approach. That evening, the ships came to anchor in the Neuse off of 
Slocum’s Creek under a bright moon, and the regimental bands filled the night air with 
music. Many soldiers sang along with this music, and the scene was such a well-spirited 
one that, in the eyes of the New York Herald’s correspondent with the expedition, “[N]o 
one would have ever supposed that the fleet lying so peacefully there meant anything 
other than mild measures.”106 Burnside had left Hawkins in command at Roanoke, with 
the 9th New York and two other recently arrived regiments. The general was careful to 
instruct Hawkins that Roanoke held “great value…as a base for military operations,” and 
therefore the safety of the island should not be hazarded under any circumstances.107 
Burnside, however, need not have worried, for the Confederates lacked the strength in 
North Carolina to protect the positions they did hold, never mind to launch an attack on a 
well-defended post. 
 Like at Roanoke, Burnside saw naval support as crucial to his plans for the 
coming battle. Rowan was in temporary command of the naval arm, as Goldsborough 
had been recalled to Hampton Roads shortly before the fleet sailed for Pamlico Sound. 
Burnside and Rowan determined to land the Union troops at the mouth of Slocum’s 
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Creek, several miles downstream from the Croatan breastwork and therefore more than 
15 miles south of New Bern. The gunboats would then advance up the Neuse to take the 
Confederate works in flank, paralleling the march of Burnside’s own force on the shore. 
Burnside and Signal Officer Albert J. Myer even coordinated signals with Rowan, so 
that the naval vessels could be informed of the division’s progress and therefore shell the 
woods and road in advance of the march without hitting any of Burnside’s own soldiers. 
This plan was solidified at a council of war held between Burnside, Foster, Reno, Parke, 
and Rowan on Rowan’s flag ship, the Philadelphia, on the night of 12 March.108 
 The morning of 13 March dawned dark and rainy. As one soldier in the 25th 
Massachusetts opined, “It always rains where we go; first at Hatteras, then at Roanoke 
and now here. I think we are rightly named a water division.” Yet the overwhelming 
sentiment, according to the Herald’s correspondent, was that “the iron was hot, and now 
was the time to strike with force.”109 Burnside certainly felt this way, and began to land 
his force shortly after 7:00 a.m. As gunboats shelled the woods on the west bank of the 
Neuse, the signal “land your forces” was given from Burnside’s vessel, the Alice Price. 
In hardly any time at all the whole river was alive with boats filled with men. Light 
steamers, towing surfboats and launches brimming with soldiers, were grounded about 
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ten yards from shore, and the color bearer of the 51st New York immediately leapt 
overboard, waded through waist deep water, and planted the Star Spangled Banner on 
dry land. “If the enemy was within six miles,” according to Larned, “they heard the 
rousing cheers of our men, among the loudest of them was General B[urnside].”110 
 Slocum’s Creek was soon full of men who followed the color bearer’s example 
and waded ashore as fast as they were able, urged on by the 23rd Massachusetts’ 
regimental band’s playing of “Hail Columbia.” Burnside himself made it ashore at 
10:00.111 Over the next several hours, the rest of the regiments disembarked at the mouth 
of the creek, on ground so soggy one private in the 25th Massachusetts termed it a “mud 
hole.” Several of the regiments, including the 23rd and 27th Massachusetts, were forced 
to land one company at a time owing to the shortage of small boats, but by 3:00 p.m. the 
entire division had come ashore. Meanwhile, steamers brought the horses as close to 
land as possible, then dumped them overboard and let them swim the remaining 
distance.112 Throughout this whole affair, Burnside’s force suffered no molestation. 
 The gunboats proceeded up the river first, throwing shells into the woods to 
break up any Confederate force wishing to challenge the Union advance, as Rowan and 
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Burnside had planned. This was actually quite an innovative tactic; indeed, historian 
Robert M. Browning Jr. has pointed out that it was in fact “one of the first uses of a 
creeping barrage.”113 The movement of the regiments began before all the troops had 
been landed, but progressed at a slow pace, as the ground was saturated and therefore the 
new rainfall had turned the road into a quagmire. One man in the 51st Pennsylvania 
described how the men were forced to use ropes to drag the artillery through the 
“muddiest mud ever invented.” The rain soon stopped, but that only brought an 
oppressive heat, which, combined with the mud, caused many men to fall out on the 
march.114 The 21st Massachusetts of Reno’s brigade took the advance, followed by the 
24th Massachusetts of Foster’s. These regiments threw out skirmishers and an advance 
guard, which led the way up the county road. Before long, they encountered their first 
sign of Confederate soldiers in the area; a deserted camp. There, the Union soldiers 
found evidence of a hasty retreat. Breakfast, half eaten, sat near fires, while the road was 
strewn with blankets, clothing, and other camp equipage.115 
 Despite the fact that the Union soldiers were tiring from their exertions, they did 
not stop at this camp, but instead, in the words of the Herald’s correspondent, “pushed 
on with a determination and energy surprising in soldiers who had not before 
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experienced the hardship and fatigue of a rapid march.”116 In the early afternoon, the 
Massachusetts regiments reached the Croatan breastwork, which they discovered 
abandoned. Foster found these works to be well-constructed and imposing, ranging one 
mile from the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad to a fort on the Neuse River. Though 
he was glad to be able to give his weary men a rest, the general was surprised that the 
Confederates had evacuated this seemingly strong position.117 
 The responsibility for this rested primarily with Colonel James Sinclair of the 
35th North Carolina and his superior officer, Colonel R.P. Campbell. On 12 March, 
Branch, having been apprised of the advance of Union vessels up the Neuse River, had 
ordered Sinclair to Fisher’s landing, several miles south of the main line of defenses but 
north of the Croatan breastwork. Sinclair reached the landing by 6:30 p.m. that evening, 
and posted his men in rifle pits and entrenchments. The next morning, Sinclair’s men 
began receiving fire from the Union gunboats, which Sinclair interpreted as evidence 
that the enemy was about to land in his front. For this reason, and because he had not 
been ordered to advance any further south than Fisher’s landing, Sinclair did not attempt 
to contest Burnside’s landing at Slocum’s Creek, nor did he defend the Croatan 
breastwork. Campbell himself came to believe that the naval gunfire was preparatory to 
another Union landing in rear of the Croatan breastwork, so shortly after 10:00 a.m. he 
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ordered Sinclair to fall back to the Fort Thompson line. Campbell shared his fears with 
Branch, who therefore thought that Union troops had landed in the rear of the Croatan 
breastwork, and so the general decided that the best course of action was to “instantly 
[throw] behind the Fort Thompson breastworks every available man under my 
command.” The result of all this was that Burnside encountered no resistance on his 
march to New Bern.118 
 Branch had previously recognized, however, that the Fort Thompson defensive 
line was itself inadequate. His initial breastworks had extended only from the river to the 
railroad, but the terrain to the west of the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad was firm 
enough for infantry to advance over it. Branch therefore decided to extend his line 
another mile to the right, ending at a swamp near the Weatherby Road, where the general 
placed a battery. Realizing that he had limited time to complete these works, Branch 
chose to use Bullen’s Creek, which ran west-east from this road to the railroad, as a 
natural part of his line. Though this expedited the completion of the works, Bullen’s 
Creek intersected the railroad roughly 150 yards north of the brickyard, where the Fort 
Thompson line ended. Thus, there was a dogleg in the center of Branch’s line. 
Furthermore, Branch could spare only one regiment, the 26th North Carolina, to defend 
the new sector. This meant that the regiment, as its Colonel and the future Governor of 
North Carolina Zebulon Baird Vance explained, “[C]overed almost as much ground as 
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all the rest of [our] troops together.” And as if this was not bad enough, the crucial 
brickyard, which covered the gap in the two lines, was protected only by a poorly armed 
militia battalion.119 Though Gatlin, still in overall command in North Carolina, had 
ordered the 18th and 35th North Carolina to New Bern to help Branch man his now 
extended breastworks, neither of these regiments arrived in time to take part in the 
battle.120 
 After stopping for a brief rest at the Croatan breastwork, Burnside resumed the 
advance. Foster’s brigade took the county road, followed by Parke’s, while Reno’s 
brigade moved up the railroad to the west. Along their march, Union soldiers were 
greeted by many contrabands, who emerged from the houses and woods along the road. 
Larned, following along with the leading regiments, provided the soldiers some much 
needed entertainment. When they came across the house of a wealthy secessionist, 
Larned found a piano, sat down, and began to play “America.” The soldiers marching by 
took up the tune, and according to the secretary, the woods rang with the noise.121 This 
march continued until 8:00 p.m., by which point the three brigades had bivouacked 
within a mile of the Fort Thompson line. A driving rain fell throughout the night, but 
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stragglers continued to trickle into the camp, and the men worked to drag the six naval 
howitzers through the mud. By 3:00 a.m. these guns had been positioned in range of the 
Confederate earthworks.122 
 Branch’s final defensive dispositions consisted of the 27th North Carolina 
stationed next to Fort Thompson, with the 37th, 7th, and 35th North Carolina extending 
this line to the railroad on the right. These regiments were supported by two field 
batteries, as well as the guns of the fort. But although the fort itself mounted 13 32-
pounders, only four of these faced landward. Vance’s 26th North Carolina held the 
ground behind Bullen’s Creek to the west of the railroad, and the task of holding the 
intervening space, consisting of the brickyard, fell to Colonel. H.J.B. Clark’s poorly 
armed and poorly trained militia. The 33rd North Carolina, stationed 400 yards to the rear 
of the brickyard, functioned as Branch’s reserve.123 
 Burnside had his force up and moving shortly after 7:00 a.m. the next day. 
Though the morning was cloudy and the soldiers were drenched from the preceding 
night’s rain, Burnside attempted to animate them by riding along their lines. This worked 
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to good effect; in the words of a soldier in the 23rd Massachusetts, “[S]uch enthusiasm as 
was kindled by the sight of Old Glory, as we called him, was cheering in the 
extreme.”124 The general, however, was still as of yet uncertain as to the extent of the 
Confederate line, believing it to reach only to the railroad. Therefore, he planned to have 
Foster’s First Brigade move up the county road and attack the entrenchments extending 
from Fort Thompson, while Reno’s Second Brigade would swing to the left of the 
railroad and flank the Confederate force. Parke’s Third Brigade, as at Roanoke, was to 
function as a reserve, and it was placed astride the railroad directly to the left of 
Foster’s.125 
 Rowan’s gunboats opened the engagement by proceeding up the Neuse to shell 
the Confederate works. To do this, the vessels had to pass a line of pilings and sunken 
vessels stretching almost the entire width of the river. The Commodore Perry and the 
Stars and Stripes were impaled on these piles, but the rest of the ships managed to pass 
the obstructions. This, however, was not the only obstacle that threatened Rowan’s 
vessels. In addition, the fleet was menaced by 30 torpedoes the Confederates had sunk in 
the Neuse months before. Each of these was constructed with a wooden frame, weighed 
down with boxes filled with stones, and capped by an iron cylinder containing a shell 
filled with 200 pounds of powder. The shells rested on springs, so that any pressure was 
                                                 
124 Entry for 14 March 1862, William J. Creasey Diary, Vol. 1, SHC; Larned to Sister, 18 March 1862, 
Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: Correspondence, LOC. 
 
125 Burnside to Stanton, 10 April 1862, Ambrose E. Burnside Collection, Box 1, Letter Book, March-June 
1862, RIHS. This letter is Burnside’s initial report to the Secretary of War on the battle. 
 
 129 
 
supposed to cause them to instantly discharge. Rowan was aware of these, and feared 
them. As he later reported, “Every minute I expected to see some of my gingerbread 
crafts go up in the air.”126 Yet, due most likely to a combination of careful maneuvering, 
luck, and ineffectiveness of the long-submerged torpedoes, not one exploded. Therefore, 
Rowan was able to advance up the river and throw five, ten, and fifteen-second shells at 
the Confederate works, many of which landed among the 27th North Carolina, the 
regiment closest to the river bank. But the dense fog made it difficult for Burnside to 
communicate with Rowan via the prearranged signals, and because of this, some of the 
shells actually fell among the advancing Union soldiers. This, however, did not deter 
Rowan. As he explained to Goldsborough, “I determined to continue [the shelling] till 
the general sent me word. I know the persuasive effect of a 9-inch shell, and thought it 
better to kill a Union man or two than to lose the effect of my moral suasion.” Indeed, 
Rowan kept his ships firing for over three hours.127 
 While Rowan attempted to soften the Confederate defenses, Foster’s brigade 
moved forward. The advance was led by the 25th Massachusetts, which moved up the 
county road on the extreme right of the Union line. To this regiment’s left were the 24th, 
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27th, and 23rd Massachusetts, which formed in column and marched through the woods 
along the road until they were within sight of the Confederate entrenchments. These 
regiments drew fire from both the Confederate line and from the guns in Fort Thompson, 
which opened on them with grape and canister. Scouts of the 25th Massachusetts soon 
determined that the earthworks here were supported by a three gun battery on the county 
road, in addition to the cannons in the fort. In response, the Massachusetts soldiers 
formed line of battle and began to pour what the Colonel of the 24th termed “an incessant 
and well directed fire on the enemy” for over two hours, supported by the navy 
howitzers which had been positioned astride the road. Nevertheless, Colonel Edwin 
Upton of the 25th Massachusetts reported that, exposed to a fire from the front and right, 
the regiments were in great danger of being badly cut up. Lt. Col. Henry Merritt of the 
23rd Massachusetts was killed, and Foster’s brigade began to take heavy losses. All the 
while, the shells from the gunboats, according to one soldier, “were coming dangerously 
near, splintering and cutting off the trees, and ploughing great furrows in the ground 
directly in front of us.” Foster, sensing the strength of the Confederate earthworks in this 
sector, decided against an all-out assault but ordered his men to continue to lay fire on 
the Confederate line from their position, now only about 150 yards away. When the 23rd 
and 27th Massachusetts subsequently ran low on ammunition, he allowed them to retire 
in good order and commanded the 11th Connecticut, of Parke’s Third Brigade, to take 
their place.128 
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 Progress, therefore, would have to come to the west of the railroad. By 8:30 a.m., 
Reno had sent the 21st Massachusetts to attack the brickyard, while the 51st New York 
and 9th New Jersey engaged the extreme right of the line held by Vance’s 26th North 
Carolina. Though many of the men’s weapons were unusable due to the rain of the night 
before, the 21st Massachusetts did manage to capture part of the enemy works. But they 
soon drew fire from all along the Confederate line and, with their ammunition almost 
expended, were forced to retreat. Vance’s outnumbered regiment, supported by two 
companies of the 19th North Carolina, had more than held their own against the 51st New 
York and 9th New Jersey, inflicting significant losses from behind the redans and felled 
trees along Bullen’s Creek. The colonel watched proudly as, time after time, the Union 
forces were “driven back in confusion by the most deadly and well directed fire from our 
lines.”129 
 So far, Clark’s Battalion of Militia had also remained steady, firing by file with 
“coolness and determination,” according to the Colonel. Yet their inadequate short-range 
weapons, their lack of experience, and the fact that the smoke so obscured the battlefield 
in this area that Clark claimed he was unable to anticipate any Union movements made 
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the militia a threat to break at any time.130 Lt. Col. William S. Clark, commanding the 
21st Massachusetts, sensed this. When his regiment was forced to retreat from the 
brickyard by the fire of the 35th, 7th, and 37th North Carolina on the Confederate left, he 
found Colonel Rodman of the 4th Rhode Island, Parke’s Third Brigade, which had been 
ordered forward and to the left in support of Reno. Clark informed Rodman that another 
attack on this position would most likely meet with success, so Rodman immediately 
sent an aide to Parke stating that he was taking responsibility and launching an assault on 
the brickyard.131 At the same time, Burnside ordered Parke to flank the batteries to the 
east of the railroad, which were causing Foster’s First Brigade a good deal of trouble. 
Parke, realizing that the taking of the brickyard would accomplish this, approved the 
course of Rodman, and ordered the 8th Connecticut and 5th Rhode Island, which 
composed the remainder of the reserve, to Rodman’s support.132 
 In his post-battle report, Rodman described what happened next: “I then gave the 
order to charge. Passing quickly by the rifle pits (redoubts on our left flank), which 
opened on us with little injury, we entered in rear of the intrenchments, and the regiment 
in a gallant manner carried gun after gun…The national flag of the Fourth Rhode Island 
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was planted on the parapet.” This charge broke the enemy center at the brickyard, where 
the dogleg in the works was located, and captured nine brass field pieces at little cost. 
Indeed, the 4th Rhode Island suffered only 11 men killed and 25 wounded in the entire 
battle, while the supporting regiments, the 5th Rhode Island and 8th Connecticut, lost only 
16 men combined.133 
 The success of Rodman’s charge, which occurred shortly after 11:00 a.m., had a 
lot to do with the behavior of Clark’s Battalion of Militia. When confronted with this 
advance, the militia came to believe that they had been outflanked, and, in the words of 
Clark himself, “At this moment…a panic seized my command and part of them broke 
ranks.” Clark, certain that he could not reform his ill-trained troops under fire, then tried 
to conduct an orderly retreat, but this was instead “succeeded by a stampede of most of 
the command.” As his soldiers streamed north towards New Bern, Clark found, much to 
his chagrin, that his influence as a commander was completely gone.134 The colonel was 
entirely unable to halt the flight of his men or to do anything to plug the large gap that 
now existed in the Confederate line along the railroad. 
The results of the actions of the militia were devastating for the rest of the 
Confederate line. One by one, the regiments to the east of the railroad realized that they 
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had been flanked. The closest, and therefore first to see that they were about to be rolled 
up, was Colonel Sinclair’s 35th North Carolina. Sinclair ordered his regiment to retire, 
but as he explained, “This created somewhat of a panic as the enemy was firing upon us 
from the Railroad and the brickyard.” Sinclair’s lieutenant colonel deserted the regiment, 
and though his men conducted as orderly a retreat as possible back to New Bern, they 
were now out of the fighting.135 This, in turn, left Colonel Campbell’s 7th North Carolina 
wholly without support on its right. Campbell complained that Sinclair’s men, despite 
the latter’s claims, “left the field in confusion,” exposing the batteries in that section of 
the line. Though Campbell ordered a charge that briefly stemmed the tide of the Union 
advance, he too had to fall back under a heavy fire, although he remained convinced that 
his men had behaved with coolness and bravery, while the militia and the 35th North 
Carolina “left the field too early in the action for me to say anything about them.”136 
Next to go were the 37th and 27th North Carolina, which had occupied the 
extreme left of the Confederate line and had fought well in holding off Foster’s brigade 
for over three hours. Colonel Charles Lee, commanding the 37th North Carolina, tried to 
aid Campbell’s regiment, but when he observed it moving rapidly to the rear, he found 
Campbell and demanded to know what was happening. Campbell promptly informed 
him that he was in full retreat, and Lee, “Feeling assured that the regiments which were 
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retreating could not be rallied,” ordered his command to fall back to New Bern. When 
the 27th North Carolina saw this, they too began to retreat to the railroad bridge leading 
to the city, first spiking all the guns in Fort Thompson. As one member of the regiment 
said of the retreat, “[S]uch a mess I never saw.”137 
Foster quickly ascertained what was happening in his front, and reacted 
accordingly. When he noticed the Confederate fire begin to slacken shortly before noon, 
he ordered an advance along his whole line, which was promptly led by the 10th 
Connecticut and 24th and 25th Massachusetts. In the words of a lieutenant in the 10th 
Connecticut, “From the curtain of the woods up sprang thousands of blue coats – a 
glittering wave of steel flashing in front – and rushed forward with loud huzzahs, and 
invincible line.”138 In less than ten minutes, the troops had braved one final volley from 
the 27th North Carolina, scaled the parapet, and planted the American flag among the 
Confederate works. Another flag was then placed in Fort Thompson to signal Rowan’s 
gunboats to stop shooting, at which point the Union soldiers halted to give nine cheers 
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for their victory. Foster himself reported that the enemy “retreat[ed] with great 
precipitation” up the county road towards New Bern.139 
Foster did not allow his brigade to revel long in their victory, but instead sent 
them in pursuit of the Confederates. The 10th Connecticut and 23rd, 24th, and 25th 
Massachusetts quickly advanced up the county road towards the railroad bridge over the 
Trent River. Two companies of the 25th Massachusetts, however, were ordered to 
support Parke’s and Reno’s brigade to the west of the railroad.140 Here, Vance’s 26th 
North Carolina, and Colonel Avery’s 33rd North Carolina, which functioned as Branch’s 
reserve, were still holding out. The 33rd North Carolina did manage to fend off several 
attacks, but Avery was shot and then taken prisoner. When Vance realized that Foster’s 
brigade had occupied the Fort Thompson works and was advancing up the county road 
and the railroad, he understood that all the troops on the field were in full retreat except 
for his own command, and therefore the colonel felt that there was “no alternative left 
me but to order an immediate retreat or be completely surrounded.” Because Union 
troops now stood between these two North Carolina regiments and New Bern, Vance 
and Lieut. Colonel Robert F. Hoke, now in command of the 33rd, were forced to retreat 
not north, but west across Bryce Creek. Initially, only one boat could be found, so many 
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men, including Vance, had to swim across the creek, which was too deep to ford. Vance 
eventually secured three more boats and got the majority of his regiment to safety, but 
lost all of his baggage. These two regiments then made a forced march to Kinston, some 
40 miles away, arriving two days later.141 
The rest of the Confederate regiments, which retreated north to the town, were by 
this point in a state of panic, fed by a false report that they were being pursued by 700 
Union cavalrymen. Therefore, the Confederates decided to burn the railroad bridge over 
the Trent River, but they did it in such haste that some men were left behind on the south 
bank. Shells from Union gunboats, however, prevented the regiments from regrouping in 
New Bern, and so a decision was made to burn all the cotton and military stores in the 
city. This order was carried out by the 19th North Carolina, which had only recently 
arrived on the battlefield and had taken almost no part in the fighting. The fire grew out 
of control and spread to many houses, but the broken and frightened Confederate 
regiments were too busy continuing the retreat to Kinston to do anything about this.142 
Therefore, when the leading Union regiments reached the Trent River, they 
found the bridge destroyed and the city on fire. Burnside ordered Foster and Parke to 
have the troops carried across the river to New Bern on Rowan’s vessels, a slow but 
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ultimately effective process. The majority of these two brigades were ferried across the 
Trent by 5:00 p.m., too late to pursue the retreating enemy, so they took possession of 
the old Confederate camp at the town’s fair grounds, which was strewn with pitched 
tents and camp equipage of all types.143 The scene that met the soldiers’ eyes of a city on 
fire, terror-stricken citizens fleeing in every direction, contrabands wildly celebrating the 
Confederate defeat, and general chaos left a great impression on many. One in the 23rd 
Massachusetts claimed that “[t]he burning of the tar and buildings, the black smoke 
ascending the dark clouds, and the booming of the cannon, was a sight and sound which 
can be imagined better than described.” But the most evocative depiction came from a 
Union officer, who concluded, “As I looked upon [the town], I could think of nothing 
but Sodom and Gomorrah.”144 
Burnside immediately took steps to bring the situation under control. Most of the 
townspeople had fled, leaving their valuables, and some of the soldiers and sailors, as 
well as the slaves, were ransacking the houses. To prevent this, Burnside ordered that 
only military goods could be appropriated, and he had guards posted at the wealthy 
residences. He also put the soldiers to work extinguishing the flames, which they 
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succeeded in doing. Within days, he had named Foster military governor of New Bern, 
and had begun distributing army rations to the poor whites and contrabands in the city.145 
Despite the brief chaos that ensued, there was no doubt among the Union soldiers 
that Burnside had won another complete victory. Larned was convinced that it was “the 
greatest victory yet;” likewise, another soldier recorded his belief in his diary that it was 
“one of the greatest victories of the war.”146 Though these men, having participated in 
the victory, were surely biased, their claims were not altogether without basis. At a cost 
of 90 men killed, 380 wounded, and 1 missing, Burnside had captured 41 heavy guns, 19 
field pieces, over 1,000 small arms, and, in his estimation, “[T]he second commercial 
city in the State of North Carolina.”147 Furthermore, he had inflicted more than 570 
casualties on Branch’s force (over 400 of these being prisoners), and forced the 
Confederates to retreat all the way west to Kinston. Though the casualty numbers for the 
two sides were not drastically different, in reality Branch lost over 15 percent of his 
effective force, while Burnside lost only 5 percent of his command. Once again, despite 
the fact that there was no interservice authority and therefore Burnside was prohibited 
from giving final orders to any officers in the navy, he had managed to utilize Rowan’s 
vessels to great effect in pulling off a combined arms victory. In fact, Burnside made 
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clear to Stanton that a “perfect understanding and co-operation has existed between the 
two arms of the service since we joined the naval fleet at Hatteras Inlet.”148 Though 
private William J. Creasey of the 23rd Massachusetts believed that 14 March was “a day 
never to be forgotten,” those historians who are critical of Burnside’s appointment to 
command of the Army of the Potomac appear to have forgotten, or willfully ignored, just 
how complete a victory Burnside won at New Bern.149 
Many Confederates, and North Carolinians in particular, probably wished they 
could have forgotten the 14th of March, but the defeat weighed on their minds much as 
the defeat at Roanoke had. The loss of New Bern and the Confederate retreat to Kinston 
left the portion of the Atlantic and North Carolina between New Bern and Goldsboro 
unprotected. If Burnside advanced in this direction and captured Goldsboro he would cut 
the Weldon Railroad which ran all the way from Richmond down to Wilmington, and 
which the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia relied on for supplies. Davis feared 
this, as evidenced by his letters to Clark pleading with the governor to do all he could to 
protect that railroad. Many Confederate citizens and military figures also understood the 
importance of the Weldon Railroad. As Chestnut wrote from South Carolina, “Now 
there stands Goldsboro. One more step and we are cut in two. The [Weldon] Railroad is 
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our backbone…No wonder we are downhearted.” 150 Indeed, it was the danger to this 
railroad that caused General Lee in Virginia to tell Davis that “another disaster in North 
Carolina would be ruinous,” and the President of the State Convention of North Carolina 
to express that he was mortified at the aspect of affairs around Kinston and New Bern.151 
Blame for the defeat was placed primarily at the feet of Branch and his 
department commander, Gatlin. As one North Carolinian explained, “Gen. Branch is the 
object of universal animadversion. He is the best abused man in N.C. just now. Gen. 
Gatlin too has his full share. ‘Incompetent’ and ‘inefficient’ are the mildest terms [they] 
get…We must have a ‘Scape Goat.’” Clark himself seemed to think that this defeat was 
the last straw for Gatlin, and he wrote to Benjamin (still, at this time, Secretary of War) 
complaining of the general’s “entire neglect and inattention to the coast defenses of his 
command.” Fair or not, all of these criticisms resulted in Gatlin being relieved of his 
command within a week of the battle.152 Even this, however, did not placate Hill, who 
always seemed to have something to say about events on the coast he had so ardently 
labored to put in a better state of defense. As the general complained to his wife, “Our 
whole system of defense had been pitifully foolish. A child ought to have seen this. It 
was as evident to me six months ago that these troubles would come. What I said was as 
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little regarded as the preaching of Noah…before the flood.” In fact, after the defeat at 
New Bern, Hill could come to no other conclusion but that “[t]he affairs of our country 
are desperate, desperate.” 153 
Meanwhile, in New Bern, the chaplain of the 25th Massachusetts held a sermon at 
the Old Presbyterian Church, preaching that “He that ruleth his own spirit is better than 
he who taketh a city.” As far as the Union cause was concerned, however, the taking of 
the city would do just fine, but now that Burnside had captured New Bern, he set about 
putting it in a good state of order and defense.154 The city, not withstanding its recent 
burning, was quite picturesque, finely laid out with many modern buildings and a 
waterfront that contained ample wharfage for shipping and warehouses. Indeed, several 
of the Massachusetts soldiers expressed their conviction that New Bern looked much 
like a New England town. These soldiers passed their time by drilling, attending church 
services, and listening to the regimental bands, which both serenaded and honored 
Burnside by playing music they composed and dedicated to the general.155 Nevertheless, 
Burnside’s time was occupied not by listening to music, but by dealing with the 
challenges his new conquest had brought him. 
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First and foremost among these was what to do with the contrabands who were 
fleeing by the hundreds into New Bern. Close on their heels were their former owners, 
who came to Burnside asking for the return of the escaped slaves, and complaining that 
those that did remain on the plantations now considered themselves free and were 
impossible to control. Larned remarked that this crowd was “perfectly despondent over 
[the loss of] their negroes, and entirely helpless without them.” The secretary was so 
disgusted with these citizens that he described them as “the most contemptible set I ever 
looked on.”156 Staying true to the policy he had established at Roanoke, Burnside refused 
to return any of the contrabands, which only made even more slaves seek out the 
protection of his division. Indeed, within four months, there were more than 10,000 
contrabands living under Union occupation in North Carolina.157 
Burnside employed the contrabands to the best possible advantage by organizing 
them into gangs and having them labor on the fortifications he was building, particularly 
a fort to the southwest of the city. Others were set to work in the hospitals and on the 
wharf, unloading ships. These men received army rations and $8 per month, and wore a 
white band on their hats labeled with the words “United States Service.”158 Burnside, 
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however, also provided rations and clothing for some of the poorer whites in New Bern, 
many of whom were the families of Confederate soldiers. Though some Union officers 
argued against this, Burnside contended that if he did not aid them the people would 
starve, and therefore “humanity requires it, as well as good policy.” According to 
Larned, when news of this policy spread it caused more deserters to come in, and also 
changed the opinion of many of New Bern’s citizens, who stated that they were 
surprised at “the good order and quiet behavior of the Yankees,” who they claimed had 
been grossly misrepresented by the Southern newspapers.159 
The sooner the fortifications could be completed, the sooner Burnside could hold 
New Bern with a small force while taking the rest of his division to fulfill McClellan’s 
initial orders by reducing Fort Macon and capturing Beaufort. Though Burnside did push 
pickets towards Kinston and Goldsboro, he determined that it would be unwise to 
advance into the interior of North Carolina without considerable reinforcements. 
Burnside requested from Stanton a regiment of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and 
“enough regiments of infantry to make a division out of each one of my brigades,” but 
these were slow in arriving. Nevertheless, though the general told McClellan that if his 
force was increased to 40,000 men he could “do almost anything,” he was not content to 
simply sit around and wait for aid. Within a week of his victory, he had sent Parke’s 
Third Brigade (minus the 11th Connecticut) to “invest and if necessary besiege Fort 
Macon,” which was located on the eastern edge of Bogue Banks, directly across from 
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Beaufort, which was itself 35 miles southeast of New Bern. Parke was to “demand an 
unconditional surrender of the place and in case of refusal begin his work at once.”160 
Parke’s progress was slowed by the fact that the Confederates had burned the 
Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad bridge at Newport, as well as most of the cars and 
engines. He still, however, managed to capture Carolina City on 21 March and 
Morehead City two days later. That same day, Parke sent a flag of truce and a demand 
for surrender to Colonel Moses White, who was in command at Fort Macon, in order to 
“save the unnecessary effusion of blood.” Parke contended to White that, “Having an 
intimate knowledge of the entire work and an overwhelming force…with the means for 
reducing the work,” the fort’s fall was “inevitable.” Though White’s command 
numbered less than 600 men, he declined to surrender. As Parke subsequently told 
Burnside, “We now have but one course to pursue, and that is to invest the place.” Parke 
admitted that it would be a slow operation because he had to repair the bridge and locate 
engines before he could bring his siege artillery up. Until then, he would be forced to 
rely on his wagon train for supplies, which had to travel back and forth from Slocum’s 
Creek. Nevertheless, he remained confident that he would ultimately reduce the 
works.161 
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Parke immediately ordered officials in Morehead City to cease all 
communication with the fort, and though they expressed fear that if they cooperated with 
Union forces Col. White would shell the town, they had no choice but to comply. The 
general reported that the people in the city were greatly frightened, but that his own 
command remained in good health and spirits. Though he requested the navy’s 
cooperation in cutting off the fort, they were prevented from acting in concert with his 
brigade by the wind, tide, and shoals, or as Parke termed them, “[O]ur old friends.” By 
27 March, Parke had three companies in Beaufort, but as this stretched his force thin, he 
requested reinforcements as soon as practicable.162 But Parke, like Burnside, was not 
going to idle away time waiting for more men, and before the month was out he had 
completely invested Fort Macon by taking full control of Beaufort, seizing all boats in 
the vicinity, and landing soldiers on Bogue Banks. Furthermore, by this point the 
Newport Bridge was fully repaired, and several Parrott guns had reached Parke’s brigade 
via the railroad.163 
Fort Macon was a masonry fort, built as part of the coastal defense system 
following the War of 1812. It had been completed in 1834, but by the Civil War, 
improvements in artillery, which the Union had showcased in taking Hatteras and Port 
Royal, meant that the fort was woefully out of date. The fort boasted a seemingly 
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impressive 54 guns, but the vast majority of these were 24 and 32-pounder smoothbores 
of limited range, the same type of guns that had failed to protect any of the Confederate 
forts on Roanoke Island. Worse yet, none of the guns had adequate ammunition. 
Lieutenant Colonel John L. Bridges, second in command at Fort Macon, wrote to 
Governor Clark describing that the several rifled cannon the fort did possess had only 18 
rounds each. Bridges requested three more columbiads of heavy caliber with 
ammunition, as well as 10,000 pounds of cannon powder, but Clark was not able to send 
any of this before the fort eventually capitulated.164 Meanwhile, the garrison inside the 
fort was in a state of both poor health and discontent. One-third of White’s men were on 
the sick list, and the rest constantly complained to the commander about their rations, 
about being confined in the fort, and about being shut off from their friends and relatives 
in Morehead City and Beaufort. This grew so intense that the men actually threatened to 
hand the fort over to the Union unless White increased their rations. All of this caused 
several desertions, such as on the night of 8-9 April, when eight men escaped the fort in 
a canoe and made their way to Beaufort. At least one gave himself up to the Union 
forces, and informed Parke of the “great dissatisfaction among the men” as well as of his 
own belief that many more would desert if they knew that Union pickets would not fire 
on them.165 
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Though bad weather in the second week of April hindered Parke’s operations, his 
men continued to labor on the siege works at Bogue Banks. The Union soldiers used 
both the sand dunes and the nighttime as cover, and persistently moved their trenches 
closer and closer to the fort. Their original camp was eight miles west of the fort, but by 
10 April they had driven in White’s pickets and were constructing batteries a little over a 
mile from Fort Macon, just out of the range of its guns. White attempted one sortie to 
slow the progress of the working parties, but the companies he sent out were quickly 
forced to retire. Not having any mortars, the colonel resorted to mounting 32-pounders 
on a 40 degree incline, for the purpose of throwing shells over the sand dunes and into 
the Union works, but this proved ineffective.166 Parke’s men were able to construct four 
batteries: four eight-inch mortars 1,200 yards from the fort, four ten-inch mortars 1,600 
yards from the fort, three 30-pounder rifled Parrott guns 1,300 yards from the fort, and a 
12-pounder Dahlgren rifled boat howitzer, positioned 1,200 yards from the fort. By 17 
April, these batteries were far enough along that Parke wrote to Burnside stating “[a]s 
soon as the guns and mortars are in position, and magazines are completed I propose 
opening fire upon the fort in conjunction with the blockading fleet.” Burnside himself, 
upon hearing this from Parke, made the prescient prediction that the fort would be 
reduced within ten days.167 
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Burnside, determined to take no chances, decided to go to Parke’s aid with 
several regiments. He felt comfortable doing this because by mid-April, the earthworks 
and forts at New Bern had been completed and mounted many heavy cannon.168 In 
addition, he had finally received his long-requested reinforcements: four full-strength 
regiments, the 17th Massachusetts, 2nd Maryland, 103rd New York, and 3rd New York 
Artillery. Burnside distributed these regiments among Foster’s and Reno’s brigades and 
by a general order made all his brigades into divisions. He subsequently awarded each of 
his brigadiers the rank of “acting major general,” commensurate with their new 
commands.169 
On 22 April, Burnside departed New Bern. On the way to Fort Macon, his 
steamer, the Alice Price, ran aground and had to be saved by several contrabands who 
came out to help pilot the ship. On the afternoon of 23 April, the Alice Price dropped 
anchor off of Bogue Banks, but apparently too close to the fort, for it was instantly fired 
upon, the shot striking within a few yards of the vessel. The steamer then moved to a 
safer position, and Burnside went ashore to talk to Parke. Thereafter, Burnside sent a 
captain with a flag of truce and a letter to Col. White, which stated, “I have arrived here 
with additional means of attacking your position…I deem it my duty to again summon 
you to surrender the place in its present condition in which case you and your garrison 
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will be allowed to return to your homes on parole.” Though Burnside made clear to 
White that “[t]his proposition is made with a view to saving human life. Should you not 
accept these terms the consequences of an attack and an assault must rest upon you,” 
White was unmoved. He declined to surrender, but the captain, who had known White 
from their West Point days, convinced him to come to a conference with Burnside the 
next morning. White agreed, and at 6:00 a.m. on 24 April, his boat approached the Alice 
Price, bearing a white flag.  Sailors on the Alice Price then strung up the steamer’s cabin 
sheet as their own white flag, and Burnside and White landed and conferenced on 
Shackleford Banks, to the east of Bogue Banks. This meeting, however, lasted only 15 
minutes, and achieved nothing. White again refused to surrender his command.170 
The bombardment would have to proceed, and Burnside ordered Parke to open it 
as soon as possible on the 25th. Parke did so at 5:00 a.m., pouring shot and shell into the 
fort from his batteries. At 7:30, several naval vessels came into action and fired on the 
fort, but before long they were forced to withdraw due to high winds and rough seas. 
Despite the briefness of their actions, Burnside claimed that the fire from these vessels 
“was well directed and was of material aid in the reduction of the fort.” White’s men 
returned the fire of Parke’s batteries, but the fort’s guns, which had to fire through very 
narrow embrasures, could inflict little damage. Parke’s fire was much more effective; 
White termed it “vigorous and accurate,” and described how it set about “dismounting 
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guns, disabling men, and tearing the parade, parapet, and walls of the fort.” Parke 
continued the bombardment until 4:00 p.m., throwing over 1,100 rounds at the fort.171 
At that time, White, who because of the damage to guns, loss of men, and general 
fatigue of the rest of his soldiers only had two pieces of artillery left firing, hoisted a flag 
of truce on the fort’s parapet. A party was sent out bearing a white flag, but Parke stated 
that the only terms would be unconditional surrender. When White again refused this, 
Parke relented, and arranged a cease fire until he could discuss the matter with Burnside. 
Upon consultation, Burnside and Parke, according to the former, agreed “that if an 
unconditional surrender was demanded the enemy would in all probability stand one day 
more bombardment thereby causing an additional destruction of property in the fort.” 
Burnside also reasoned that, because many of the men in the fort were from the 
surrounding counties, paroling them “would create a better impression in the community 
and thereby strengthen our cause.”172 Therefore, Burnside and Parke decided to take this 
course of action. Larned later explained to a relative that both Burnside and the captain 
whom he had sent to ask White to surrender on the 23rd knew White and thought him to 
be “a man of the most intense passion and the most desperate character,” and believed 
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that White was “as likely to blow up the fort as to surrender it.”173 White himself was of 
the opinion that “[t]wo days more of such firing would have reduced the whole [fort] to 
a mere mass of ruins,” so he agreed to the more lenient terms.174 
The next morning, White and Parke went on board Burnside’s vessel, and the 
terms of capitulation were drawn up by Larned. The fort was to surrender, along with its 
armaments and garrison, but the officers and men were to be “released on their parole of 
honor not to take up arms against the United States until properly exchanged, and to 
return to their homes, taking with them their private effects.” The garrison of the fort 
subsequently marched out and stacked arms as White lowered the Confederate flag. As 
Burnside looked on, an American flag, found in the fort, was hoisted in its place. This 
created wild enthusiasm among the men. Larned claimed that he “never wanted to cheer 
the old flag more,” but Burnside, in consideration to White, ordered that no cheering was 
to be allowed. The secretary also reported that White behaved admirably during the 
surrender ceremony, but the fort’s garrison “seemed perfectly delighted to get away.”175 
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At the cost of one man killed and two wounded, Burnside had captured 54 guns, 
more than 400 prisoners, 500 small arms, and secured the use of one of the best harbors 
on the Southern coast, and the only one in North Carolina that could accommodate ships 
drawing over 12 feet of water. Indeed, within three weeks, Lincoln issued an order 
ceasing the blockade of Beaufort and reopening it to commerce. Burnside attributed his 
most recent success largely to Parke, claiming that “[t]he result proves that the [siege] 
was conducted by the right man.”176 The day the fort surrendered, Burnside read a 
general order to his divisions, expressing his thankfulness to Parke, as well as to the 
men, “[F]or the patient labor, fortitude, and courage displayed in the investment and 
reduction of Fort Macon.” The regiments and artillery companies engaged were to place 
the words “Fort Macon, April 26, 1862” upon their flags, and Burnside assured them that 
“every patriot heart will be filled with gratitude to God, for having given to our beloved 
country such soldiers.”177 Jefferson Davis, conversely, could not have felt less gratitude. 
After Fort Macon’s fall, he issued a proclamation to the Confederate people, strikingly 
somber in tone. In contrast to the euphoria of Burnside’s soldiers and the North more 
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generally, Davis lamented that “recent disaster has spread gloom over the land, and 
sorrow sits at the hearthstones of our countrymen.”178 
Though, true to his nature, Burnside was willing to disperse credit for the capture 
of Fort Macon, he himself had been eminently successful in conducting the entire 
expedition. As Larned concluded, "The taking of Fort Macon finishes the program laid 
down for the general [by McClellan] before we left New York.” Burnside was fast 
becoming a hero in the eyes of the men he had led to victory. When he arrived back in 
New Bern on 1 May, he was greeted by the ringing of bells and the blowing of the 
whistles of all the vessels in the harbor. General Foster, on horseback, met Burnside at 
the wharf and escorted him through crowds of cheering soldiers to headquarters.179 
Burnside’s own soldiers, however, were not the only ones who were elated by his three 
complete victories on the North Carolina coast. Northern citizens, Lincoln’s 
administration, the War Department, and the Northern press shared similar sentiments, 
and it is therefore to their reaction to the campaign, and to the general who waged it, that 
we now turn. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“BURNSIDE IS A TRUMP”: THE NORTHERN RESPONSE TO BURNSIDE’S 
EXPEDITION 
By the conclusion of April, Burnside had experienced a great deal of success as 
an independent commander in eastern North Carolina. Roanoke, New Bern, and Fort 
Macon were clear-cut victories at a time when Union successes, particularly in the 
Eastern Theater, were sorely lacking. It was these victories that catapulted Burnside to 
prominence, in the estimation of the army, of Lincoln, and, just as importantly, of the 
Northern press and public. Burnside’s victories combined with those in the West to 
produce elation in the North, and led many citizens, soldiers, and politicians to feel that 
he had exceptional capabilities as a military commander. In fact, the legacy of 
Burnside’s accomplishments in North Carolina was so strong that his two subsequent 
refusals of command did not divest Lincoln of the belief that Burnside was the best man 
to lead the army. 
Though none of Burnside’s battles were large, they were judged to have 
important strategic results. This was particularly true of the victory at Roanoke Island, a 
vital point the military importance of which was recognized by both Union and 
Confederate military and political figures. As D.H. Hill explained, “Roanoke Island is 
the key to one third of North Carolina,” and its possession by Burnside’s forces enabled 
him to threaten the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad.1 The loss of Roanoke not only 
                                                 
1 D.H. Hill to Stephen R. Mallory, 18 October 1861, Daniel Harvey Hill Papers, Box 1, LV. 
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endangered the railway, but meant the loss of the possession of Albemarle Sound, which 
had served as a haven for blockade runners and privateers and provided access to North 
Carolina’s interior waterways.2 The importance of the Albemarle was well understood 
by Governor Clark, who had repeatedly attempted to call President Davis’s attention to 
the fact that Union possession of the sound “would entail one of the heaviest calamities 
of the war not only to North Carolina but to the Confederacy.”3 After Roanoke was lost, 
the island’s commander, Wise, remained firmly convinced that it was “the key to all the 
rear defenses of Norfolk,” and he lamented that its capture “unlocked two sounds, eight 
rivers, four canals, and two railroads” to Union forces.4 
Wise’s estimate of Roanoke’s value was echoed by the Northern press. The New 
York Herald was explicit about the fact that if Burnside secured Roanoke’s capture, he 
would “put a stop to the inland coast navigation of North Carolina” of Confederate 
privateers and blockade runners, because Roanoke commanded “all the water 
communications along the whole North Carolina Coast.” The Herald saw the isolation of 
Norfolk as the most important result of Roanoke’s fall, but relayed to its readers that this 
also placed “all the seaboard defenses of North Carolina, all the cities, towns, and 
                                                 
2 Robert M. Browning Jr., From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron 
during the Civil War (Tuscaloosa, Ala: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 7-8; Walter Gwynn to Warren 
Winslow, 9 July 1861, RG 109.9, Records of Confederate Military Organizations: Records of the 
Department of North Carolina, Ch. II, vol. 259.5, NA. 
 
3 Henry T. Clark to Jefferson Davis, 16 December 1861, Governor Henry T. Clark Papers, G.L.B. 46, Part 
II, NCSA. 
 
4 Wise believed that the island “should have been defended at the expense of 20,000 men and of many 
millions of dollars.” Quoted in Patricia C. Click, Time Full of Trial: The Roanoke Island Freedmen’s 
Colony, 1862-1867 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 20-21. 
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villages of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, and the navigable rivers emptying into 
them…and the most important railroads of the State, completely at the mercy of the 
Burnside expedition.” Therefore, the paper concluded that the victory “secure[s] to us 
the speedy restoration of [North Carolina] to the Union.”5 
Likewise, the New York Times believed that Burnside’s taking of Roanoke made 
Norfolk’s surrender “simply a question of time,” and proved prescient in predicting that 
the victory at New Bern would lead to the capture of Fort Macon and the harbor of 
Beaufort.6 And Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper felt strongly that “[t]he importance 
of Newbern as a point d’appui cannot be overrated,” because its position upon the Neuse 
River allowed troops stationed there to threaten Goldsboro and thus the Atlantic and 
North Carolina Railroad, which was the only direct rail route to another crucial North 
Carolina port city, Wilmington.7 
The advantages conferred by Burnside’s succession of victories were not lost on 
his superiors. Both Lincoln and McClellan rejoiced to hear of Burnside’s victory at 
Roanoke, and delighted in the fact that he had “pushed the enemy so rapidly and so 
far.”8 Furthermore, McClellan believed that the capture of New Bern and Beaufort gave 
                                                 
5 “The Burnside Expedition,” New York Herald, 10 February 1862; “The Brilliant Victories for the 
Union,” New York Herald, 15 February 1862. A day later, the paper echoed these same themes, remarking 
that the success at Roanoke “will result in the cutting off of Norfolk from supplies without firing a gun, 
and…expose the whole of North Carolina to be overrun by the Union legions.” See “The Triumph of the 
Union Arms,” New York Herald, 16 February 1862. 
 
6 “Burnside at Roanoke Island – Norfolk Threatened,” New York Times, 12 February 1862; “Another 
Glorious Victory,” New York Times, 19 March 1862. 
 
7 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 8 February 1862. 
 
8 McClellan to Burnside, 14 February 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, NA. 
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“the double advantage of preventing blockade running at those points and of enabling us 
to threaten or attack the railways near the coast, upon which Richmond largely depends 
for supplies.”9 Though circumstances in Virginia would ultimately prevent Burnside 
from attacking these railways, it is clear that at the time his victories were judged to have 
significant strategic ramifications. 
Burnside’s string of victories also had an important effect on international 
diplomacy. Before he learned of Burnside’s successes, Thurlow Weed, serving at the 
time in London as a political advisor to Secretary of State William H. Seward, wrote that 
the British Parliament was becoming increasingly anxious to attack the Union blockade 
on the basis of its inefficiency, and therefore, he was fearful that if nothing came of 
Burnside’s expedition, “[I]t will be impossible to hold Europe from intervention.” But 
when he learned of the fall of Roanoke, as well as the taking of Fort Henry on the 
Tennessee River by General Grant, Weed expressed his conviction to Seward that “the 
successes will keep all right.”10 Though the seizure of Roanoke, New Bern, and Beaufort 
did not make the blockade of North Carolina’s coast airtight, it did seal off two ports of 
entry and create a danger for any vessels entering or leaving the remaining ports.11 The 
                                                 
9 George Brinton McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1887), 203. 
 
10 Weed to Seward, 5 March 1862, in Frederick W. Seward, ed., Seward at Washington: A Memoir of His 
Life, with Selections from His Letters, 1861-1872 (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), 62, 75. Like 
Weed, Harper’s Weekly had worried that if Union military efforts in early 1862 should fail, “John Bull 
will begin to clear his throat preparatory to saying, ‘You can’t do the work, and I recognize ’em.’” See 
“The Van of Victory,” Harper’s Weekly, 1 February 1862. 
 
11 By the Declaration of Paris of 1856, nations were not bound to respect “paper blockades.” Therefore, for 
a blockade to be legal, it had to be effective. However, Union naval officers had realized since early in the 
war that this could be effected by blockading or shutting the major ports of entry, as opposed to ringing the 
whole coast. See Samuel F. Du Pont to Henry Winter Davis, 1 June 1861, in John D. Hayes, ed., Samuel 
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European response to Grant’s and Burnside’s simultaneous victories is made clear in the 
writings of the two principle Confederate ministers abroad. From London, James Mason 
wrote that “[t]he late reverses…have had an unfortunate effect upon the minds of our 
friends here,” while in Paris John Slidell bemoaned the fact that the defeats produced 
unfavorable public sentiment, meaning that “the declaration of the inefficiency of the 
blockade, to which I had looked forward with great confidence at no distant day, will be 
indefinitely postponed.”12 
 The strategic and political implications of Burnside’s victories were magnified 
by the fact that they were some of the first significant Union successes on land. After the 
surrender of Fort Sumter in April 1861, Union forces had suffered a debacle at the battle 
of Bull Run in July, a stinging defeat at Wilson’s Creek in Missouri in August, and an 
embarrassing rout at Ball’s Bluff in Virginia in October. All of these defeats, in 
conjunction with McClellan’s inactivity, caused consternation in the North.13 At the 
                                                 
Francis Du Pont: A Selection from his Letters, Vol. 1, The Mission: 1860-1862 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1969), 74 n. 2, 75-76. The British basically assented to this view. In February 1862, Lord 
Russell, the British Foreign Minister, wrote to Lord Lyons, the British Minister to the United States, that if 
“a number of ships are stationed and remain at the entrance of a port sufficient really to prevent access to 
it, or to create an evident danger on entering it or leaving it,” the Union blockade would be recognized as 
an effectual one. See James D. Richardson ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Confederacy, Including Diplomatic Correspondence 1861-1865, Vol. 1 (Nashville, Tenn.: United States 
Publishing Company, 1905), 286. 
 
12 Slidell to R.M.T. Hunter, 10 March 1862, and Mason to R.M.T. Hunter, 11 March 1862, both in 
Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, Vol. 2, 193-194, 199. 
 
13 Union forces under Grant also barely escaped disaster at the Battle of Belmont, in Missouri, in early 
November. For brief descriptions of these battles, see James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The 
Civil war Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 335-347, 351-352, 362, and Russell F. 
Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), 58-61, 66, 101, as well as 82-85 for Northern frustrations at McClellan’s 
inactivity. 
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close of 1861, George Templeton Strong, a prominent New York Republican and 
founder of the United States Sanitary Commission noted in his diary, “Poor old 1861 just 
going up. It has been a gloomy year of trouble and disaster.” But on 12 February 1862, 
having learned of Burnside’s victory at Roanoke, Strong was possessed to exclaim that it 
was “[t]he best day we have had since [the] war began.”14 
Strong was by no means alone in these sentiments. Historians, however, have 
often ignored the reaction to Burnside’s victories in favor of focusing on Grant’s 
seizures of Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee, both of which took place within a 
week of Roanoke. A prime example is Castel, who contends that Grant’s capture of 
these forts “provided the North with its first major victory of the war…It constituted the 
greatest triumph gained by either side so far.” Even Burnside’s most favorable 
biographer, Marvel, claimed that Grant overshadowed Burnside’s victory at Roanoke by 
taking Fort Donelson.15 But Northern citizens, generals, politicians, and the press rarely 
weighed the victories against one another. Instead, they viewed them as a linked string 
of successes that portended ultimate Confederate defeat, and therefore constantly 
referenced them side by side in their writings. 
                                                 
14 Strong began the diary entry for 12 February 1862 with the phrase “Laus Deo,” Latin for “Praise be to 
God.” Allan Nevins and Milton Halsey Thomas, eds., The Diary of George Templeton Strong, Vol. 3, The 
Civil War 1860-1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), 198, 206. 
 
15 Albert Castel, Victors in Blue: How Union Generals Fought the Confederates, Battled Each Other, and 
Won the Civil War (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 50-51; William Marvel, 
Burnside (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 60. 
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 The linkage of these events was very prominent among members of Lincoln’s 
administration. After hearing of the fall of Fort Donelson (which surrendered on 16 
February 1862), Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase wrote to the editor of the 
Cincinnati Commercial that this blow, combined with what he termed the “splendid 
triumphs under Burnside,” would knock the underpinning out of the rebellion. A similar 
view was evinced by Seward, who told Weed that this “magnificent series of triumphs” 
was “auspicious of the restoration of the Union.”16 Yet another member of the 
Administration, Secretary of the Navy Welles, was certain that Burnside’s victories 
“come to swell the current of cheerful tidings that reach us from the West.” Even 
Lincoln’s chief personal secretary, John G. Nicolay, was convinced that all of these 
military operations made it certain that “[u]nless some great calamity befalls us, we shall 
conquer [the Confederates].”17 
 It is perhaps less surprising that McClellan, who as general in chief was in 
command of all Union military movements, would see the victories as parts of a whole. 
It was he who informed Burnside on 12 February of the fall of Fort Henry, but in the 
next sentence he assured Burnside that, “your success seems to be the most brilliant yet.” 
McClellan’s thoughts are even clearer in a 17 February draft of an address to the Army 
                                                 
16 Chase to M.D. Potter, 17 February 1862, in John Niven, ed., The Salmon P. Chase Papers, Vol. 3: 
Correspondence, 1858 – March 1863 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996), 135; Seward to 
Weed, 19 February 1862, in Seward, ed., Seward at Washington, 64. 
 
17 Gideon Welles to Commodore Louis Goldsborough, 14 February 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, NA; Nicolay to Therena Bates (fiancée), 17 February 1862, in Michael 
Burlingame, ed., With Lincoln in the White House: Letters, Memoranda, and other Writings of John G. 
Nicolay, 1860-1865 (Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 70-71. 
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of the Potomac, which he wrote but never issued. After announcing the “glorious 
victories” gained by those in North Carolina and Tennessee, he expressed his belief that 
“Roanoke, Fort Henry, & Fort Donelson will hereafter be the pride of all true 
Americans, & will cause the hearts of all loyal men to throb with joy.”18 Burnside 
himself, after learning of the situation in the West, came to believe that rebellion was 
strongly on the decline.19 
 Prominent newspapers in the North saw the victories in much the same light. The 
New York Times was firmly convinced that Burnside’s victory at Roanoke, along with 
Grant’s at Fort Henry, “[O]ffers that conclusive argument against [European] 
interference – entire military success.”20 Less than two months later, after Burnside had 
emerged victorious at New Bern and Fort Macon, the Times proclaimed that “[w]e have 
met [the enemy] this year already on twenty fields…we have conquered him behind his 
intrenchments at Donelson and Roanoke. In no instance has he stood the onset of our 
columns, or the contact of the bayonet.” The New York Tribune felt similarly, declaring, 
“The cause of the Union now marches on in every section of the country…The rebels 
themselves are panic-stricken or despondent. It now requires no far-reaching prophet to 
                                                 
18 McClellan to Burnside, 12 February 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, NA; 
“To the Army of the Potomac” (address not issued), 17 February 1862, in Stephen W. Sears, ed., The Civil 
War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865 (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 
1989), 183-184. 
 
19 Burnside to Brother, February 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, NA. 
 
20 “Prospects of Intervention,” New York Times, 12 February 1862. Similarly, the New York Herald 
expressed that after the taking of Fort Henry and Roanoke, “[W]e have ceased to entertain any 
troublesome thoughts of European intervention.” See “The Rebellion Downward – Solemn Advice to the 
South,” New York Herald, 12 February 1862. 
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predict the end of the struggle.”21 And from the West, the Vincennes Gazette (Indiana) 
made similar pronouncements, remarking that “the rebel forces are dispirited and 
demoralized and fleeing in every direction…Everything indicates that the rebellion is 
about at an end.”22 
 Likewise, the New York Herald paid great attention to Burnside’s victories, 
which it believed exposed the Confederacy as “a giant of brass upon legs of clay,” which 
“reels and staggers and is at its wit’s end, like a drunken man.” The Herald continually 
linked Roanoke with the triumphs in the West, remarking that Burnside’s and Grant’s 
successes “caused great rejoicing throughout the country,” particularly in New York, 
where “a general confidence was felt that the backbone of the rebellion was broken.”23 
Indeed, the Herald asserted that “[n]ever before has there been such a truly intense 
demonstration of joy as on the occasion of the receipt of the Roanoke Island capture.” In 
the Herald’s estimation, this was due to the fact that “[i]n importance this victory in the 
waters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sound has not been equaled by anything which our 
armies have yet achieved, and taken in connection with the victory in Tennessee, at Fort 
Henry…the affair at Roanoke Island acquires a double value.”24 Another such 
                                                 
21 “The Pending Battles,” New York Times, 7 April 1862; New York Tribune, 12 February 1862. It is 
telling of the impact of the Roanoke victory that this latter article was written before the fall of Fort 
Donelson on 16 February. 
 
22 “The Rebellion,” Vincennes Gazette, 22 March 1862. 
 
23 “Our Brilliant Victory in North Carolina,” New York Herald, 13 February 1862; “The Triumph of the 
Union Arms,” New York Herald, 16 February 1862; “Popular Enthusiasm – The News of the Successes of 
Burnside,” New York Herald, 16 February 1862. 
 
24 “The Victory at Roanoke Island,” New York Herald, 14 February 1862; “The Situation,” New York 
Herald, 15 February 1862. The last article claimed that “[t]he brilliant success of the Union arms at 
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demonstration of joy would occur on 22 February, the anniversary of George 
Washington’s birthday. As the Herald relayed, “Never in the history of our country” had 
the day been celebrated “with more universal and earnest interest,” a result of “the 
achievements of the heroes of Forts Donelson and Henry and the exploits of the 
Burnside expedition,” which had served to “buoy up our spirts and point to a speedy 
termination of the great war.”25 Finally, after Burnside was again successful at New 
Bern, the paper exclaimed, “The cause of the Union is riding proudly onward upon the 
swelling waves of victory…the sustaining spirit of the rebellion, from repeated defeats, 
is utterly broken…It is all over with [Jefferson Davis] and his Southern Confederacy.”26 
 Harper’s Weekly and Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper could not have been 
more in agreement with these sentiments. Harper’s pointed to all of the recent Union 
victories as evidence that “the heart of the difficulty has been pierced…nothing now 
remains for it but to bleed to death.”27 And like the other papers, Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper linked Roanoke with Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, and 
catalogued all of the recent Union successes for its readers so they could see that 
“everywhere the giant arms of the Nation are closing around this most unholy rebellion.” 
                                                 
Roanoke Island forms the principle point of our news,” and boasted that the Herald devoted a full 18 
columns of space to the victory. 
 
25 “The Day of Celebration,” New York Herald, 24 February 1862. 
 
26 “The Swelling Tide of Victory – The Capture of Newbern, North Carolina,” New York Herald, 19 
March 1862. 
 
27 “Daybreak,” Harper’s Weekly, 8 March 1862. 
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Burnside, having taken Roanoke, now hung “like a surcharged thunder-cloud on the 
flank of the Rebellion.”28 By the time Burnside had captured Fort Macon, the paper was 
asserting that unless an unexpected and severe reverse occurred, Northern citizens could 
“count on the complete extirpation of the rebellion before midsummer.” Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper, however, went further than linking the victories in North 
Carolina with those in the West. Instead, it linked both with the victories of the 
American Revolution: “The men of Donelson, Roanoke…and Newbern stand beside the 
departed heroes of Washington’s day in the estimation of the world. The victory of 
Burnside at Newbern shows that in the determined fighting element, the men of ’62 are 
not a jot behind those of ’76.”29 
In part because of what they read in the papers, the morale of Northern citizens 
skyrocketed. From Washington, Seward observed that, after Roanoke, “All America is 
ablaze with bonfires, and regards the insurrection as practically a failure.” As if to prove 
Seward’s point, one New York resident wrote to Burnside on 6 March, congratulating 
him on his victory, and expressing his conviction that it “puzzles the traitors of 
Richmond; the idea of a Southern army surrendering after ‘dying in the last ditch’…is 
preposterous.” This flood of enthusiasm did not stop after Roanoke; shortly after the 
                                                 
28 “Post the Books,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 8 March 1862; “Long Live the Nation!,” Frank 
Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 1 March 1862. 
 
29 “Summary of the Week” and “The Landing of the U.S. forces at Slocum’s Creek, Near Newbern,” 
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 5 April 1862. As evidence of the valor of Union soldiers, the paper 
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Battle of New Bern on 14 March, Burnside received another letter from New York 
informing him that “[y]our latest victory has produced a thrill of joy throughout this 
community.”30 
These feelings were certainly not limited to New York. Towards the conclusion 
of Burnside’s campaign, the mayor of Newport, Rhode Island, told the general that 
“[w]e all rejoice over your success…It is very evident that the great & wicked rebellion 
is nearly crushed out.” He went on to express his hope that all of the Union’s soldiers 
would soon be able to return to their homes and firesides.31 Naturally, those soldiers who 
were a part of Burnside’s expedition felt much the same way. Larned, Burnside’s close 
confidant as well as his secretary, became firmly convinced that “the repeated defeats 
[the Confederates] have suffered, and the closing in process all round must have the 
most disastrous effect on the spirit of their troops.”32 In the light of this evidence, it must 
be concluded that Burnside’s victories were a primary (albeit not singular) factor in 
boosting Union morale in the spring of 1862. To Lincoln’s administration, the press, the 
Northern public, and Union soldiers, it mattered not that Burnside (or, for that matter, 
                                                 
30 Seward to Weed, 19 February 1862, in Seward, ed.,  Seward at Washington, 64; Letter from New York 
Office of the Illinois Central Railroad Company to Burnside, 6 March 1862, and Jennings to Burnside, 22 
March 1862, both in RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 5, NA. 
 
31 William H. Cranston to Burnside, 13 May 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 7, 
NA. 
 
32 Daniel Reed Larned to Brother-in-law Henry, 5 May 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: 
Correspondence, LOC. 
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Grant) had greatly outnumbered his Confederate opponents. What mattered was that 
victories, almost nonexistent during 1861, were finally being won by Union forces. 
This fact in itself, however, does not necessarily prove that people associated the 
rise in Union fortunes directly with Burnside. This is another link in the chain of 
Burnside’s rise to command of the Army of the Potomac that has long been overlooked. 
Careful analysis of the archival papers of Larned (who handled a great deal of 
Burnside’s personal correspondence) and of Burnside himself, as well as of 
contemporary Northern newspapers, illuminate the fact that citizens, military officials, 
and the press did directly link the victories in North Carolina to the general. These 
sources not only demonstrate that Burnside had become a household name, but also that 
many in the North began to think very highly of his military ability. 
Shortly after the Roanoke victory, Larned explained to his brother-in-law that 
congratulations for Burnside were coming in “thick and fast.” Larned, who was charged 
with answering many of these letters, may have been peeved by their sheer volume. 
Unfortunately for him, over the next two months, the flood of letters would not recede. 
Much of the correspondence showed a personal devotion to Burnside. For instance, he 
received numerous letters asking permission to name male heirs after him.33 As one 
citizen wrote: 
                                                 
33 Larned to Brother-in-law Henry, 27 February 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: 
Correspondence, LOC; In a mid-January article, the New York Herald had related details of Burnside’s 
upcoming expedition, “upon which so much of the public interest has been concentrating for some time 
past.” The truth of this statement regarding the public’s attention to the campaign would be proven over 
the next several months. See “The Situation,” New York Herald, 14 January 1862.  
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The glorious news of your success has just reached here…and [at] the 
same time, in my humble dwelling, there came a ‘ten pound shell’ – 
different only from those which you shelled Roanoke Island – in that your 
shells were filled with powder & shot, and this one contained ‘flesh and 
blood’ – had arms & legs.’ It is proposed, with your permission, to call 
this little fellow in honor of your victory, by your own full name. If he 
lives the boy shall be shown your autograph, and taught to emulate your 
patriotism.34 
 
Others neglected to ask the general’s permission, and only informed him they had named 
their offspring for him after the fact. One such resident of Newport did so on 23 April, 
describing that his infant had been taught to wave a Union flag, and sending Burnside a 
picture of the boy.35 
 Union citizens did not stop with requests to name children after the general. One 
lady sent Burnside a hand-stitched quilt to commemorate his victory, while another from 
Philadelphia sent a cake, which was decorated with orange blossoms and lilies of the 
valley and in the center iced with a depiction of the American flag and the words 
“General Burnside” and “Roanoke & New Bern.”36 Oliver Ditson & Company, one of 
the major music publishing houses of the era, issued new piano sheet music 
commemorating the general’s victories.37 In addition, Burnside received many requests 
for autographs, was constituted an honorable member for life of the American Board of 
                                                 
34 Resident of New York to Burnside, 13 February 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, 
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35 Resident of Newport to Burnside, 23 April 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 6, 
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entitled “Gen. Burnside’s Victory March.” 
 
 169 
 
Foreign Missions, and was sent a poem by Oliver Wendell Holmes entitled “The Two 
Armies,” commemorating his victories.38 But it was a separate poem, published in a 
Massachusetts newspaper and titled simply “Burnside,” which evinced the strongest 
sentiments regarding the general: “We thank thee Burnside: proudly hast though 
won/The guerdon of thy country’s gratitude/We have no words to bless thee as we 
would/But O, we love thee for what thou hast done.” The poem concluded by 
exclaiming “For thee, the great guns boom – the air is rent with cheers/Stand up, proud 
Hero, with the Nation’s noblest peers.”39 
 This press too directly connected the Union’s increasingly bright prospects with 
Burnside. First and foremost, all of the papers referred to the North Carolina campaign 
as “Burnside’s expedition,” ensuring that the public would not fail to recognize who was 
responsible for the positive results in the Old North State. All of the major New York 
papers, including Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper and Harper’s Weekly, were able 
to relate particulars of the campaign to the public because they sent correspondents with 
Burnside’s Coast Division to cover the general’s movements, a fact which aptly 
demonstrates the connections between the public, the press, and military events.40 
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Larned was tasked with dealing with these reporters, a job of which he soon grew tired. 
After Roanoke, he referred his brother-in-law to the report of the New York Tribune, 
because “their reporters have their account direct from the Generals themselves…so it 
may be relied on.” But less than two weeks later, Larned termed the reporters “a perfect 
nuisance,” and claimed that he had “turned the cold shoulder on them.” And by the end 
of February, he was complaining that the reports in the papers were full of errors, and 
stated that “if the wishes of the staff were carried out, the whole batch of reporters would 
be annihilated.”41 
 Despite Larned’s objections, the reporters remained, and they ultimately brought 
Burnside’s expedition into the public eye and turned the general himself into a national 
figure. J.H. Schell, a combination sketch artist and correspondent, covered the campaign 
for Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, as did Angelo Wiser for Harper’s Weekly. 
Both men provided their publications with numerous images of Burnside and his 
achievements. These sketches depicted everything from the fleet crossing the bar at 
Hatteras Inlet, to the landing of troops on Roanoke Island, to the captured rebel 
fortifications at New Bern, and finally Fort Macon and Burnside’s bombardment of it.42 
                                                 
February 1862. J.H. Schell covered the expedition for Frank Leslie’s, Elias Smith for the New York Times, 
Angelo Wiser for Harper’s Weekly, and a Mr. Bentley for the Philadelphia Inquirer. 
 
41 Larned to Brother-in-law Henry, 9, 23, and 27 February, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: 
Correspondence, LOC. 
 
42 “General Burnside,” 1 March 1862; 8 March 1862; 19 April 1862; 24 May 1862, all in Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper. Harper’s Weekly included sketches of the Burnside expedition in essentially every 
issue it produced in the Spring of 1862. See, for example, the issues of 15 February 1862, 1 March 1862, 5 
April 1862, 12 April 1862, 17 May 1862. 
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Two of Schell’s sketches from the battle of Roanoke in particular stand out as the most 
stirring. The first depicted the charge of the 9th New York Zouaves on the Confederate 
breastworks, which the paper claimed “decided the fortunes of the day.” The second was 
accompanied by an article that stated, “The first blow of the Burnside Expedition has 
fallen with terrific force on the enemy’s flank,” and depicted an indeed forceful looking 
Burnside, bellowing orders from the rigging of one of the naval vessels. It is unclear if 
Schell purposely attempted to make Burnside look like Father Neptune in the sketch, but 
the resemblance is uncanny.43 
 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper was also fond of providing its readers with 
detailed maps, including Pamlico, Albemarle, Currituck, and Roanoke Sounds, which it 
believed would “enable our readers to follow the operations of the great Burnside 
Expedition.”44 The New York Herald, New York Times, New York Tribune, and Harper’s 
Weekly did this as well; indeed, a large portion of the front page of the Times on 12 
February was occupied by a huge map showing the scene of operations on the North 
Carolina coast, while the Herald’s 15 February edition provided two maps of Roanoke 
Island and the North Carolina sounds.45 And though the illustrated periodicals 
                                                 
43 “The Battle of Roanoke,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 8 March 1862; “The Victory at 
Roanoke Island,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 1 March 1862. 
 
44 “Map of Pamlico, Albemarle, Currituck, and Roanoke Sounds,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 8 
February 1862. 
 
45 “Burnside’s Expedition,” New York Tribune, 13 February 1862; Harper’s Weekly, 1 March 1862; “The 
Situation,” New York Herald, 15 February 1862; “The Situation,” New York Herald, 25 March 1862; “The 
Burnside Expedition,” New York Times, 12 February 1862. In later papers, the Times would include large 
maps of Roanoke Island, as well as Newbern and its approaches. See “The Battle of Roanoke,” 13 
February 1862, and “Another Glorious Victory,” 19 March 1862. 
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undoubtedly had the best sketches, this did not stop the Herald from trying to provide its 
readers with similar visuals. In February the paper carried scenes of Roanoke Island, 
while a March edition contained sketches of multiple places that Burnside had 
conquered, such as Elizabeth City.46 
 While the maps and sketches helped the public follow the campaign, the articles 
in these papers ensured that readers would link it directly to Burnside. Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper began habitually referring to the general as “the gallant 
Burnside,” whom it claimed had brought the North “the most stirring news.”47 It also 
began carrying advertisements for large ambrotype pins of the general, as well as for 
“Burnside vest chains.” Furthermore, it proposed that New Bern be renamed “New 
Burnside” in honor of the general’s victory there.48 The New York Herald frequently 
reprinted Burnside’s full reports, and on 15 February carried a biographical sketch of 
Burnside and his brigadier generals, Foster, Reno, and Parke, in which it explained that, 
when it came to Burnside, “Next to the young chieftain of the Union armies 
[McClellan], no general enjoys more fully the esteem and affection of his officers and 
men. He is…truly a leader.”49 
                                                 
46 “Brilliant Operations at Roanoke Island,” New York Herald, 13 February 1862; “What General Burnside 
Has Accomplished,” New York Herald, 25 March 1862. 
 
47 “Summary of the Week,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 5 April 1862. 
 
48 For advertisements, see, for example, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 19 April and 24 and 31 
May, 1862. For the proposed name change, see 24 May 1862. 
 
49 “Sketches of the Generals,” New York Herald, 15 February 1862. Likewise, Harper’s Weekly carried 
lengthy biographies of both Burnside and Foster in its 1 March 1862 issue. 
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For its part, the New York Times often carried stacked headlines placing the 
general’s name next to his accomplishments, like the one that read “Overwhelming 
success of the Burnside Expedition/Roanoke Island and Elizabeth City Captured/The 
National Forces Pushing On.”50 But the paper also remarked positively on Burnside’s 
refusal to lose heart when his expedition faced delay and disaster at Hatteras Inlet, 
terming it “well for the country” that Burnside was a far better man than the “croakers” 
on the home front.”51 Harper’s Weekly depicted the general in a similar, noble light. 
After the victory at Roanoke Island, the paper carried an anecdote from the Battle of 
Bull Run in which General Irvin McDowell, the commander of the Union Army at that 
time, rose in his saddle during the heat of the battle and asked earnestly, “Where is 
Burnside?” As Harper’s explained, now the entire country was asking this question, and 
“from the heart of the enemy’s country…comes the quiet voice of the leader, ‘Here, 
where I meant to be!’” As if to leave no doubt of Burnside’s increasing popularity, the 
paper concluded, “And now if you ask again, ‘Where is Burnside?’ the answer rings 
from the lips of millions of grateful countrymen, ‘Fast in our hearts forever.’”52 
During this time, Burnside also received more formal congratulations. The 
General Assembly of the State of Ohio passed a resolution thanking him, along with the 
naval commander of the expedition, Goldsborough, for their “brilliant victories in 
                                                 
50 “The Battle of Roanoke,” New York Times, 13 February 1862. 
 
51 “A Lesson to Croakers,” New York Times, 18 February 1862. 
 
52 “Where is Burnside?” Harper’s Weekly, 1 March 1862. 
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Eastern North Carolina,” and stated that these victories were the beginning of the 
“speedy end of the ‘great rebellion.’” Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, Burnside’s 
birth state, requested that Burnside send him a photograph or steel plate portrait, which 
was to be placed among a collection of Indiana’s greatest generals.53 And Rhode Island, 
Burnside’s adopted state, passed a joint resolution of its legislature directing that a 
Tiffany sword be sent to Burnside “as a testimonial for your conduct and success,” to 
commemorate his victory at Roanoke, which it termed “one of the most brilliant exploits 
of the war.”54 
A committee was appointed to select this sword, and the one they chose would be 
described by Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper as “a poem in sculpture, which 
cannot be too highly commended.” The hilt of the sword contained a statuette of a 
winged victory, six inches in height, her right arm holding above her head a chaplet of 
laurel, while a flag floated over her right shoulder. The hand guard was ornamented with 
an elegant scroll bearing Burnside’s initials, and the scabbard, made of sterling silver, 
contained laurel garlands, heraldic ribbons, a shield emblazoned with the arms of the 
commonwealth, and a pendant inscribed ‘Roanoke.’55 
                                                 
53 State of Ohio to Burnside, Resolution Passed 17 February 1862, Ambrose E. Burnside Collection, Box 
2, Folder 15, RIHS; Private Secretary of Oliver P. Morton to Burnside, 16 May 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. 
Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 7, NA. It is unclear if Burnside ever sent the picture. 
 
54 Governor William Sprague to Burnside, 10 April 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 6, NA. 
 
55 “Rhode Island to Burnside,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 31 May 1862. The article was 
accompanied by a sketch of the magnificent sword. The total cost of this ceremonial gift was $800. 
 
 175 
 
In June, delegates from the Rhode Island General Assembly traveled to New 
Bern to present the sword to Burnside. On 18 June, Burnside’s men, outfitted in their 
finest parade dress, formed a hollow square in the midst of a rain shower around a 
wooden platform erected on caissons. As the infantry, cavalry, and artillery of his 
expedition looked on, Burnside proceeded to the platform while cannons rang a 15-gun 
salute. General Maurau, representing Rhode Island, met Burnside on the platform and 
presented him with this token of Rhode Island’s thanks, at which point, according to a 
newspaper correspondent with the expedition, “[A] cheer was raised by the men that 
rivaled in force the salvos of artillery that heralded the approach of the much beloved 
commander…it was repeated and repeated, the woods throwing back the echo, until one 
would almost fancy a whole state had raised up its voice.” As Burnside received the 
sword, the rain shower ended and a rainbow appeared; a (perhaps too) perfect metaphor 
for those who believed that the darkest days of the Union were behind them, now that 
they had found a general who could win.56 
 Indeed, there were many who believed that Burnside was just the man to defeat 
the Confederates. As Burnside’s brother informed him, his movements had been eagerly 
watched by the whole country, and a large number of people concluded that they liked 
what they saw in the general. Even before learning of the victories at New Bern and Fort 
Macon, the Forest City Union Association of Cleveland, Ohio, passed a resolution 
                                                 
56“The Burnside Expedition,” Harper’s Weekly, 19 July 1862. Harper’s included a sketch of the sword 
presentation, with the rainbow clearly visible in the background. A description of the sword presentation 
can also be found in Marvel, Burnside, 94. 
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stating that “[w]e have full and unlimited confidence in the ability, energy, zeal, and 
patriotism of Gen. Burnside, and we are confident that while the command of our 
National Forces is in such able military hands, the success of our cause in this great 
struggle will be certain.”57 The rest of the campaign only added to this conviction. In late 
May, Amos D. Smith, a leading citizen and wealthy textile investor in Providence, 
Rhode Island, assured Burnside that his name was “spoken by all patriots, both here and 
in New York and Philadelphia, and wherever I have been, as one of our bravest, and 
most energetic and judicious commanders.” Evidence of the truth of this claim was 
present in one of the sermons of Bishop Clarke of Rhode Island, who told his 
congregation that “Roanoke has bowed before the powers of that noble man…The Lord 
of Hosts is with him – the God of battles is his refuge.” But it was Newport’s mayor who 
summed up the general feeling best, when he succinctly stated the belief that “Burnside 
is a trump.”58 Multiple citizens even wrote saying that they were eagerly awaiting news 
of the general’s next victory, which would give a “coup de grace” to the rebellion.59 
 A significant part of Burnside’s appeal as a commander was the almost fanatical 
level of devotion he inspired in the soldiers who served under him. Even before the 
                                                 
57 Benjamin Burnside to Ambrose Burnside, 2 March 1862, and A.T. Goodman to Burnside, 8 March 
1862, both in RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 5, NA. 
 
58 Amos D. Smith to Burnside, 22 May 1862, and William H. Cranston to Burnside, 13 May 1862, both in 
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expedition sailed, Larned told his sister just how much he liked the general, stating that 
he “would not be afraid to follow him anywhere.”60 Those who knew Burnside best, like 
Larned, were amazed at his kindness, cheerfulness, and work ethic. The very sight of 
Burnside was enough to inspire confidence. When the expedition had trouble crossing 
the bar at Cape Hatteras and endured several severe storms, many of the soldiers began 
to despond. But Burnside’s presence and cheerfulness helped the men weather the 
storms. As one soldier in the 25th Massachusetts explained, Burnside was “everywhere to 
be seen, flying about among the boats and vessels, encouraging his men and looking as 
cheerful as though everything was going to suit him…He knows no such word as fail, 
and is bound to overcome all obstacles.”61 The soldiers were fond of cheering the 
general and referring to him as “Old Glory.” Likewise, the bands of the regiments 
frequently played “Hail to the Chief” whenever Burnside appeared on the deck of his 
vessel.62 Larned proved prescient in estimating that “[t]he untiring energy, patience, & 
perseverance of the General…will in the end accomplish great things.”63 
 This devotion only increased when the fighting began. This was particularly true 
after the Union victory at New Bern. Burnside had been at the front throughout the 
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61 Entries for 15 January and 23 January 1862, in David L. Day, My Diary of Rambles with the 25th 
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Larned diary entry, 26 January 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 1: Correspondence, LOC; Entry for 
14 March 1862, William J. Creasey Diary, Vol. 1, SHC. 
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battle, and had met many of the wounded and shook hands with them. When he rode 
inside the captured Confederate lines, according to Lieutenant William J. Creasey of the 
23rd Massachusetts, “Such a cheering as was given…never was heard before in the 
woods of the pine tree state.” Creasey fully believed that “[t]o see him was enough to 
pay for that day’s work.”64 After this battle, even family members of those serving in 
Burnside’s expedition wrote to the general describing “the very strong expressions of 
attachment to you by all who are so fortunate as to comprise a portion of your Army.”65 
Moreover, the “courage, coolness, and determination” of Burnside’s soldiers, in addition 
to their personal loyalty to him, inspired Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper to claim 
that Burnside’s Coast Division was the counterpart of Napoleon’s famed ‘Old Guard.’ 
When the men received news of Burnside’s nomination for a Major Generalship 
thereafter, many of them were overjoyed, not just for Burnside, but for the fortunes of 
the Union cause.66 
 As evidenced by this promotion to Major General after his victory at New Bern, 
Burnside’s military prowess caught the eye not only of his soldiers and of civilians, but 
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of McClellan and the War Department. The Union’s Adjutant General made known to 
Burnside that both Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton were highly pleased with the 
bravery and skill displayed by him in achieving successes “at once brilliant and fruitful.” 
Stanton later communicated the “highest satisfaction” of both himself, the President, and 
the whole nation for Burnside’s distinguished service.67 Meanwhile McClellan, who was 
more inclined to accept accolades rather than give them out, wrote to his mother that 
“Burnside has so far done splendidly, & I am sure will continue in the same path.”68 
 All of these sentiments echoed what was being said by the Northern press, which 
was doing its best to tout Burnside as one of (if not the) best generals the Union 
possessed. On a tactical level, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper was impressed with 
the fact that, although it expected the landing of troops on Roanoke Island to be “hotly 
contested” by the rebels, “[S]o admirably had Gen. Burnside made all his arrangements, 
that our entire force was disembarked from the transports without a single casualty.” But 
the paper was also won over by Burnside’s “untiring energy and attention to the duties of 
his position.”69  
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The New York Herald, meanwhile, termed Burnside’s victory at Roanoke Island 
“the most complete achievement of the war,” and grew certain that the “brilliant 
conduct” of Burnside and his army would accomplish nothing less than the speedy 
restoration of North Carolina to the Union.70 By the end of Burnside’s campaign, one of 
the Herald’s war correspondents felt comfortable asserting that Burnside’s “name alone 
is a tower of strength,” because it was “so greatly feared by the rebels,” and concluded 
that “[i]t is certain that wherever Gen. Burnside makes a strike, let his forces be what 
they may, it will be decisive and brilliant.”71 This opinion was shared by a correspondent 
for the New York Tribune, who remarked that Burnside, having less manpower than all 
of the other Union generals, had still managed to achieve “more important and brilliant 
results than any other commander.”72 
 Burnside’s accomplishments were made to appear even greater because the 
papers often exaggerated the strength of the Confederate forces in North Carolina. For 
instance, Harper’s Weekly termed Burnside’s victory at New Bern “in many respects the 
most brilliant affair of the war” due in part to the mistaken belief that Burnside had 
defeated an enemy equal in number to his own army. Therefore, Harper’s lavished 
praise on Burnside for completely routing this force in the space of a few hours.73 
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Undoubtedly, however, it was the New York Times that had the best things to say about 
Burnside’s military ability. Burnside’s successes were almost always termed “complete,” 
in contrast to the victories McClellan claimed, which seemed barren of results and often 
left the enemy in possession of the field.74 When the Times learned that Burnside’s force 
was about to depart from Roanoke, it opined that “Burnside is just the man to give [the 
Confederates] all the fight they can stomach,” and therefore speculated (correctly) that 
“we may look out for warm work and a brilliant bulletin shortly.”75 And after receiving 
such bulletins containing news of Burnside’s victory at New Bern and Brigadier General 
Parke’s investment of Fort Macon, the Times thundered that “Gen. Burnside is not 
satisfied with one, two, or three successes, so long as more work remains to be done.” 
Indeed, all of this caused the paper to express the conviction that Burnside’s campaign in 
North Carolina had “illustrated his invaluable skill and steadiness as a general.” Given 
this, the Times called the fact that Burnside had not yet been given a larger role in the 
war a “military mystery.”76 Little did the paper know that Lincoln would soon attempt to 
give the general just such a role.  
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 While Burnside prosecuted the war in North Carolina, McClellan was busy 
conducting his own campaign on the Virginia Peninsula, which many Northerners 
believed would lead to the capture of Richmond. In a series of battles in late June and 
early July of 1862, however, McClellan was defeated by General Robert E. Lee and 
forced to retreat down the Peninsula.77 With McClellan’s advance stalled, and Lincoln 
and the War Department growing increasingly restive, Burnside was ordered to 
Washington and arrived on 22 July. In a closed conference with Lincoln and Stanton, 
Burnside was offered McClellan’s command. Burnside, however, turned it down, 
arguing that McClellan was the better general and that if he was allowed to renew his 
campaign, he would produce results. Lincoln did not force the matter and for the time 
being allowed McClellan to remain at the head of the Army of the Potomac.78 McClellan 
became aware of what had transpired, which did nothing to assuage his poor relationship 
with the Administration. As he explained to a friend, “The command was for two days 
persistently pressed upon a General Officer [Burnside] who happened to be a true friend 
of mine, & declined the offer. I know that the rascals will get rid of me as soon as they 
dare.”79 
                                                 
77 These were the Seven Days Battles, fought from 25 June to 1 July, 1862. For an excellent history of 
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78 Marvel, Burnside, 99-100. The exact date Lincoln offered Burnside the command has not been 
determined, though it was clearly between 22 and 27 July, 1862. Dispatches from the New York Herald’s 
war correspondent at Fortress Monroe indicates that it had happened by 25 July. On that date, he wrote to 
the paper, “Major General Burnside arrived this morning [on the Peninsula] from Washington, where he 
had been in close consultation with the War Department.” See “News from McClellan: Our Fortress 
Monroe Correspondence,” New York Herald, 28 July 1862. 
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 One measure that Lincoln and Stanton did take was to consolidate several 
military departments in the Shenandoah Valley and bring Major General John Pope east 
to take command of this newly created Army of Virginia.80 Pope had captured New 
Madrid in Missouri in March and then surrounded and forced the surrender of Island 
No.10 on the Mississippi River in early April. Thereafter, he commanded the left wing 
of General Henry Wager Halleck’s army in the taking of the vital railroad junction of 
Corinth, Mississippi.81 Once brought east, however, Pope fared no better against Lee 
than McClellan had, and suffered a disastrous defeat in the Second Battle of Bull Run at 
the end of August. As Pope’s broken army streamed toward Washington, it was 
combined with McClellan’s, which had been shifted from the Peninsula over the 
preceding month. When the War Department learned that Lee was preparing to cross the 
Potomac to invade Maryland, Burnside was again called to the White House, and on 5 
September he was offered command of the field army which was to be used to combat 
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this incursion into the North. But Burnside once again declined, reiterating a belief that 
he could not manage so large a force.82 
 Though historians have focused solely on the official reason Burnside gave to 
Lincoln for refusing the command, several other factors heavily influenced Burnside’s 
decision. One was undoubtedly his friendship with McClellan, which predated the war. 
After Burnside resigned from the regular army in 1853, he had gone broke when the 
government failed to make good on its promise to purchase a breech loading carbine he 
had designed. At this low point in his life, it was McClellan, his old West Point 
classmate, to whom Burnside turned. McClellan offered Burnside a job with the Illinois 
Central Railroad, which he thankfully accepted. This was a favor Burnside would not 
soon forget. He earned an annual salary of $2,000, half of which he used to pay off his 
creditors, until he was debt free.83 
 There is abundant evidence of the strong friendship between the two men in their 
correspondence during Burnside’s expedition. Burnside continually addressed 
McClellan as “My dear Mac,” while McClellan frequently prefaced his letters with “My 
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dear Burn.”84 Burnside’s official report on his victory at New Bern spoke glowingly of 
McClellan, although it was Burnside who had planned and fought the battle. This report, 
naturally, made McClellan very happy, and he replied by writing Burnside what Larned 
termed a “beautiful letter.” When Burnside read it, he confided to Larned, “I love him 
[McClellan].”85 This report did not escape the notice of McClellan’s friends, several of 
whom expressed great pleasure with it, and explained that it had caused the New York 
newspapers (specifically the Post and the Tribune) to stop berating McClellan, whom 
they had previously “abused beyond endurance.”86 As Burnside’s victories piled up, 
McClellan acknowledged them by expressing his opinion to Burnside that “I can never 
forget the debt I owe you.”87 
 Nor did Burnside forget the debt he believed he owed McClellan. Burnside’s 
assertions to Lincoln that McClellan was a great general who would produce results if 
given time were not simply a measure to avoid taking the command himself. Larned’s 
papers make clear that Burnside possessed genuine confidence in McClellan, a 
confidence which he attempted to impart to his staff. As Larned explained during 
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McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, Burnside “has perfect confidence in [McClellan]…He 
says he is working slow because the time has not yet come for him to make the dash…he 
has not the slightest doubt as to the result.” That this confidence stemmed in large part 
from Burnside’s personal relationship with McClellan is evident in another of Larned’s 
letters, in which he stated to his sister, “The General has known [McClellan] for many 
years as an intimate and confidential friend. He is acquainted with all his 
characteristics…He has the utmost confidence in him as a man and a military leader.”88 
Therefore, Burnside’s refusals of command may have had less to do with a belief that he 
was the wrong man for the job, as opposed to his conviction that McClellan was, in fact, 
the right man for the job.89 
 Another underlying reason for Burnside’s refusals of command, which has 
escaped the notice of historians, was his excessive modesty. Burnside shared a vast 
amount of his credit not only with McClellan, but with his brigade commanders as well. 
Burnside had hand-picked Brigadier Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke, all of whom were 
his friends at West Point, to lead his three brigades.90 In General Orders No. 5, issued 
after the victory at Roanoke, Burnside praised the bravery and energy of these three 
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men, which, he claimed, “resulted in the complete success of our arms.” Burnside was 
more direct in his initial report to McClellan, stating unequivocally, “I owe everything to 
Genls. Foster, Reno, & Parke.”91 In his report to Stanton on New Bern, Burnside again 
mentioned the unflagging bravery of the brigadiers, asserting his belief that “[t]o them 
and their brave officers and men the country owes every success which has been 
obtained during this campaign.” Nor did Burnside slight the contributions of the Union 
Navy, citing their perfect cooperation as a major reason for the victory.92 In fact, 
Burnside almost always mentioned the Navy’s role in his reports, a fact which was 
appreciated by naval officers connected to his campaign, such as Commander Stephen 
Clegg Rowan.93 In none of Burnside’s reports on any of his three battles did he claim 
any special credit for the victories, which he may well have done. 
 Even when he was being personally honored, Burnside remained determined to 
credit almost everyone except himself for the laurels he had won. The speech he made 
upon being presented the sword from Rhode Island is indicative of this; as he asserted to 
his gathered army: 
Without the skill, courage, patience, and fortitude of the general officers, 
field and staff officers, company officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
privates of this corps d’ armee, together with the full and hearty 
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cooperation of our gallant navy in these waters, the state of Rhode Island 
would have been deprived the pleasure of giving, and I debarred the 
proud satisfaction of receiving, this elegant sword.94 
 
Utterances like these certainly endeared Burnside to those serving in his expedition, but 
they also gave the general a reputation for modesty that was virtually unmatched at the 
time. 
Indeed, the Northern press picked up on and lauded this modesty. After Roanoke 
Island fell, the New York Herald noted that Burnside “does all honor to Generals Foster, 
Reno, and Parke.”95 But the modesty of the general was best embodied in his report on 
the New Bern victory. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper reprinted Burnside’s 16 
March report to Adjutant General Thomas, citing the fact that it was “brief and modest” 
as evidence that it was “a model of this class of compositions.”96 The New York Times 
went even further, claiming that “[i]f anything were wanting to perfect the claims of 
Gen. Burnside to public respect and admiration, it would be supplied by his official 
narrative of the victory at Newbern. To proofs of well-contrived strategy [and] cautious 
and successful leadership…Gen. Burnside adds evidence of rare modesty.”97 
Undoubtedly, these papers portrayed Burnside to their readers as a modest man of noble 
character. 
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This portrayal led the papers to overlook Burnside’s assertion that he was not 
capable of handling so large a force as the Army of the Potomac. Harper’s Weekly, for 
one, specifically stated that this was simply part of Burnside’s “characteristic modesty,” 
and went so far as to contend that “[t]here is nothing finer in history than the lofty 
example of patriotism and self-sacrifice thus given by General Burnside.” Harper’s, 
therefore, saw Burnside’s disinclination to take the command as less of an honest self-
evaluation than as a refreshing case of a general who paid little heed to his personal 
ambition but rather was willing to surrender his own interests for the public good.98 
 It is quite probable that Lincoln saw the situation in a similar manner, and 
attributed Burnside’s refusals of command less to a sincere belief that he was not 
qualified to lead the Army of the Potomac, than to his typically noble manner.99 In fact, 
it is likely that this influenced Lincoln in placing Burnside in command, as Lincoln may 
well have been tiring of dealing with arrogant generals who failed to back up their talk 
with victories. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1862, Lincoln had clashed with 
McClellan, who was notoriously boastful. Indeed, when McClellan had originally been 
made general in chief, and Lincoln expressed his concern that this would entail a vast 
labor, McClellan had confidently replied, “I can do it all.” As historian George C. Rable 
explains, the choice of Burnside as McClellan’s potential replacement “reflected 
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Lincoln’s growing frustrations with generals who offered unsolicited policy advice 
without winning victories.”100 
Pope too had appeared a braggart to the Administration; in his first address to the 
Army of Virginia after coming east, he had claimed that his armies in the West had 
always seen the backs of their enemies.101 And Joseph Hooker, another name thrown 
around by the Administration for command at the time, was also known to be cocky and 
overly ambitious. Throughout the fall of 1862, Hooker schemed to elevate his own name 
while casting doubt on the ability of his superiors, a fact that was not a well-kept 
secret.102 Indeed, Lincoln would later remark to newspaperman and close confidant 
Noah Brooks that “the most depressing thing about Hooker” was that he was 
overconfident.103 In comparison to McClellan, Pope, and Hooker, Burnside appeared a 
noble officer with a record of success, and therefore the best man to lead the army. 
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One of the reasons that historians fail to acknowledge this is undoubtedly 
Burnside’s performance at the Battle of Antietam. Burnside’s actions on 17 September 
have received a great deal of scrutiny, the majority of which stems from McClellan’s 
rendering of Burnside’s role in the battle. McClellan, who had retained command of the 
Army of the Potomac after Burnside’s second refusal of command, essentially pinned 
the army’s (and by extension his own) failure to win a decisive victory at Antietam on 
Burnside. A careful reading of the evidence, however, makes clear two crucial facts: 
McClellan was dishonest in his disparaging of his loyal friend, and, more importantly, 
his strong censure of Burnside did not take place until 1863, and therefore would have 
played no role in Lincoln’s decision to give Burnside command of the Army of the 
Potomac in November of 1862. 
After Burnside had turned down the command of the army, McClellan made him 
commander of the right wing, composed of Burnside’s Ninth Corps (which included two 
of his brigades from the North Carolina expedition) and Hooker’s First Corps. Burnside 
remained very popular with the soldiers who had served under him in the preceding 
months and now followed him into Maryland; as one officer explained, “Vociferous 
cheering, first heard in the distance and increasing in apparent volume as it came nearer, 
was recognized as the sure announcement of the coming of Burnside.”104 But just prior 
to the battle, McClellan (supposedly temporarily) removed Burnside from wing 
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command and left him in charge only of the Ninth Corps, for reasons that are not 
altogether clear. As McClellan planned his attack on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia 
(scattered around the town of Sharpsburg) on 16 September, he positioned Burnside on 
the Union left, facing Confederate General Robert Toombs’s brigade across Rohrbach’s 
Bridge, which spanned Antietam Creek.105 
McClellan’s plan was to assault the Confederate left with Hooker’s First Corps, 
on the northern edge of the battlefield, while several other corps made ready to attack the 
Confederate center in support. Burnside, too, was ordered to be ready to strike the 
Confederate right, but both the timing of this attack, and its ultimate purpose, have 
become sources of heated controversy. In his memoir, McClellan claimed the he had a 
lieutenant of the topographical engineers deliver an order to Burnside at 8:00 a.m. on 17 
September to carry the bridge (known afterwards as ‘Burnside’s Bridge’), and to “gain 
possession of the heights beyond, and advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg.” 
When Burnside made little progress during the morning, McClellan sent another order to 
take the bridge “at all hazards.” According to McClellan, Burnside once again failed to 
do this, so McClellan had a third order delivered, which commanded Burnside to “push 
forward his troops without a moment’s delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the 
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point of the bayonet.”106 Finally, after a delay of around four hours, Burnside carried the 
bridge at 1:00 p.m. 
With this accomplished, McClellan directed one of his aides to inform Burnside 
that he was to “push forward his troops with the utmost vigor and carry the enemy’s 
position on the heights,” and that “we must not stop for loss of life, if a great object 
could thereby be accomplished.”107 Burnside did eventually carry these heights, but his 
subsequent advance on Sharpsburg was stopped by darkness and the arrival of 
Confederate reinforcements. McClellan contended that if Burnside had accomplished his 
mission two hours earlier, “a position would have been secured upon the heights from 
which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy’s line, and turned 
their right and rear.” He went on to state, in no uncertain terms, that “[o]ur victory might 
thus have been much more decisive,” and that “if [General Fitz John] Porter or [General 
Winfield Scott] Hancock had been in Burnside’s place the town of Sharpsburg would 
have been ours.”108 
Much like his memoirs, McClellan’s official report heavily censured Burnside 
for failing to understand that he was to throw a strong force against the Confederate right 
in conjunction with Hooker’s attack on the enemy’s left. It essentially blamed the lack of 
a clear cut victory on Burnside, who had failed to accomplish the seemingly simple task 
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of crossing the bridge and securing the heights in the rear of Sharpsburg.109 McClellan’s 
rendering of events, however, should not be accepted uncritically for several reasons. 
One is that this official report was not written until August of 1863 (after he had been 
removed from command), and it did not line up with his original report written on 15 
October 1862, shortly after the battle. In that initial report, McClellan stated: 
The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy’s left – at least 
to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of 
something more, by assailing the enemy’s right – and, as soon as one or 
both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center 
with any reserve I might then have in hand.110 
 
This clearly indicates that McClellan initially planned to use Burnside’s attack on the 
Confederate right only as a diversion, and this is indeed how Burnside seems to have 
understood the attack. Thus, it is one factor that helps explain why Burnside did not 
attempt to throw an overwhelming force across the bridge early in the morning, but it is 
not the only one. 
 The timing of McClellan’s first order to attack the Confederate right is another 
point that has been heavily disputed. Burnside’s post-battle report, dated 30 September, 
gave the timing of the order as 10:00 a.m., a full two hours later than McClellan’s later 
official report. McClellan’s initial report, however, explicitly stated that the order to 
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Burnside to attack was communicated at 10:00 a.m.111 McClellan’s later revised 
statement that the attack order was communicated at 8:00 a.m. has been accepted in part 
because it was supported by the letters of Colonel Delos B. Sacket, the aide McClellan 
sent to Burnside to order him to carry the bridge at all hazards. Sacket claimed that 
Burnside snapped at him, “McClellan seems to think I am not trying my best to carry 
this bridge, you are the third or fourth one who has been to see me this morning with 
similar orders.”112 If this were true, it would certainly support the contention that 
Burnside had been receiving orders to cross the creek since early in the morning. Yet 
Sacket’s claims, much like McClellan’s, are suspect. 
 Sacket’s letters were not published until years after the war, and they were added 
posthumously to McClellan’s memoir. The validity of their content has been disputed 
both by Marvel, and by Major General Jacob D. Cox, who commanded one of 
Burnside’s divisions. Cox acknowledges that Sacket did deliver Burnside an order to 
attack at 10:00 a.m., but in his estimation, “The manner in which we had waited, the free 
discussion of what was occurring under our eyes and of our relation to it, the public 
receipt of the order by Burnside in the usual and business-like form, all forbid the 
supposition that this was any reiteration of a former order.”  This led Cox (who, it should 
be noted, had no prior attachment to Burnside), to conclude that “the emulative evidence 
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seems to prove conclusively that the time stated by Burnside, and by McClellan himself 
in his original report [10:00 a.m.], is correct.”113 Additionally, as Marvel notes, Sacket’s 
claims about being the fourth messenger at that hour contradict even McClellan’s later 
writings. Marvel goes so far as to term Sacket “either McClellan’s unflagging supporter 
or an obsequious flatterer.”114 
 A final point of importance is the way in which McClellan portrayed the 
difficulty (or lack thereof) of Burnside’s assignment. As Cox points out, McClellan’s 
official report treated the attack “as little different from a parade or march across, which 
might have been done in half an hour.”115 This was a serious misrepresentation by 
McClellan. Though Burnside faced only Toombs’s brigade of the 2nd, 20th, and 50th 
Georgia regiments, about 550 men in total, this force was well dug in on the heights and 
strongly supported by Confederate artillery.116 Both the banks of the stream and the 
woods behind it were covered with Confederate rifle pits; furthermore, any advance 
across the bridge could be made only by a narrow column with a front of eight men at 
most. Nor could the Confederate position be softened by artillery fire, as the steepness of 
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the heights and the curve of Antietam Creek made it impossible for such fire to reach the 
Confederate line. As Cox concluded, “[T]he Confederate position was virtually 
impregnable to a direct attack over the bridge.”117 
 Burnside himself recognized this, and ordered Brigadier General Isaac P. 
Rodman’s division to try to ford the river at a bend in the Antietam below the bridge. 
Rodman met with sharp resistance, and this, combined with the difficult terrain, thwarted 
his effort. Though another of Burnside’s brigades would later locate a ford north of the 
bridge, this did not happen until early afternoon, and therefore Burnside was forced, in 
the end, to carry the bridge directly.118 Shortly after 1:00 p.m., the 51st New York and 
51st Pennsylvania of Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis’s division succeeded in 
crossing the bridge, but it was 3:00 before Burnside could replenish the division’s 
ammunition and move two other divisions across the bridge to consolidate his new 
position.119 Burnside then advanced on Sharpsburg, driving General D.R. Jones’s 
Confederate division before him, but McClellan failed to support the attack with the 
Union reserve (Porter’s Fifth Corps). Therefore, when General A.P. Hill’s Confederate 
division arrived on the field from Harper’s Ferry between 3:30 and 4:00, it was able to 
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concentrate enfilade fire on Burnside’s left flank. As Confederate General James 
Longstreet explained, this attack “seemed to spring from the earth…outflanked and 
staggered by the gallant attack of Hill’s brigades, [Burnside’s] advance was arrested.”120 
Thus ended the day’s battle. 
 Burnside’s performance during the battle was by no means perfect. He failed to 
personally reconnoiter the fords of Antietam Creek, and it is possible that if he had done 
so, he could have found a place to cross one of his divisions and outflank the 
Confederate line. But the serious charges leveled against him by McClellan, which have 
influenced historical opinions of Burnside’s aptness for command, ring false. 
McClellan’s inference that Burnside could have advanced across the bridge at any time 
was misleading; his later assertions that the attack was not originally planned as a 
diversion, and that Burnside ignored an 8:00 a.m. order to assault, are contradictory to 
his initial report and appear downright false. It is only by ignoring these facts that 
historians such as Warren W. Hassler Jr. can claim that “[Burnside’s] inexcusable 
procrastination, despite McClellan’s specific and repeated orders, cost the commander a 
crushing victory over Lee.”121 
Regardless of the merit of McClellan’s charges, it is clear that they did not arise 
until 1863, after McClellan had been removed from command and was searching for 
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scapegoats to detract notice from his own performance. As Marvel points out, Burnside, 
who by the time McClellan’s official report was published had suffered a disastrous 
defeat at Fredericksburg, made an easy target. Indeed, Marvel claims that McClellan 
“gathered his best rounds [of criticism] from the banks of the Rappahannock River 
[Fredericksburg].”122 Cox too came away with a “profound conviction that the 
…criticisms upon [Burnside] in relation to the Battle of Antietam were unjust.”123 True 
to character, Burnside never publicly defended himself against these criticisms. 
Moreover, in the fall of 1862, he would not have had to, as they did not yet exist. There 
is, in fact, a complete lack of evidence demonstrating that Lincoln, Stanton, or any of the 
members of the War Department or the Administration felt any differently about 
Burnside’s military ability after the battle than they had before it. 
Nor did the Northern press change its opinion of Burnside as a result of the 
general’s actions on 17 September. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper spoke highly 
of Burnside’s conduct, and laid the blame for the failure to achieve a complete victory 
on McClellan, whom it believed allowed Porter’s corps to “remain perfectly passive with 
17,000 men, while Burnside was struggling with overwhelming numbers at the 
bridge.”124 Even the New York Herald, which was a strongly Democratic (and therefore 
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pro-McClellan) paper, acknowledged that Burnside “had to encounter the most 
determined opposition in successfully executing that part of McClellan’s plan to which 
[his corps] had been assigned.” Admittedly, the Herald’s optimism was due in part to the 
fact that the paper viewed Antietam as a battle won, but it was Burnside’s “vigorous 
attack and steady advance” that it cited as ultimately deciding the engagement.125 And 
while moderate censure of Burnside for his initial failure to throw overwhelming force 
against Rohrbach’s Bridge was present in the New York Times, the paper was far more 
critical of McClellan, when it stated that “more unfortunate in its results was the total 
failure of [the] separate attacks on the right and left to…in any manner cooperate with 
each other.” The Times actually compared Burnside’s performance favorably with that 
of other corps commanders such as William B. Franklin and Edwin V. Sumner.126 
While both the press and the Administration found little fault in Burnside’s 
actions, they did continue to doubt that McClellan was the right man to lead the Army of 
the Potomac. Prior to Antietam, McClellan had been left in command of the army much 
to the displeasure of certain members of the Administration, such as Stanton. Though a 
pre-war Democrat, Stanton had aligned himself with influential Republicans since 
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becoming Secretary of War, and had grown increasingly hostile to McClellan. More than 
once, Stanton had made statements about McClellan expressing his belief that the 
general “doesn’t intend to do anything.” Stanton had gone so far as to submit to Halleck 
in late August (who by that time had been made general in chief) a list of questions that 
were designed to cast doubt on McClellan’s obedience and loyalty.127 
Chase was another man who was angered by McClellan’s continued presence in 
command. In a September letter to Republican Senator Zachariah Chandler, Chase made 
clear that “the action of the President in placing General McClellan in command…was 
not prompted by me.” Chase went on to name several officers who he believed were 
better suited to the command, including Burnside.128 Chandler himself, who was an 
influential member of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, hated McClellan, 
going so far as to say privately that McClellan should be shot.129 In the end, however, 
Lincoln retained the ultimate authority in selecting a commander, and he sidestepped 
both Stanton’s and the Radical Republicans’ objections in retaining McClellan in 
command after Burnside had rejected his second offer. 
 But during the month following Antietam, Lincoln too became fully convinced 
that he needed a new man for the job.130 McClellan had failed yet again to deliver a 
                                                 
127 Marvel, Lincoln’s Autocrat, 168-169, 229-231.  For details of Stanton’s courting of the Radicals and 
falling out with McClellan, see specifically Chapters 8-10, pages 148-233. 
 
128 Chase to Zachariah Chandler, 20 September 1862, in Niven, ed., Salmon P. Chase Papers, Vol. 3, 275. 
 
129 Chandler to Wife, July 1862, quoted in Marvel, Lincoln’s Autocrat, 211. 
 
130 The military and political factors surrounding McClellan’s final removal as commander of the Army of 
the Potomac are extensive and have generated a great deal of historical debate. A thorough examination of 
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stinging defeat to Lee’s army, which he outnumbered two to one. He remained out of 
step with Republicans on the issue of emancipation, which he did not believe should be a 
goal of the war, and he irked the Administration by consistently blaming his defeats on 
their supposed failure to cooperate with his plans. Throughout October, he continually 
submitted requests for more supplies and troops, while ignoring Lincoln’s prodding to 
advance.131 Lincoln grew increasingly frustrated with this, and on 13 October wrote 
McClellan a pointed letter stating, “You remember my speaking to you of what I called 
your over-cautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do 
what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in 
prowess, and act upon the claim?”132 McClellan finally got the Army of the Potomac 
moving at the end of October, but his glacial pace allowed Lee to block his advance.133 
Therefore, by the beginning of November, Lincoln felt that the general had outlived his 
usefulness; as Nicolay explained to his fiancée, “The President’s patience is at last 
                                                 
these factors would have to date back to at least the fall of 1861, and are beyond the scope of this study. 
Those who wish to learn more about this topic would do well to consult the several excellent biographies 
of McClellan, such as Stephen D. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (New York: Ticknor 
& Fields, 1988), and Ethan S. Rafuse, McClellan’s War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the 
Union (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2005). Illuminating primary source material 
pertaining to said topic is located in many sources, the most valuable of which are McClellan, McClellan’s 
Own Story; Sears, ed., Papers of George B. McClellan; Niven, ed., Salmon P. Chase Papers, Vol. 3; and 
Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vols. 5 and 6 (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1953). 
 
131 Marvel, Lincoln’s Autocrat, 250-258. 
 
132 Lincoln to McClellan, 13 October 1862, in Basler, ed., Collected Works, Vol. 5:1861-1862, 460-461. 
 
133 Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 8-9. 
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completely exhausted with McClellan’s inaction and never-ending excuses.”134 This 
meant that Lincoln had to once again cast his sights around for a new man to lead the 
Army of the Potomac.
                                                 
134 Nicolay to Therena Bates, 9 November 1862, in Burlingame, ed., With Lincoln in the White House, 90-
91. 
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CHAPTER V 
“THE LAST THING ON WHICH I WISH TO BE CONGRATULATED”: BURNSIDE 
TAKES COMMAND 
For Abraham Lincoln, selecting a general to lead the Army of the Potomac 
successfully had proved no easy task. By the fall of 1862, McClellan had failed to 
deliver results for the second time, and he would soon be cast aside like McDowell and 
Pope before him. Clearly, Lincoln had yet to find the right commander for the Union’s 
most prominent army, but as war-weariness grew in the North, the necessity for him to 
do so became more and more pronounced. Some of the conditions that made his decision 
of whom to place in that important command so difficult were not of his own making. 
Most notably, the vast expansion of the volunteer army at the start of the conflict meant 
that many officers rose to the rank of general very quickly, but none of these newly 
minted generals had previous experience handling or fighting large bodies of troops.1 
Because of this lack of experience with high command by all Union generals, Lincoln 
came to rely on two basic criteria for selecting a commander: public opinion and 
demonstrated success in the field. 
                                                 
1 The regular army at the start of the war was only 16,000 strong; by 1862, the Army of the Potomac had 
over 100,000 men. McPherson does well to point out that most officers, even those who had served in 
Mexico, knew little of strategic theory, due to the fact that the curriculum at West Point favored the study 
of engineering, fortification, and army administration. See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: 
The Civil war Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 331, and T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and 
His Generals (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 4-10. Williams bluntly asserts that, “There was not an 
officer in the first year of the war who was capable of efficiently administering and fighting a large army.” 
On the Union side, this problem would persist into the war’s second year. 
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 As historians such as Gary Gallagher and Kathryn Meier have pointed out, the 
fact that the Union was a democratic republic guaranteed links between citizens, politics, 
and military affairs. Throughout the course of the war, citizens in the North were fixated 
on military events, which dominated the attention of the press. One of the topics which 
captivated their attention most were changes in leadership in the national armies.2 
Lincoln well understood the extent to which the public followed the war; indeed, in his 
Second Inaugural Address, he acknowledged that, “The progress of our arms, upon 
which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself.” But he also 
understood the importance of swings in public opinion. As he had famously stated in one 
of his 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas, “Public sentiment is everything. With public 
sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed.” Therefore, “[H]e who 
molds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces 
decisions.”3 Given this stance, Lincoln could not afford, nor was he likely, to completely 
ignore how the public felt about certain generals’ aptness for command. 
 Lincoln’s own understanding of public sentiment was that it was (somewhat 
paradoxically) both heavily influenced and represented by the press. As Lincoln scholar 
                                                 
2 Gary Gallagher and Kathryn Meier, “Coming to Terms with Civil War History,” Journal of the Civil 
War Era 4, no. 4 (December 2014): 493-494. As one piece of evidence that citizens were obsessed with 
military affairs, the authors point to the fact that over 80% of Harper’s Weekly’s front page illustrations 
during the war years featured “military-related subjects and individuals.” Harper’s was one of the two 
leading American illustrated newspapers, along with Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper. 
 
3 “Second Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1865, in Roy P. Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 
Vol. 8: 1864-1865 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 332; “Lincoln-Douglas Debate 
at Ottawa,” 21 August 1858, in Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 3: 1858-1860, 27. 
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Harold Holzer makes clear, by the era of the Civil War, newspapers and politicians had 
become “mutually dependent and totally inseparable.”4 Developments such as Samuel 
F.B. Morse’s invention of the telegraph and the formation of the Associated Press 
(which the New York Times, Herald, and Tribune had all joined by 1850) allowed news 
to be distributed both faster and wider than ever before. One New York newspaper went 
so far as to term the AP “the most potent engine for affecting public opinion the world 
ever saw.”5 The national press was dominated by the New York papers, particularly 
Horace Greeley’s Republican Tribune, James Gordon Bennett’s Democratic Herald, and 
Henry J.  Raymond’s moderate-Republican Times, as well as two relatively new 
illustrated publications, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper and Harper’s Weekly. By 
1860, the Tribune had a circulation of nearly 200,000, with the Times not far behind. 
And while the Herald claimed only 84,000 subscribers, it had the widest European 
circulation of any American newspaper. Other papers routinely reprinted articles that 
originated in the New York newspapers, especially during the war years. For instance, 
the New York Tribune’s original report on the Battle of Antietam eventually appeared in 
1,400 papers nationwide.6 
                                                 
4 Harold Holzer, Lincoln and the Power of the Press (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), xvi. The 
analysis of Lincoln’s connections to the press in this work is heavily indebted to Holzer’s book. 
 
5 Holzer, Lincoln and the Power of the Press, 74, 146-147. 
 
6 Holzer, Lincoln and the Power of the Press, xxvii-xxviii, 198, 206, 303, 326. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated 
Newspaper was founded in 1852, Harper’s Weekly in 1857; by 1861, Harper’s claimed 200,000 
subscribers. For newspaper information and circulation numbers, see also J. Cutler Andrews, The North 
Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), 8-10, and Harold Holzer and 
Craig L. Symonds, eds., The New York Times Complete Civil War 1861-1865 (New York: Black Dog & 
Leventhal, 2010), 8-11. 
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 The influence of these newspapers only grew as the war gave Northern citizens 
an insatiable appetite for news from the front. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. expressed the 
general feeling when he stated, “We must have something to eat, and the papers to read. 
Everything else we can give up.”7 Due to this sentiment, the number of correspondents 
Northern newspapers sent to cover the war was larger than had ever been sent to the 
front in any nation up to that time. Historian J. Cutler Andrews identified 350 different 
Northern war correspondents, and many more probably existed; the three major New 
York papers all had around 20 war correspondents in the field at any given time. These 
papers spent large sums of money on this war coverage, and routinely included maps of 
the scenes of military action and sketches from the front so that citizens could both 
follow and feel more connected to the war effort.8 
 Therefore, it is not surprising that Lincoln paid heed to, and made an effort to 
cultivate, what the newspapers wrote. His belief in the power of the press to shape public 
opinion is illustrated by several incidents that took place before the war. While Lincoln 
served in Congress in 1848, he religiously read the New York Tribune, and began a 
correspondence with the already influential Greeley.9 Eleven years later, after his failed 
                                                 
7 Holmes Sr. quoted in Holzer, Power of the Press, 324. 
 
8 Andrews, North Reports the Civil War, 751-759; Holzer, Power of the Press, 324-329. The New York 
Herald later estimated that it spent between $500,000 and $750,000 on war coverage. Telling is Frank 
Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper’s description of its own publication as one which “brings home to everyone 
the history of the week, graphically illustrated and described…The war pictures are universally allowed to 
be the most truthful and interesting sketches every published of contemporary events, and form a complete 
gallery of this great crisis of our history.” See Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 29 November 1862. 
 
9 Holzer, Power of the Press, 96. Lincoln’s stepmother would later recall that he had been an avid reader 
of newspapers since the 1820s (see pages 5-6). 
 
 208 
 
run for Senate, and with his political career stalled, Lincoln attempted to enhance his 
prospects by bailing out a German-language weekly newspaper in his hometown of 
Springfield, the Illinois Staats-Anzeiger (“State Advertiser”). Though Lincoln never 
officially owned the paper, the contract he had the publisher sign stipulated that the 
paper would be shut down if it ever printed anything “designed to injure the Republican 
Party.” As Holzer explains, Lincoln “expected his reward solely in political capital,” as 
evidenced by the fact that he allowed the paper to go out of print after he won the 1860 
presidential election.10 Furthermore, Lincoln consistently called on editors of Illinois 
newspapers to curry favor and talk politics, and he subscribed to the Chicago Tribune 
and began corresponding with its Republican editor, Joseph Medill. Given all this 
evidence, it is no surprise that Lincoln’s law partner and close confidant William H. 
Herndon once remarked that Lincoln “never overlooked a newspaper man who had it in 
his power to say a good or bad thing of him.”11 
In fact, upon being elected President, Lincoln made John Nicolay his chief 
personal secretary in part because Nicolay had journalistic experience, having served 
both as the editor of the Pike County Free Press in Illinois, and as a correspondent for 
the Missouri Democrat.12 Throughout the war years, Lincoln consistently strove to 
maintain a good relationship with the press, particularly with the New York editors. 
                                                 
10 Holzer, Power of the Press, 186-192. 
 
11 Holzer, Power of the Press, xv, 202-204. Medill would later claim (according to Holzer, not 
implausibly) that Lincoln’s 1860 presidential campaign was “hatched in his newspaper’s own office.” 
 
12 Holzer, Power of the Press, 244-245. 
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When Bennett was initially critical of Lincoln’s call for 75,000 troops to put down the 
rebellion, Lincoln sent Republican politician and New York political boss Thurlow 
Weed to smooth talk Bennett into supporting the war. This tactic worked; Bennett 
thereafter assured Lincoln that the Herald would be “unconditionally for the radical 
suppression of the rebellion by force of arms, and would advocate and support any war 
measures by the Government.”13 Later that same month, when Raymond began 
condemning what he saw as a lack of supposed firmness on the part of the 
Administration, Lincoln invited the disgruntled editor to Washington and charmed him. 
The President even assented to some of Raymond’s patronage recommendations. For the 
remainder of the war, Raymond would remain firmly in Lincoln’s camp; Lincoln even 
began referring to him as “my Lieutenant General in politics.”14 
Clearly, Lincoln was well aware of the influence these editors wielded, through 
their shaping of public opinion, on military affairs. The premature Union advance on 
(and subsequent defeat at) Bull Run in the summer of 1861 was largely a result of the 
Northern public’s clamoring for action. This had been heavily influenced by Greeley, 
whose Tribune had, for eight straight weeks in the early summer of 1862, ran the banner 
headline “The Nation’s War Cry: Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond!”15 As 
                                                 
13 Bennett quoted in Holzer, Power of the Press, 304. 
 
14 Holzer, Power of the Press, 304-306. Raymond had printed an article in the New York Times in late 
April which read, “When we see results, we know that a hero leads. No such hero at present directs affairs. 
The experience of our Government for months past has been a series of defeats.” See New York Times, 25 
April 1861. 
 
15 For instance, see New York Tribune, 26 June 1861. 
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Weed later asserted, Greeley’s message had such a powerful effect that the editor 
essentially “assumed command of our armies.”16 This was a lesson Lincoln would not 
soon forget, and thereafter he attempted to obtain greater influence with the New York 
editors (mainly, through political patronage and public correspondence), and to use the 
press to help prepare the Northern public for his decisions, both on military matters and 
on emancipation.17 Clearly, Lincoln was not exaggerating when he concluded in 1864 
that “the press has no better friend than I am – no one who is more ready to 
acknowledge…its tremendous power for both good and evil.”18 
But Lincoln also made an ardent effort to gather his own war news. He haunted 
the War Department’s telegraph office, especially while his armies conducted active 
campaigns. As the manager of the office, David Homer Bates, explained, Lincoln 
“seldom failed to come over late in the evening before retiring, and sometimes he would 
stay all night… [He] almost lived at the telegraph office when a battle was in 
                                                 
16 Weed quoted in Holzer, Power of the Press, 314. 
 
17 The manner in which Lincoln prepared the Northern public in the summer of 1862 for his Emancipation 
Proclamation through his public correspondence with Greeley is illustrative of this. Lincoln knew his 
letters would be widely reprinted, and so he moved cautiously to link emancipation to the war effort and 
thus soften its blow for Democrats. Lincoln’s late August response to Greeley’s “Prayer of Twenty 
Millions” (which called for immediate emancipation) stated famously that “If I could save the Union 
without freeing any slave I would do it, and If I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I 
could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.” This message was well 
received in the North, even among those who were anti-emancipation. See “The Prayer of Twenty 
Millions,” New York Tribune, 20 August 1862, and Lincoln to Greeley, 22 August 1862, in Roy P. Basler, 
ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 5: 1861-1862 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 1953), 388-389. For a full discussion of how Lincoln used the press in relation to the emancipation 
issue, see Holzer, Power of the Press, Chapter 12: “Slavery Must Go to the Wall,” 376-415. 
 
18 Lincoln quoted in Andrews, North Reports the Civil War, 55. 
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progress.”19 And when bad news came in, Lincoln’s first thought was often of the public 
reaction. When the President learned of Hooker’s defeat at Chancellorsville, his friend 
Brooks, who had read Lincoln the news, described how he “walked up and down the 
room, saying: ‘My God! My God! What will the country say?’” Lincoln knew much of 
this information (that which was not overly sensitive in nature) would find its way into 
the papers, and therefore he wanted to get it first. As Bates makes clear, this was all a 
part of Lincoln’s “skillful leading of public opinion.”20 
 There are several instances in which Lincoln, or a member of his cabinet, 
explicitly made the connection between the press, public opinion, and military affairs in 
writing. Lincoln explained his later elevation of Hooker (despite Hooker’s intrigues for 
command) to Raymond by pointing out that Hooker “is stronger with the country today 
than any other man.”21 But in November 1862, Hooker’s popularity was not yet what it 
would become over the next few months. In fact, in the words of Secretary of the Navy 
Welles, it was Burnside who “would make an acceptable and popular” general.22 Lincoln 
himself could not have been more aware of the need for such a general. As he later 
                                                 
19 David Homer Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military 
Telegraph Corps during the Civil War (New York: The Century Co., 1907), 7, 42. 
 
20 Noah Brooks, Washington in Lincoln’s Time, ed. Herbert Mitgang (New York: Rinehart & Company, 
1958), 61; Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, 409. 
 
21 Lincoln quoted in A. Wilson Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud: The Army of the Potomac, 
December 16, 1862-January 26, 1863,” in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., The Fredericksburg Campaign: 
Decision on the Rappahannock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 211. 
 
22 Edgar T. Welles, ed., The Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. 1: 1861-1864 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1911), 182. 
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explained to Brooks, “I kept McClellan in command after I had expected that he would 
win victories, simply because I knew that his dismissal would provoke popular 
indignation and shake the faith of the people in the final success of the war.”23 But by 
the fall of 1862, it was just this lack of victories that was shaking the public faith, and so 
Lincoln resolved to find a new commander.  
Privately, Lincoln could complain that “the most trying thing of this war is that 
the people are sanguine; they expect too much at once,” but by this point in the war he 
could not afford to ignore the public’s expectations.24 After Antietam, Northern citizens 
and particularly the press began to despair of victory, due mainly to the ineffectiveness, 
and now inaction, of the Army of the Potomac. As the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
pointed out, “[A]nother winter of delay will be something terrible to contemplate.”25 
Greeley felt much the same way, and surely believed he was expressing the opinion of 
the Tribune’s 200,000 plus readers when he bemoaned the fact that “the country cannot 
endure another month’s inaction in our Armies…[the war] must be fought out speedily 
and resolutely or it will die out. Defeat will be a calamity, but delay is a ruin.”26  
                                                 
23 Brooks, Washington in Lincoln’s Time, 26. According to Brooks, Lincoln made this remark in April of 
1863. 
 
24 Lincoln made this statement to Brooks in June of 1864. Brooks, Washington in Lincoln’s Time, 138. 
 
25 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 31 October 1862, quoted in George C. Rable, Fredericksburg! 
Fredericksburg! (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 36. 
 
26 New York Tribune, 8 November 1862. Ironically, this article was printed the day after McClellan was 
removed from command, but before the news had reached the public. 
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Meanwhile, non-partisan Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper was consistently 
critical of “our slow-moving generals” (read, McClellan), and, in a possible attempt to 
grab the Administration’s attention, expressed its belief that “[n]ations, like individuals, 
are amenable to the sentiment of the community to which they belong. Disregard of that 
sentiment can only spring from ignorant and dangerous conceit or from blind 
recklessness.”27 Upset with the lack of a clear-cut victory at Antietam, the paper 
lamented that the Northern public was fighting the war “under a Government in which it 
has no confidence, and under generals whose incompetence has been proved so often as 
to become a scoff and a proverb” (again, this was primarily a shot at McClellan). In 
reference to public opinion, the paper believed that “the only thing that can shape it 
favorably [is] the success of our arms!” Therefore, it specifically recommended that 
Lincoln give the command to Burnside, and in doing so, “[I]nspire the nation anew.”28 
Just as telling of Burnside’s prominence at this juncture is the fact that even the pro-
McClellan Herald, while defending the general and arguing that he would soon be 
involved in active operations, admitted that “Burnside is one of our most successful and 
prominent officers.”29 
                                                 
27 “Summary of the Week” and “Maintaining the National Dignity,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 
11 October 1862. 
 
28 “The Requirements of the Nation,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 20 September 1862. 
 
29 “The Grand Review,” New York Herald, 7 October 1862. Also indicative of Burnside’s celebrity by 
November 1862 is the fact that Barnum’s American Museum had chosen to display a wax figure of him 
along with those of the nation’s “most distinguished national soldiers,” including Halleck, McClellan, and 
Commodore Henry Foote. See Barnum’s advertisement under “Amusements,” New York Tribune, 1 
November 1862. 
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Therefore, Lincoln needed to choose a general that demonstrated military ability 
and the will to act, but also had the confidence of the Northern people. As has been 
demonstrated, Burnside had a great deal of public support, but he also had something 
that almost no other Union general had - battlefield success in an independent command. 
 Though McClellan’s 7 January orders laid out the ultimate objectives of 
Burnside’s expedition (the capture of Roanoke, New Bern, and Beaufort), Burnside had 
a tremendous amount of discretion in planning and executing his movements. In fact, 
Burnside even had a great deal of leeway in assembling his Coast Division. He worked 
tirelessly to recruit the type of seafaring men he believed he needed for an amphibious 
operation (namely, troops from New England who had grown up or worked around the 
water), and it was he who had set about the task of securing ferry boats, steamers, and 
surf boats, as well as rations and arms, for his force.30 Once the expedition was in 
progress, Burnside did not rely on direct orders, but instead formulated his own plans 
and informed McClellan of their details after the fact. Burnside’s discretion is evident in 
McClellan’s letters, which, instead of directing movements, made statements such as “I 
think you are making the best use of your time.”31 Therefore, Burnside’s successes were 
                                                 
30 Correspondence relating to Burnside’s preparations for his expedition is found in RG 94, Ambrose E. 
Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folders 2 and 3, NA. Of particular interest are Burnside’s letters to the New York 
Arsenal and to U.S. transportation agent Lt. John Tucker, 9 December and 15 December 1861, 
respectively. For Burnside’s efforts to procure New England regiments, see William Marvel, Burnside 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 32-33. 
 
31 McClellan to Burnside, 19 April 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 1, Folder 6, NA. For 
evidence that Burnside would typically submit his plans and McClellan would approve them after the fact, 
see Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas to Burnside, 4 March 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, 
Box 1, Folder 5, NA. 
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largely and justifiably judged to be his own, as evidenced by the public’s strong 
identification of the victories directly with him. 
 By November 1862, there was no other Union general who had Burnside’s 
combination of popularity and battlefield success. This is, in fact, the greatest weakness 
of the historical criticisms of Burnside’s appointment: these historians consistently fail to 
offer the name of any general who was a better choice at the time. Castel bypasses the 
issue entirely; Catton claims that Hooker was the “individual hero” of the Battle of 
Antietam and that he “had reason” for thinking he was the man best suited to command 
the Army of the Potomac, but stops short of arguing that Hooker should have been 
elevated over Burnside.32 It is all too easy for historians who ignore Burnside’s North 
Carolina victories, such as Catton, to claim that Burnside “was never anything 
resembling a great general.” A similar opinion was evinced by Hassler, who pointed to 
Antietam as proof that Burnside had “glaring limitations” and was “probably the most 
incompetent of all the generals then serving with the Army of the Potomac.” 33 But it is 
inherently more difficult for these historians to demonstrate that Lincoln had a better 
option (which they fail even to attempt). The majority of other generals discussed for 
command by the Administration and the War Department, such as Hooker and Franklin, 
                                                 
32 Bruce Catton, Glory Road (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 6-7. As evidence that the Administration and 
the War Department thought highly of Hooker, Catton cites Hooker’s being commissioned a Brigadier 
General in the Regular Army after Antietam. 
 
33 Catton, Glory Road, 20; Warren W. Hassler Jr., Commanders of the Army of the Potomac (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 100-101; Warren W. Hassler Jr., General George B. 
McClellan: Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 322. 
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had never commanded more than a corps, and had never achieved any independent 
success. Furthermore, Franklin was a McClellan disciple, and Hooker was both junior in 
rank to Burnside and had damaged his reputation by being openly hostile to McClellan.34  
In actuality, the only other Union general who had won notable victories with an 
independent command was Grant. But despite the fact that Grant’s reputation had risen 
after his capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in February of 1862, it took a hard hit 
after the Battle of Shiloh in early April. Shiloh was viewed at the time as, at best, a 
bloody draw, and rumors had circulated in the press that Grant’s army had been caught 
by surprise (true) and that Grant had been drunk (false). General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, 
who served as an adviser to Stanton as well as Chairman of the War Board, wrote that 
Washington regarded Grant as “absolutely disgraced and dishonored” for being caught 
off guard.35 This situation was exacerbated by the fact that Halleck, Grant’s Department 
Commander, had submitted official complaints about Grant both before and after the 
battle. As McPherson concludes, “A hero after Donelson, Grant was now a bigger goat 
than Albert Sidney Johnston had been in the South after his retreat from Tennessee.”36 
                                                 
34 Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 182. Williams points out that, for reasons of army morale, Lincoln 
was hesitant to appoint a man such as Hooker, who was “an open enemy of the idolized ‘Little Mac’ 
[McClellan].” Thus, “Burnside was an ideal compromise” because he was not hostile to McClellan, but 
had operated largely independently of him. For additional evidence that Hooker’s reputation as an 
intriguer was well known to Lincoln, see Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 50. 
 
35 Hitchcock quoted in William Marvel, Lincoln’s Autocrat: The Life of Edwin Stanton (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 181. Marvel contends that Shiloh “resurrected lingering distrust 
in Grant.” 
 
36 Marvel, Lincoln’s Autocrat, 181-182; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 414; Williams also points out 
that it was General Halleck who claimed the lion share of credit for Grant’s victories. This was one of the 
reasons why Halleck was made general in chief in July 1862. See Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 
134-135. 
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All of this left Burnside as the logical choice for the command of the Army of the 
Potomac.37 
On the night of 7 November 1862, Burnside, who had retired early, was awoken 
by Catharinus P. Buckingham, Stanton’s Adjutant General. On orders from Lincoln, 
Stanton had summoned Buckingham to the War Department two days before and had 
handed him two envelopes, one addressed to Burnside and the other to McClellan. 
Buckingham arrived at Burnside’s headquarters in the village of Waterloo, Virginia on 
the Rappahannock River, by special train from Washington. The envelope Buckingham 
carried for Burnside contained General Orders No. 182, issued by the War Department 
and dated 5 November, which read: “By direction of the President of the United States it 
is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of 
the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take the command of that Army.” Stanton 
had instructed Buckingham to visit Burnside first; if Burnside steadfastly refused to take 
the command, Buckingham was to return to Washington without delivering the other 
envelope to McClellan.38 
                                                 
37 The few historians who do acknowledge this, such as Williams, McPherson, and Marvel, present either 
flawed or incomplete arguments. See the introduction to this paper for an overview of these author’s 
works. 
 
38 General Orders No. 182, 5 November 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 3, Folder 4, NA; 
Larned to Mrs. Burnside, 9 November 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol. 3: Correspondence, 25 
October 1862 – 16 July 1863, LOC; Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 179; Marvel, Burnside, 159-160; 
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For the third time, Burnside did attempt to refuse, citing his conviction that he 
was “under very great personal obligation to McClellan” and that it was poor military 
policy to change commanding generals “at this place and at this season of the year,” 
particularly as the army was beginning an active campaign.39 Buckingham then 
explained to Burnside that if he refused the command, it would go to Hooker, whom 
Burnside strongly disliked.40 When Burnside learned of this, he conferred with several 
members of his staff, including Parke and Lewis Richmond, for an hour and a half. What 
the tenor of the conversation was is unknown, but in the end Burnside did agree to take 
the command. He and Buckingham then mounted their horses in a driving snowstorm 
and rode to Salem, where they caught a military train for Rectortown, the site of 
McClellan’s headquarters. There they entered McClellan’s tent at 11:00 p.m. and found 
the general still awake and working.41 
McClellan would later claim that he divined the two men’s purpose immediately. 
To his credit, he surrendered the command gracefully, merely stating “[w]ell, Burnside, I 
turn the command over to you.” Privately, McClellan unsurprisingly felt that the change 
in commanders was a grave mistake; as he lamented to his wife, “Alas for my poor 
                                                 
39 Burnside to War Department, 9 November 1862, RG 94, Box 3, Folder 4, NA; Marvel, Burnside, 159; 
Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! 43. As Burnside later explained, “I then assumed the command in 
the midst of a violent snow-storm with the army in a position that I knew but little of.” 
 
40 Marvel claims that Burnside found Hooker “arrogant, devious, and dangerously selfish;” Rable that 
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Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 43. Rable refers to the threat that the command would go to 
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41 Marvel, Burnside, 160; Marvel, Lincoln’s Autocrat, 258-259; Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 179. 
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country!”42 True to character, Burnside behaved with great dignity during the visit, 
causing McClellan to express to his wife the belief that “[Burnside] never showed 
himself a better man or truer friend.” McClellan was also firmly convinced that Burnside 
was “as sorry to assume command as I am to give it up.”43 Indeed, one correspondent for 
Harper’s Weekly reported that Burnside, when congratulated by an acquaintance on 
receiving the command, remarked, “That, Sir, is the last thing on which I wish to be 
congratulated.”44 
McClellan did graciously consent to stay with the army for several days to help 
Burnside get his bearings. On 10 November, Burnside organized one last review of the 
army for the commander who was now ordered to retire to his home in Trenton, New 
Jersey. Men lined up in droves to bid farewell to McClellan, and cheered, wept, and 
broke ranks as the general passed by them; as he rode away, men were heard to yell, 
“Come back to us, come back to us McClellan!” That evening, McClellan was overcome 
by the men’s reaction, and wrote that “[t]he scenes of to-day repay me for all that I have 
endured.”45 
                                                 
42 George Brinton McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1887), 651-652. 
 
43 McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, 7 November 1862, and McClellan to Mary Burnside, 8 November 
1862, both in Stephen W. Sears, ed., The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected 
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44 “General Burnside,” Harper’s Weekly, 29 November 1862. 
 
45 “McClellan’s Farewell,” New York Herald, 12 November 1862; Marvel, Burnside, 161; Rable, 
Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 48; McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story, 661. The Herald’s article 
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In his farewell address, McClellan expressed his love and gratitude for an army 
he justifiably believed had grown up under his care. He concluded the address by 
exclaiming, “We shall also ever be comrades in supporting the Constitution of our 
country & the nationality of its people.”46 Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence to 
support the contention that a good number of soldiers in the army felt similarly and 
remained loyal to McClellan. Brigadier General John Gibbon was one such soldier, 
going so far as to state that, in removing McClellan, “The Government has gone mad.”47 
Nevertheless, many soldiers (and quite possibly some of the same soldiers) expressed 
great confidence in Burnside’s ability. Burnside delivered his first address to the Army 
of the Potomac on 9 November, the day he officially assumed command. In it he stated: 
Patriotism and the exercise of my every energy in the direction of this 
army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and men, 
will, I hope, under the blessing of God, ensure its success. Having been a 
sharer of the privations and a witness of the bravery of the old Army of 
the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified with them in 
their feeling of respect and esteem for General McClellan, entertained 
through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not 
as a stranger that I assume their command…With diffidence for myself, 
but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination 
of the gallant army now entrusted to my care, I accept its control with the 
steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail.48 
 
                                                 
46 McClellan to the “Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac,” 7 November 1862, RG 94, 
Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 3, Folder 4, NA. The date indicates that McClellan either penned this 
address immediately upon being notified of his removal from command, or backdated it. 
 
47 Gibbon quoted in Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 45. For the wide range of emotions related 
to McClellan’s removal, see pages 44-48. 
 
48 General Orders No. 1, 9 November 1862, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol 3: Correspondence, LOC. 
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On that very day, Burnside submitted a plan of campaign to the War Department.49 The 
Army of the Potomac, now his army, would soon begin to move, and soldiers, 
politicians, the press, and citizens alike could not help but express confidence in the new 
commander. 
 Those soldiers who knew Burnside best, like Larned, voiced the highest praise. 
When Burnside called his staff together to thank them for their service and tell them that 
he was still as approachable as ever, Larned came away deeply impressed. As he wrote 
to his brother-in-law, “Our general behaves like a hero, and every one of his staff admire 
him more than ever…There was not one [at the meeting] who would not gladly have told 
him how much they loved him.” But Larned also stated that the changing of 
commanders “increases my hopes of a rigorous & speedy termination of the war.”50 
Meanwhile, one of the commanders of Burnside’s naval vessels during the North 
Carolina expedition penned a letter to congratulate the general and remarked that “I have 
been anxious to see you placed in [command] ever since we parted at New Bern.” And 
from Rhode Island, Father Thomas Quinn, who was a chaplain during the expedition, 
did his best to convince Burnside that “anyone who has served with you, no matter in 
what capacity, must necessarily rejoice at your elevation.”51 While it is not surprising 
                                                 
49 Burnside to War Department, 9 November 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 3, Folder 4, 
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50 Larned to Brother-in-law Henry, 13 November 1862, and Larned to Mary Burnside, 9 November 1862, 
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that those who had been under Burnside’s command were happy to see him elevated, 
there were many soldiers who had no connection to the general who evinced the same 
sentiment. 
 Several soldiers in the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery are examples of this, and 
both based their beliefs in Burnside on his North Carolina victories. One private wrote 
home that all were satisfied with the new general and claimed “[t]here is more 
confidence felt in the army now than there was a month ago,” due to the opinion that 
“for what old ‘Burny’ undertakes to do, if let alone, he is pretty sure to accomplish.” 
Another commented that Burnside “tries more energetic than McClellan,” and expressed 
his conviction that Burnside would win in Virginia just as he had won in North 
Carolina.52 Around the same time, an officer in Hooker’s First Corps claimed that the 
19th Indiana was very pleased with Burnside’s promotion, despite the fact that 
Burnside’s primary rival for the command was Hooker himself. Other Indiana soldiers 
even wrote to their hometown newspapers expressing “great confidence in Gen. 
Burnside.”53 Even Herman Haupt, the Union’s railroad general, asserted, “I like 
Burnside very well…I feel more encouraged than I have for a long time.”54 Loyalty to 
                                                 
52 Lewis Bissell to Father, 13 November and 30 November 1862, in Mark Olcott and David Lear, eds., The 
Civil War Letters of Lewis Bissell (Washington, D.C.: The Field School Education Foundation Policy, 
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McClellan never fully died away among those in the Army of the Potomac, but as a war 
correspondent for the New York Herald summed up, while the army “lose McClellan 
with regret, they receive Burnside with satisfaction. He succeeds to their popularity as no 
other man could.”55 
 Members of Lincoln’s administration were more cautious in their optimism. 
Chase had preferred Hooker for the command, largely because Hooker had pandered to 
Radical Republicans in trying to attain the position. But he still believed that Burnside 
“has some excellent qualities and I hope too he may possess all that he needs for his 
trying post.” Welles too felt that Burnside was an acceptable choice, but worried that he 
might never become a great general. Nevertheless, he hoped that Burnside’s patriotism 
and character would be enough to improve the Union’s fortunes.56 Politicians outside of 
the Administration, however, were less restrained. Governors Sprague and Morton both 
wrote directly to Burnside to tender their congratulations. Morton applauded Burnside’s 
patriotism and “professional efficiency,” and assured him of “my high appreciation of 
your ability as a leader and entire confidence in your success in the execution of the 
important task committed to your hands.” Sprague, for his part, stated his belief that 
Burnside’s “well known energy, skill, and patriotism” would “secure confidence to a 
                                                 
55 “The Army of the Potomac: Our Warrenton Correspondence,” New York Herald, 14 November 1862. 
 
56 Chase to General Benjamin F. Butler, 14 November 1862, in Niven, ed., Salmon P. Chase Papers, Vol. 
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disheartened people, and lead them to expect active operations & the speedy success of 
our brave army in suppression of treason & rebellion.”57 
 Indeed, feelings of growing confidence were visible among the war-weary 
Northern public. A resident of New York sent Burnside a letter that stated, in no 
uncertain terms, that the news of Burnside’s acceptance of the command had “revive[d] 
the drooping spirits of those whose hearts are devoted to the triumph of our arms.” The 
writer felt confident in asserting, “I know that I express the general sentiment of the 
loyal people of the North, when I say that your ascension to your present high position, 
gave immediate confidence and hope to every friend of the National cause.”58 Letters 
also arrived from other states, such as Pennsylvania, one of which included a poem 
extolling Burnside’s virtues, and concluding with the lines “For Liberty will he 
stand/And fight the Rebels on sea & land/His motto shall ever be/Union, Union and 
Liberty.” This evidence points strongly to the fact that many citizens looked to Burnside 
with the hope that he would be the man to end this terrible war. As the sister of one of 
the soldiers in the Army of the Potomac explained, “To you under God we now look as 
our leader…O sir cannot this be brought to a close now?”59 
                                                 
57 Morton to Burnside, 22 November 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 3, Folder 5, NA; 
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 The high hopes of Northern citizens reflected the unrestrained optimism of the 
Northern press. One of the New York Tribune’s correspondents with the Army of the 
Potomac was elated that that army was now led “by a favorite General, of energy, 
daring, and promptness in following up victories.” In its own article covering 
McClellan’s removal from command, the New York Times pointed out to its readers that 
Burnside “has shown thus far during the war great military ability.”60 Harper’s Weekly 
too pointed to Burnside’s “brilliant triumphs” at Roanoke, Newbern, and Fort Macon to 
justify its belief that Burnside united “exalted character” and “the greatest military skill” 
with “dash, energy, and the prestige of success.” Therefore, the paper viewed Burnside’s 
appointment upon McClellan’s removal as simply “a matter of course,” as well as a 
“source of unmixed satisfaction.” Harper’s even insisted to its readers that Burnside’s 
appearance and temperament made him “the very beau-ideal of a soldier.”61 
If the Times and Harper’s Weekly were happy with the change in commanders, 
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper was overjoyed. The paper boldly announced to its 
readers that “Gen. Ambrose Burnside, the victor of Roanoke and Newbern, the soldier 
‘sans peur et sans reproche’ [“without fear and without reproach”], is commander of the 
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Army of the Potomac.” The paper acknowledged the difficulties Burnside faced, which 
it largely blamed on McClellan for wasting the autumn months. Now, Burnside would 
have to conduct a winter campaign, “[I]n which he must cross half a state, through the 
sodden soil of which McClellan never succeeded in penetrating so far as to be out of 
sight of the dome of the Capitol…[and] carry the flag of his country victoriously over 
fields whence it lately recoiled in dishonor.” Nevertheless the paper believed firmly, “Of 
one thing the nation may be sure – our army will not be permitted to waste away in 
inaction.”62 
 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper could not resist taking parting shots at 
McClellan, whom it seemed to blame almost entirely for the Union’s unhappy state of 
affairs. It even printed an epigram that read: “When driven back, from place to place/ 
’Twas wise in Mac, to change his base,” a scathing reference to McClellan’s retreat 
down the Virginia Peninsula in the summer of 1862. But the paper did more than 
disparage McClellan; it encouraged its readers to take hope, now that “a soldier is at last 
(and Heaven grant it may not be too late!) at the head of the Army of the Potomac.”63 
Unsurprisingly, William Lloyd Garrison’s abolitionist newspaper, The Liberator, 
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evinced similar sentiments. The paper contended that with the removal of McClellan and 
the elevation of Burnside, “A nightmare has passed from the Northern breast.” And like 
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, The Liberator put Burnside up as a man of action, 
as opposed to McClellan, whose strategy “has turned out to be like that of the frog in the 
well – jumping up two feet, and falling back three.”64 
 Bennett’s New York Herald, which supported McClellan to the end, was 
naturally upset that he had been removed from command. The Herald believed that 
McClellan “has fallen a victim to the machinations of the radical abolition faction” 
because of his “persistent refusal to make the cause of the Union secondary to the cause 
of negro emancipation,” and continued to blame the Administration for his supposed 
military failures. Yet it still believed that “[t]he promotion of General Burnside may 
prove to be a step in the right direction,” due to the fact that the general “has shown 
himself, in every position in which he has been tried, a courageous, energetic, and able 
officer. His operations in North Carolina, emblazoned with the victories of Roanoke 
Island, Newbern, and Fort Macon, have proved that his qualifications to conduct the 
invasion of a difficult, hostile country are of a high order.”65 The Democratic Herald, 
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like the Republican Times and the non-partisan Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 
and Harper’s Weekly, invoked memories of Burnside’s successful expedition to relay the 
message to its readers that Burnside was the right choice for the command of the Army 
of the Potomac. But the Herald also proved prophetic when it looked to the future. As 
the paper recognized, “General McClellan having been suspended on the charge of being 
too slow, General Burnside will understand that his policy is immediate action.”66 
 Despite the high hopes of the army, politicians, the people, and the press, 
Burnside’s tenure in command would not last three months. He quickly moved the army 
to Falmouth, with the intention of crossing the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg 
before Lee could get his army into position. Burnside arrived at Fredericksburg on 19 
November, but the pontoon trains that his plan called for were delayed for over a week. 
Burnside refused to cross without them, and by the time they reached his army, Lee had 
concentrated General James Longstreet’s and General Thomas Jackson’s corps and 
taken a commanding position on the heights on the opposite bank of the river. As 
Burnside explained to Halleck, “Had the pontoon bridge arrived even on the 19th or 20th 
the Army could have crossed with trifling opposition – but now the opposite side of the 
river is occupied by a large rebel force…I cannot make the promise of probable success 
with the faith that I did when I supposed that all the parts of the plan would be carried 
out.”67 Having been put in command in part as a result of McClellan’s constant foot-
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67 For Burnside’s initial plan and the failure of the pontoon bridges to reach the army in a timely manner, 
see Burnside to War Department, 9 November 1862, RG 94, Ambrose E. Burnside Papers, Box 3, Folder 
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dragging, Burnside felt that he had to attack regardless. On 11 December, in the words 
of Nicolay, Burnside “let slip his dogs of war” at Fredericksburg, thus sparking a battle 
which was to last three days.68 
 Meanwhile, the Northern press’ opinion of Burnside and his initial movements 
was almost wholly positive. Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper admitted that 
Burnside had encountered difficulties, but thought they were “not greater than those 
overcame by persistence and energy in his celebrated expedition to Roanoke and 
Newbern.”69 The New York Times believed that “[n]o general ever had a firmer hold of 
his men; few armies ever had greater devotion to their leader,” and agreed with 
Burnside’s military movements, claiming that “the proper route to Richmond [is] by 
Fredericksburg.”70 And from the Army of the Potomac, a New York Tribune 
correspondent claimed that Burnside had “inspired the army to a marvelous extent” by 
his swift movements. As the correspondent made clear, “[T]he old formula of ‘All quiet 
along the lines’ is among the things that were.”71 
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 Even though the New York Herald had consistently defended McClellan’s 
movements, it concurred with the view of the other papers, asserting, “In every point of 
view the present movements for Richmond are immeasurably stronger and better 
organized than those of last spring.” Furthermore, the Herald’s special correspondent 
with the Army of the Potomac relayed that he found “on every side the greatest 
willingness to push on, and the most unbounded confidence in the…new commander.” 
As Burnside provided more and more evidence that he was a “live” general, the 
correspondent became more and more convinced that “[t]he prospect of an early and 
crushing defeat of the rebels was never so good as now.” He finished by stating that he 
hoped he would soon be writing back to the Herald from Richmond.72 
Despite all of this optimism, by all accounts the Battle of Fredericksburg, fought 
on 11-13 December, was a disaster for the Army of the Potomac. Before the attack took 
place, a Confederate cavalry officer asserted his belief that “it is a mere question of how 
many dead [Burnside] will leave for us to bury.”73 In fact, Burnside would leave over 
1,200 Union soldiers dead on the field. All told, the army suffered around 12,600 
casualties to the Confederacy’s 5,300 in attempting to dislodge Lee’s forces from 
perhaps the strongest position they ever held. Burnside’s effort to use Franklin’s Grand 
Division to turn the right of Lee’s line failed, as did futile Union charges up Marye’s 
                                                 
72 “The Army of the Potomac,” New York Herald, 19 November 1862; “News from Burnside’s Army,” 
New York Herald, 21, 22, and 23 November 1862. For additional evidence that public confidence in 
Burnside remained high, see Chapter 9: “Preparations,” in Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 143-
155. 
 
73 Confederate officer quoted in Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 147. 
 
 231 
 
Heights.74 On 14 December, Burnside’s corps commanders persuaded him against 
leading a final charge up the heights in person, and, on 15 December, choking back 
tears, the general ordered the Army of the Potomac to retreat back across the 
Rappahannock.75 
Both Lincoln and the Northern public were greatly disheartened by Burnside’s 
defeat. In a rare moment of despair on 18 December, Lincoln confided to a friend, “We 
are now on the brink of destruction. It appears to me the almighty is against us, and I can 
hardly see a ray of hope.”76 Meanwhile, journalist Brooks described how in Washington, 
there were “signs of woe on every hand,” and lamented that “the great heart of the nation 
was oppressed with discouragement and anxiety.”77 Northern newspapers produced a 
string of panicked editorials; as Harper’s Weekly pronounced, “We are indulging in no 
hyperbole when we say that these events are rapidly filling the heart of the loyal North 
with sickness, disgust, and despair.” This grew so bad that the War Department 
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attempted to prevent newspaper correspondents with the army from telegraphing any 
further details of the battle. Many of the papers, however, pointed the finger not at 
Burnside but at Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck, who they believed had forced Burnside 
into the attack. When Burnside learned of this, he immediately decided to, in his words, 
“[P]ut a stop to that.”78 As he reportedly stated to a fellow officer, “I understand 
perfectly well that when a General meets with disaster, he alone is responsible; and I will 
not attempt to shift that responsibility upon anyone else.”79 
In an 18 December meeting with the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
Burnside indeed took full blame for the defeat; he did the same in a letter to Halleck in 
which he stated: 
To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus re-
crossing [the Rappahannock] in the face of the enemy I owe everything. 
For the failure in the attack I am responsible…The fact that I decided to 
move from Warrenton on to this line, rather against the opinion of the 
President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you left the whole 
movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me 
responsible.80 
                                                 
78 For instance, see “The Reverse at Fredericksburg,” Harper’s Weekly, 27 December 1862, and “News 
from the Rappahannock,” New York Herald, 19 December 1862. In the latter article, one of the Herald’s 
correspondents with the Army of the Potomac stated, “Nobody hereabout believes that General Burnside 
made the movement across the Rappahannock on his own responsibility and judgment.” See also “The 
Situation,” New York Herald, 17 December 1862, which stated, “It is but just, perhaps, to General 
Burnside to say that the advance movement upon Fredericksburg was not undertaken in accordance with 
his own judgment, but was peremptorily ordered by the military authorities in Washington, who, of 
course, are alone responsible for the result.”; Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 325, 351. 
 
79 New York Tribune, 24 December 1862. The quote was relayed by the Tribune’s correspondent with the 
Army of the Potomac, who allegedly overheard the conversation. 
 
80 Burnside to Halleck, 17 December 1862, Ambrose E. Burnside Collection, Box 1, Folder 3, RIHS; “The 
Army of the Potomac,” New York Herald, 23 December 1862. The Herald termed this letter “very 
remarkable, very curious, very generous, and very naïve.”; See also Rable, Fredericksburg! 
Fredericksburg!, 349-352, and Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud,” in Gallagher, ed., The 
Fredericksburg Campaign, 173. 
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Burnside contrived the letter after a 20 December meeting with Lincoln, in which 
Lincoln expressed great thanks that the general was willing to take some of the 
responsibility from the President’s shoulders. Burnside backdated the letter 17 December 
and Lincoln and Stanton had it sent to the Associated Press; it was thereafter reprinted in 
several Northern newspapers, including the New York Times, New York Tribune, and 
New York Herald.81 The Herald in particular devoted a great deal of attention to the 
letter, complimenting Burnside for “accepting the whole responsibility” for the defeat, 
but also stating that the letter “evidences the generosity of the writer’s nature with more 
force than it does his judgment as a military commander.”82 
 Unfortunately, the remainder of Burnside’s stay at the head of the Army of the 
Potomac did not go much better. While several generals, including Hooker, attempted to 
increase the now growing discontent with Burnside in Washington, Burnside worked 
hard on plans for another campaign. As he explained to his old assistant adjutant general 
from the North Carolina expedition, “Not withstanding my late reverse I hope by God’s 
help to, yet, do something for our noble cause.” His efforts to do so, however,  
culminated in the disastrous “Mud March” of 20-23 January 1863, in which abysmal 
                                                 
81 New York Times, 23 December 1862; “From General Burnside’s Army – Letter from Major-Gen. 
Burnside,” New York Tribune, 23 December 1862; “General Burnside’s Report on the Fredericksburg 
Disaster,” New York Herald, 23 December 1862; Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 351-352, 559 
n. 61. 
 
82 “The Situation,” New York Herald, 23 December 1862. Likewise, the New York Tribune opined that 
“[s]uch a man may not be a Napoleon; but he is at least great in his moral courage and his integrity.” See 
New York Tribune, 24 December 1862. 
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weather mired the Army of the Potomac in mud one soldier referred to as “ass deep,” 
and eventually forced the army to return to camp.83 By this point, many soldiers had 
little faith left in Burnside, though some believed his failure was not totally of his own 
making. As one in the 100th Pennsylvania put it, “We think Burnside did all he could 
do… [He] appeared much like Washington to the troops that knew him best.” But on 25 
January, Lincoln relieved Burnside of command and put Hooker in his place.84 As 
Larned wrote, “Thus endeth the drama of ‘Burnside and the Army of the Potomac.’”85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Hooker traveled to Washington in early January, where he made known to anyone who would listen his 
lack of faith in Burnside and his own suitability for the command. Meanwhile, Franklin, according to First 
Corps Artillery Chief Charles S. Wainwright, “[T]alked so much and so loudly…that he has completely 
demoralized his whole command.” For a thorough analysis of the intrigues against Burnside, the 
worsening state of morale in the Army of the Potomac, and the Mud March, see Rable, Fredericksburg! 
Fredericksburg!, Chapters 23-24, pages 389-426; Burnside to Lewis C. Richmond, 12 January 1863, Box 
2, Folder 5, RIHS. 
 
84 Soldier quoted in Greene, “Morale, Maneuver, and Mud,” in Gallagher, ed., The Fredericksburg 
Campaign, 213. Greene’s chapter is a perceptive analysis both of the state of the Army of the Potomac 
after Fredericksburg, and of various generals’ intrigues to get Lincoln to remove Burnside from command. 
See also Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 419-422. 
 
85 Larned to Mrs. Burnside, 28 January 1863, Daniel Reed Larned Papers, Vol 3: Correspondence, LOC. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: “THE HADES OF LOST REPUTATIONS” 
While the Battle of Fredericksburg was raging, Welles wrote in his diary that 
“Burnside is on trial.”86 Burnside certainly has been on trial among historians, as has 
Lincoln for appointing him. But so far the testimony has been mostly one-sided. 
Historians such as Catton, Castel, and Hassler have excoriated Lincoln for giving 
command of the Army of the Potomac to a general they believe had little or no military 
ability. This opinion is predicated largely on the disastrous results of Fredericksburg, and 
to a certain extent on a flawed understanding of Burnside’s actions at the Battle of 
Antietam. In fact, the Richmond Daily Dispatch, a popular Confederate newspaper, 
proved remarkably prescient when it asserted in late November 1862 that, should 
Burnside be defeated at Fredericksburg, he would “enter the Hades of lost reputations.”87 
Indeed, the large majority of existing historiography that pertains to Burnside receiving 
command of the Army of the Potomac indicates that this is precisely what has happened. 
 In fact, this backwards reading of history began almost before the blood had 
frozen on the fields of Fredericksburg. A week after Burnside’s defeat, the New York 
Herald lashed out against Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck for appointing Burnside to the 
command of the Army of the Potomac. Although the Herald admitted that Burnside had 
                                                 
86 Entry for 14 December 1862, in Edgar T. Welles, ed., The Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. 1: 1861-1864 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 192. 
 
87 Richmond Daily Dispatch, 19 November 1862, quoted in George C. Rable, Fredericksburg! 
Fredericksburg! (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 79. 
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been successful at Roanoke, New Bern, and Beaufort, it contended that “the highest 
number of men under his command was 20,000 and it does not follow that he would be 
equally fortunate with an army numbering 50,000 or 75,000 men, much less that he 
would be equal to the task of commanding so large an army as that which he hurled 
against the enemy entrenchments at Fredericksburg.” Though Burnside took the blame 
for the defeat, the Herald believed that this “does not exonerate from responsibility to 
the people those who appointed General Burnside,” because “they had no proof that he 
was capable of leading in battle an army of 150,000 men.”88 
 In actuality, Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck had no proof that any Union general 
(including McClellan) was capable of successfully leading so large an army, and so they 
had to go with the best choice available. But the Herald was further deceitful in its 
pretended ignorance of the fact that it had, prior to the battle, fully believed that the best 
choice was Burnside. On 13 November, the paper had stated unequivocally that 
Burnside’s “admirably managed and eminently successful campaign in North Carolina 
furnishes many evidences of his good qualities as a military leader…We are entirely 
satisfied…that General Burnside is the best selection that could have been made to fill 
the place of General McClellan.” The Herald went so far as to conclude that “[n]ever did 
the Union cause look more promising nor that of the rebellion more hopeless.”89 Yet a 
month later, after Burnside had been defeated, there was no talk of North Carolina or of 
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Burnside’s attributes or accomplishments; instead, there was merely a stinging rebuke of 
those who elevated a general who, supposedly, lacked the qualifications to command. 
Historians have primarily echoed the Herald’s post-Fredericksburg, as opposed 
to pre-Fredericksburg, assessment of Burnside. These assertions of Burnside’s unfitness 
for command by Catton, Hassler, Castel, and others, however, wholly ignore both 
Burnside’s earlier successes in North Carolina, and the Northern public’s, the army’s, 
the Administration’s, and, perhaps most importantly, the press’s reaction to them. After 
Burnside’s victories in North Carolina, many Union soldiers, Northern citizens, the 
Northern press, and even members of Lincoln’s cabinet became firmly convinced that 
Burnside was the right man to lead the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln could not afford to 
ignore these varied sentiments, most of all that which emanated from the press and did 
so much to shape public expectations of the war effort. As his personal secretary John 
Hay explained, “There has never been an age so completely enthralled by newspapers as 
this. They have begun to be taken as the absolute reflex of the will of the people and the 
earnest thought of a nation.”90 
By November 1862, the press (and therefore, in Lincoln’s mind, the public), 
thought Burnside should be the next commander of the Army of the Potomac. Thus, 
once the ultimate decision was made to remove McClellan, Burnside was undoubtedly 
the logical choice for command, given both his popularity and his record of battlefield 
                                                 
90 Hay quoted in Harold Holzer, Lincoln and the Power of the Press (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
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success. Indeed, after he had been removed from the command in late January 1863, the 
New York Times explained just what the country had seen in the general: “He had a 
reputation for activity, courage, skill, hearty devotion to the cause, and honest greatness, 
excelled by no man in the army. Above all, he had the prestige of success.”91 
Linking Burnside’s campaign in North Carolina to the Northern reaction to both 
the victories and the general himself demonstrates exactly why Lincoln elevated 
Burnside. Historians who have ignored these victories or given them only passing 
attention misrepresent the factors Lincoln took into account when he made this decision. 
Like all wartime presidents, Lincoln weighed many influences, ranging from his own 
military judgment to public sentiment. To gloss over these is to unfairly judge from 
hindsight the difficult and all important job of Commander in Chief. In the case of 
Burnside, Lincoln’s own estimation of the general’s capabilities actually mirrored what 
Northern newspapers and citizens were saying about him. Lincoln, the Northern public, 
and even the Confederacy (as evidenced by the widespread fear in North Carolina and 
Virginia and Davis’s first use of martial law) recognized Burnside’s string of victories as 
highly significant. In light of this, many Northerners thought Burnside the best hope to 
save the Union. To downplay or ignore this is to distort the realities under which 
wartime presidents are forced to operate. 
 The overall point is not that Burnside was the best Union general, or even that he 
was a better general than McClellan. It is, rather, that if one reads Lincoln’s decision to 
                                                 
91 “The Change of Commanders,” New York Times, 27 January 1863. 
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appoint Burnside to the command in the context of what happened prior to November 
1862, and not in the context of what happened thereafter, Burnside was the natural 
choice. The fact that Burnside ultimately failed to win a victory at the head of the Army 
of the Potomac does not change this fact. Events would prove that Burnside did not have 
the ability to defeat Lee on the battlefield or to adroitly play politics with those in 
Washington who could unmake a general as fast as they elevated him. But as Burnside 
observed upon being removed from command, the Administration and the War 
Department would “find out before many days that it is not every man who can 
command an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men.”92 Hooker’s own subsequent 
failings at the Battle of Chancellorsville provided a bloody illustration of this truth. 
As the noted military historian Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “In war, as in life generally, 
all parts of a whole are interconnected and thus the effects produced…must influence all 
subsequent military operations. Their possible influence on events has to be established 
and allowed for.”93 It is time that historians recognize the influence that Burnside’s 
victories in North Carolina, and the public attention devoted to those accomplishments 
and to the general himself, had on his ascension to the command of the Army of the 
Potomac 
 
                                                 
92 Burnside to Colonel of the 7th Rhode Island, quoted in Rable, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!, 423. 
 
93 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 158-159. 
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